Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witness by Freedman, Ann E.
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 17
2003
Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases:
Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for
Compassionate Witness
Ann E. Freedman
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Freedma, Ann E. "Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate
Witness." American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law 11, no. 2 (2003): 567-656.
FREEDMAN_PKFINAL5.DOC 6/9/03 1:36 PM
567
FACT-FINDING IN CIVIL DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES: SECONDARY




I. The Fact-Finding Gap and the Complexity of
Fact-Finding Needs ............................................................................ 577
A. Inadequate Fact-Finding Resources and
Practices in Family Courts.................................................................. 577
B. Challenging Cases That are Difficult to Resolve................. 580
C. Overview of the Situation in Civil Proceedings
Involving Domestic Violence.......................................................... 583
II. The Implications of Concentrating on Criminal
Law and High Profile Cases............................................................... 587
III. Additional Structural and Attitudinal Obstacles to
Addressing the Fact-finding Gap....................................................... 592
                                                          
∗  Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law—Camden; B.A., Harvard
University 1968; J.D., Yale Law School, 1971; co-founder, Women’s Law Project,
Philadelphia, PA.  Many thanks to Ann Shalleck for organizing this symposium and
to my deans, colleagues, and students at Rutgers Law School – Camden who have
supported the teaching, scholarship and activism out of which this Article grows.  I
would also like to express my appreciation for the comments and support of Susan
Bandes, Sally Goldfarb, Diana Griffith, Linda Jeffrey, Betti Kahn, Judy Kleppel,
Marilyn Lammert, Alan Lerner, Louise Lumen, Erin Minta, Ruth Anne Robbins,
Maxine Vogt and Linda Wharton.  Special thanks to Joan Meier for her pathbreaking
work on counter-transference and for our colleagueship and nourishing
collaborations over the years, including the rich synergy of our articles in this
symposium, and to JoAstrid Glading for inspiring me with her friendship, and for
reading and editing  every draft and testing these ideas in her own work.  I am
grateful to my teachers and supporters Barbara Babcock, David Crump, Thomas
Emerson, Martha and Stanley Freedman, Talia Malka, Eleanor Holmes Norton,
Jason Shulman and Tacie Vergara, and to Clare Dalton, Charles Figley, Linda
Gordon, Judith Lewis Herman, Byron Katie, Demie Kurz, Philip Lichtenberg, Jean
Baker Miller, Jean Koh Peters, Susan Deller Ross, Susan Schechter, Elizabeth
Schneider, Reva Siegal, Evan Stark and other pioneers whose work made this Article
possible.  Finally, I want to acknowledge Rand Rosenblatt for his faith and deep
engagement in my work, and for building with me a life of richness and passion in
which work and play are balanced and grace and joy are abundant.
1
Freedman: Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumati
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2003
FREEDMAN_PKFINAL5.DOC 6/9/03  1:36 PM
568 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 11:2
A. The Prohibitive Cost of Legal Services................................ 593
B. The Pro-Settlement Bias of Family Courts .......................... 594
C. The Cumulative Impact of the Fact-Finding Gap and
Other Circumstances on People Struggling with
Domestic Violence.......................................................................... 597
D. Prospects for Fundamental Change.................................... 601
IV. Compassionate Witnessing as a Resource for Change........... 604
A. Compassionate Witnessing and the Problem of
Bystander Reactivity........................................................................ 609
1.Psychological Perspectives on How People
Cope with Distress ....................................................................... 609
2. An Introduction to the Concept of Compassionate
Witnessing.................................................................................... 612
3.Components of Compassionate Witnessing Practice ............. 614
B. Compassionate Witnessing and the Legal System:
The Role of Restorative Justice and Peacemaking in
Responding to Atrocities ................................................................ 624
1.  Teachings from Traumatic Stress Studies.......................... 624
2. The Transformative Potential of Compassionate
Witnessing in the Legal System .................................................. 627
3.  Compassionate Witnessing, Children’s Needs and the
Legal System ................................................................................ 633
C.  Compassionate Witnessing and Systemic Change............. 637
1.  The Logic and Resilience of Legal System Patterns .......... 637
2. Honoring and Challenging Strategies of
Disconnection ............................................................................. 640
3.   The Eighth and Ninth Components of Compassionate
Witnessing: Creating Community and




This symposium in response to Elizabeth Schneider’s invaluable
book, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking, is an excellent occasion
for drawing attention to two striking features of domestic violence law
and practice.  The first is the troubling inadequacy of fact-finding
resources1 in civil domestic violence proceedings, particularly in cases
                                                          
1. The phrase “inadequate fact-finding resources” refers to the combined
effects of resource deficiencies and troubling practices.  These include, for example,
inadequate or no legal representation for clients with complex claims;
overburdened, inexperienced, or poorly trained judges; and informal, rushed, often
very brief legal hearings.  See infra Part I; infra Part III.  The term “civil proceedings”
2
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involving children.  This inadequacy means that even with progressive
laws and promising remedies, justice and assistance for victims of
domestic violence and their children are often out of reach.
The second striking feature is the high proportion of civil domestic
violence cases that are murky and difficult, in part as a result of these
cases’ high degree of particularity.  By the latter phrase, I mean that
domestic violence family cases include a strikingly diverse variety of
life circumstances, patterns of behavior, and needs for social support
and legal intervention.  This variety is coupled with unusual
challenges in the gathering, presentation, and sifting of evidence.
Finally, domestic violence cases, like many family matters, are
primarily concerned with shaping and predicting the future on the
basis of evidence about the past and the present.  For this and other
reasons, the correct outcome is more difficult to discern and may be
more uncertain than in most other court cases.  Even the concept of
“outcome” is more ambiguous in these cases.  While court judgments
mark the end point of many legal disputes, both domestic violence
and child maltreatment cases often require longer term judicial
oversight and extended social services.  As one litigator remarked, in
effect, these cases begin rather than end with a judge’s ruling.2  The
result is that many cases pose significant fact-finding challenges.
When cases are complex, the deficiencies of fact-finding resources
have even more devastating consequences, because there is a sharp
decrease in the odds of getting the accurate results that facilitate
constructive support to adults and children who need it.  Thus, the
more difficult and confusing the cases, the more elusive the goal of
providing appropriate civil remedies and other social assistance to
victims and their children.
While addressing the fact-finding gap would not be a panacea, it
would make an important difference to troubled families and
                                                          
is used for all proceedings in family court and for civil restraining (or protective)
order hearings, although child abuse and neglect (dependency) proceedings are
only occasionally discussed.  Criminal proceedings brought to enforce civil
restraining orders are also included.
2. Telephone Interview with Alan Lerner, Practice Professor of Law, University
of Pennsylvania Law School (Feb. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Lerner Interview].  The
need for monitoring and support on an ongoing basis is more widely reflected in
system design in dependency courts than it is in either criminal or civil domestic
violence matters, although domestic violence advocates and researchers have
certainly demonstrated the need for such measures.  For recent documentation of
the importance in domestic violence practice of ongoing judicial oversight and
intensive follow up with both victims and perpetrators of abuse, see EDWARD W.
GONDOLF, BATTERER INTERVENTION SYSTEMS 174-75, 191, 214-18 (2002).  See also
LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, BATTERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 185-87 (2002) (discussing protocol and the
need for intensive follow up) and infra note 199.
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children because the legal system has something worthwhile to offer.
When the innovative legal remedies in civil domestic violence cases
which have been developed over the last few decades are properly
deployed, victims of violence and their children benefit.3  From this
perspective, the paucity of fact-finding resources in family courts to
address the complex, urgent dilemmas presented and craft
appropriate legal and social responses is tragic.4
The consequences for children of inadequate fact-finding
resources in family matters, particularly in cases potentially involving
domestic violence and child maltreatment, are especially severe.  As
compared to adults, children have far less capacity and dramatically
fewer resources to handle dangerous, abusive or painful situations in
their own families.  Children usually cannot escape, cannot readily
access external sources of support, and are not developmentally able
to make sense of these experiences on their own.  The negative
impacts on children when domestic violence is inflicted on a parent
are well documented, and there is a high correlation between such
violence and direct physical and emotional abuse of children.5
The legal system in effect abandons children both when the
protective efforts of one parent are not supported and when there
are no direct supports for children in harmful family situations whose
parents do not seek outside assistance for themselves or their
children.6  The failure to respond to the needs of children in the
                                                          
3. Intelligent application of existing legal remedies substantially reduces safety
risks to victims of abuse and their children, especially when initial legal intervention
is followed up effectively and combined with other forms of social support.  See
GONDOLF, supra note 2, at 202-03.  For both civil restraining orders and arrest
followed by criminal prosecution, the available evidence suggests that the deterrent
effect of legal intervention may be as high as a one-third to one-half reduction in
subsequent acts of violence.  See, e.g., CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER,
BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 558-59, 637 (2001) (reporting social science
research); GONDOLF, supra note 2, at 22-23, 201 (reporting results of a sophisticated
four city evaluation of high-end batterer intervention programs).  A recent study
suggests that “in predicting long-term rates of domestic violence, the only public
service variable that mattered is access to legal services.”  Lou Marano, Access to Legal
Aid Lowers Domestic Abuse, UPI, Jan. 8, 2002 (reporting on a study conducted by two
economists, Amy Famer and Jill Tiefenthaler), available at http://www.upi.com/
view.cfm?StoryID=20030108-024530-2063r; see also Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler,
Access to Legal Aid Lowers Domestic Abuse, 21 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 158 (2003).
4. An implicit premise of this account is that issues of this importance and
difficulty deserve the investment of time, attention and resources that would
maximize the possibilities of accurate fact-finding in particular cases and in general.
5. For a review of both types of evidence, see DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note
3, at 240-66; see also BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 2, at 29-129 (examining
various harmful effects on children having a battering parent); id. at 42-47 (reviewing
evidence on correlation between domestic violence and child abuse).  See also infra
note 179.
6. In severe cases, the legal system requires and encourages other adults, e.g.,
teachers and health professionals who become aware of the children’s difficulties, to
4
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 17
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol11/iss2/17
FREEDMAN_PKFINAL5.DOC 6/9/03  1:36 PM
2003] SECONDARY TRAUMATIC STRESS 571
context of domestic violence has serious negative effects on
children’s lives during childhood and in adulthood.7
It is important to note that the well-being of children is directly
related to the well-being of the adults who care for them.  Unless
protective resources for adults experiencing domestic violence are
widely available, children suffer.8  The lack of adequate fact-finding
resources and practices means, among other things, that even when a
family member seeks assistance from the courts, there is a high
likelihood of one of three outcomes: no one will make adequate
inquiry into the children’s circumstances; the legal system will fail to
respond effectively to harm and threats of harm; or children will
suffer as a result of bungled intervention.9  In fact, as Joan Meier
explains, despite general improvements in domestic violence law and
practice, the most egregious fact-finding gaps and failures in civil
domestic violence matters tend to occur when parenting
arrangements are at issue.10
While related weaknesses in domestic violence law11 and practice12
                                                          
report the situation to the child welfare system.  The suggestion here is that direct
supports for children, not conditioned on contact with the child welfare system, are
also urgently needed. See infra Part IV.B.3.
7. For reviews of the evidence of effects of childhood abuse during childhood
and in the longer term, see B. B. Robbie Rossman, Longer Term Effects of Children’s
Exposure to Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF CHILDREN 35
(Sandra A. Graham-Bermann & Jeffrey L. Edleson eds., 2001); JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN,
TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 110-14 (1992) [hereinafter HERMAN, RECOVERY] (reviewing
the evidence of effects of childhood abuse on adults).
8. See DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 250-66; BANCROFT & SILVERMAN,
supra note 2 at 190.  Of course, additional resources for children’s and families’
needs (education, health care, housing, child care, income support) are also
necessary.  See, e.g., RUTH SIDEL, KEEPING WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST, AMERICA’S WAR
ON THE POOR 141-65 (2d ed. 1998); BETSY MCALISTER GROVES, CHILDREN WHO SEE TOO
MUCH 133-35 (2002); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE 268-70 (2002).
9. Practices and problems vary somewhat from one part of the legal system to
another.  For example, the child welfare system must investigate claims of child
abuse and neglect, though the system may or may not treat intimate violence against
a parent as a reason to investigate. (Of course, if the child welfare system is
functioning poorly overall, adding domestic violence to the caseload without other
reforms is not necessarily a good idea.)  Civil domestic violence proceedings typically
lead to inquiry into the risk to the children only if the adult victim of abuse raises the
issue, and the resulting risk assessments are rarely done according to child welfare
system standards.  In any event, despite the valiant efforts of many people, the
majority of jurisdictions are not yet doing an adequate job either on fact-finding or
in their overall response to domestic violence and child maltreatment cases.
10. See Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection:
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 657, 660, 667, 675-716 (2003).
11. See infra notes 57-58 for examples of recent reforms in applicable criminal
and civil legal standards and related police and prosecutorial policies.
12. See infra notes 58, 183, 185, and 199 for discussion of recent efforts to
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have been the focus of sustained inquiry and reform, I have been
surprised to discover that the inadequacy of fact-finding resources
and practices in the face of great and urgent need has largely
remained in the background of scholarly and activist conversations.13
As a result, I have become curious about two questions.  The first is
what caused the relative obscurity in domestic violence discourse of
the fact-finding gap in these cases.  The second inquiry concerns
measures that might reduce the gap and improve outcomes for
victims of domestic violence and children.
At one level, there is no mystery about why there is a fact-finding
gap.  Businesses, large corporations and the wealthy have more
resources, both individually and collectively, which makes it easier for
them to get attention paid to their fact finding needs.  In contrast,
high volume matters involving low or moderate-income people,
particularly those involving women’s and children’s issues, are likely
to get “mass processing” by “street level bureaucrats.”14  The fact-
finding gap in civil domestic violence cases, and in family courts more
generally, merely reflects this general pattern.  Therefore, collective
political action to promote economic, social and political equality will
continue to be essential for feminist lawmaking on domestic violence,
including addressing the fact-finding gap, as well as to make progress
on other legal issues affecting families.15
                                                          
improve coordination between different systems of social response, including
different parts of the legal system.  However, although through what are known as
Green Book initiatives, there have been heartening recent efforts to develop
cooperative relationships between child welfare authorities and domestic violence
advocates, see infra notes 183 and 185, child custody disputes between parents have
not been included.  See Meier, supra note 10, at 661.
13. While these deficiencies and possible reforms have received relatively less
attention than other types of reforms, they have not been ignored in the social
science and advocacy literature.  See, e.g., DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 521-
26 (discussing the importance and lack of adequate legal representation).  In
addition, the passage of VAWA II in 2000 provided around $20 million in new
funding to legal service providers doing civil protection order work.  See Jane C.
Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect
Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L., 499, 502-03 (2003).  More
attention is needed because of the enormous cumulative and pervasive impact of the
fact-finding gap.  Civil system reforms should integrate legal and non-legal strategies
to support the efforts of battered women to stop the abuse.  For a discussion of the
disproportionate emphasis on legal intervention as opposed to other forms of
assistance for victims of domestic violence, see id. at 509 and infra note 64.
14. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 183-84 (1980).
15. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING
229-32 (2000) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN].  For a compelling
account of the complex ways poverty, welfare policy, childhood victimization and
domestic violence intersect to trap battered women and their children, see generally
JODY RAPHAEL, SAVING BERNICE (2000).  See also ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 25-46
(noting child maltreatment as “indirectly caused by parental poverty, detected
because of parental poverty, or defined by parental poverty” id. at 27); id. at 268-71
6
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This Article suggests another critical factor in understanding both
the fact-finding gap and its relative obscurity in domestic violence
discourse: the largely unacknowledged problem of secondary
traumatic stress, and an associated lack of interdisciplinary
collaboration to address this problem.16  Secondary traumatic stress
has the potential to affect everyone who has any contact with trauma,
who are collectively described as “observers” or “bystanders.”17 Among
the traumatic experiences whose vicarious impact on bystanders has
been documented are rape, child abuse and domestic violence, as
well as war, solitary confinement, torture, and natural and
environmental disasters.18  Prolonged, repeated interpersonal
                                                          
(increasing social support for poor families as a way to drastically reduce cases of
child abuse and neglect).
16. Among the other terms used for secondary traumatic stress (“STS”) are
vicarious trauma, indirect trauma, compassion fatigue or empathic strain.  According
to Charles Figley, STS can be defined “as the natural consequent behaviors and
emotions resulting from knowing about a traumatizing event experienced by a
significant other–the stress resulting from helping or wanting to help a traumatized
or suffering person.”  Charles R. Figley, Compassion Fatigue as Secondary Traumatic
Stress Disorder: An Overview [hereinafter Figley, Overview], in COMPASSION FATIGUE:
COPING WITH SECONDARY TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN THOSE WHO TREAT THE
TRAUMATIZED 1, 7 (Charles R. Figley ed., 1995) [hereinafter COMPASSION FATIGUE].
Figley has also suggested that the term Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (and its now-
familiar acronym PTSD) be redefined as Primary Traumatic Stress Disorder, to
distinguish it from Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder, which refers to the similar
(though typically less severe) syndrome of symptoms that may arise in people
exposed to secondary sensors, e.g., by working with victims of direct trauma.  Id. at 8-
9.  STS should not be confused with burn-out, “which emerges gradually and is a
result of emotional exhaustion, [whereas] STS (compassion stress) can emerge
suddently with little warning.”  Id. at 12.  Of course, participants in the legal and
social service systems may experience both STSD and burn-out.  See also JEAN KOH
PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND
PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS § 9-2(g) (2001) (discussing vicarious traumatization in lawyers
who work with child abuse victims); INT’L SOC’Y FOR TRAUMATIC STRESS STUDIES,
INDIRECT TRAUMA (2003) (providing a brief explanation of indirect trauma), available
at http://www.istss.org/terrorism/indirect_trauma.htm.  Subsequent discussions of
direct and secondary traumatic stress in this Article rely primarily on the work of
Judith Lewis Herman and particularly her book, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY.  See generally
HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7; see also PETERS, supra note 16, §§ 9-1-9-6.
17. See HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 7-8 (using the term bystander); Id. at
115 (using the term observer).  The term “bystanders” may strike some readers as an
odd way to talk about professionals involved in responding to domestic violence.
The term seeks to highlight the impact of exposure to the traumatic experiences of
others.  When we come into contact with the trauma of others, we occupy individual
societal roles (which can be more or less tangential to a traumatic situation, such as
gardener, bank teller or more salient, such as social worker, judge, attorney, court
clerk) and simultaneously the roles of bystanders to a scene that may be painful to
encounter.  Id.; see also infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.  The term
bystander is also here differentiated from the word “witness” to mark the distinction
between the fact of encounter and the moral choice to become a conscious witness.
See infra Part IV.C.  For discussion of the possible impact of secondary traumatic
stress on professionals working with victims of domestic violence, see infra, Part IV.A.
18. See infra app. for bibliographic information on traumatic stress studies and
links to other resources.
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victimization, such as that which can occur in the context of domestic
violence, child abuse, prisons, concentration camps and slave labor
camps, is most likely to produce more serious forms of traumatic
stress, both in survivors of trauma and in bystanders who have
extensive contact with them.19  This Article suggests that the practice
of compassionate witnessing20 can assist bystanders, particularly
people on the front lines in the legal system, to respond more
effectively to individuals experiencing or recovering from family-
related trauma, particularly when prolonged and repeated
victimization is involved.  It also concludes that improving societal
responses to both domestic violence and child maltreatment depends
primarily on the formation of interdisciplinary communities of
support, bringing together participants in the legal system and others
with different training and perspectives who also work with people
experiencing domestic violence and child maltreatment.  Finally, this
Article contends that compassionate witnessing, if widely practiced
within the legal system, will provide new clarity about the link
between the fact-finding role of family courts and the rights of both
adults and children to be protected from intimate violence and
patterns of domination and control.  Part I provides an overview of
the fact-finding gap and the murkiness of family law cases involving
domestic violence issues.  It argues that focusing attention on the lack
of resources for fact-finding in civil domestic violence cases, as well as
the high proportion of difficult cases, is an urgent and long
overlooked task.  This task is especially urgent in the context of
divorce and child custody disputes.  Reforming statutory standards
                                                          
19. Researchers have suggested “expanding the concept of Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (“PTSD”) to include a spectrum of disorders, ranging from the brief, self-
limited stress reaction to a single acute trauma, through simple PTSD, to the
complex disorder of extreme stress [Disorders of Extreme Stress Not Otherwise
Specified] (“DESNOS”) that follows upon prolonged exposure to repeated trauma.”
Judith Lewis Herman, Complex PTSD: A Syndrome in Survivors of Prolonged and Repeated
Trauma, 5 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 377 (1992).  For more information on the secondary
impacts on bystanders of work with people suffering DESNOS, see HERMAN,
RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 146-47, and works listed infra app. See supra note 16 for the
suggestion that PTSD should be renamed Primary Traumatic Stress Disorder.
20. Compassionate witnessing is the term used here for certain capacities that are
helpful to people whose work involves contact with traumatic situations.  These
capacities include being able to take care of one’s own needs appropriately, serve as a
conscious witness to the suffering of others, and make wise and compassionate
choices about how best to respond to the underlying situation, consistent with one’s
role and resources.  Essential resources for compassionate witnessing include
curiosity, an effective support system, and the ability of the witness to acknowledge
and manage the personal resonance of traumatic material. See also infra text
accompanying notes 125 and 126 and text following note 135. Further explanation
of the concept of compassionate witnessing (and its benefits to both participants in
the legal system and victims and perpetrators  of domestic violence and their
children) is presented in Part IV.
8
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and creating specialized domestic violence courts,21 without
acknowledging the fact-finding gap and its destructive effects, can
obscure the magnitude and many significant nuances of the problem
of domestic violence.  Among these problems are the high rates of
domestic violence during and after divorce proceedings, and the
ability of abusers to use the judicial process to continue their abuse.22
Part II notes how the legal system’s prevailing focus on criminal
remedies and on dramatic, and often relatively clear cut, examples of
domestic violence can distract attention from the crying need for
resources to evaluate and respond to many other important domestic
violence matters, particularly in cases where children are affected.
This Part suggests that both preferences for more simplistic criminal
justice remedies, and the failure to deploy adequate resources in civil
domestic violence proceedings share the same cause: the painful
emotions domestic violence often evokes in bystanders, particularly
when children may be at risk.  A more balanced distribution of
resources and significant improvements in civil case processing can
only occur if participants in the legal system have adequate support to
function effectively in the highly charged context of domestic
violence and child maltreatment issues.
Part III looks at the inadequacies of legal representation in family
law cases and the anti-litigation bias of family courts, which are two
additional structural and attitudinal obstacles to addressing the fact-
finding gap in family court and civil protection order proceedings.  It
also describes the cumulative effect of fact-finding deficiencies on
victims of abuse and their children.  It concludes, in Part III(D), with
a discussion of the complexity and magnitude of systemic changes
needed to make meaningful improvements in the legal system’s
responses to domestic violence.  If the cycle of incomplete and
misguided family court reform is to be broken, transformative
changes in people’s attitudes toward themselves and each other are
needed.
Part IV explores likely interconnections between the painful
subject matter involved in civil domestic violence proceedings and
the disheartening conditions in many family courts.  Family court
personnel experience first hand the reality that violent and
                                                          
21. For a description of such courts, see Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized
Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
1285 (2000).
22. See infra notes 53-54 (discussing post-separation violence, coercion and
control); infra notes 42-43, 55, 100-02 and accompanying text (providing examples of
batterers’ abusive litigation tactics); BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 2, at 125
(illustrating batterers’ use of litigation as a form of abuse).
9
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controlling behavior in family and intimate relationships is prevalent,
largely uncontrolled, poorly understood and often devastating in its
consequences.  Because of this exposure, system participants
necessarily experience powerful emotional responses.  Given the
dispiriting circumstances in most family courts, the detrimental
effects of secondary traumatic stress are especially likely.23
Unfortunately, most people are unaware of the nature and extent
of secondary traumatic stress, lack access to supportive resources, and
have little or no training about how to recognize reactivity24 in
themselves and others or how to respond to the resulting distress.  As
a result, people are likely to adopt coping mechanisms and engage in
self-protective defensive maneuvers25 to create distance and reduce to
tolerable levels their own entirely understandable discomfort,
anxiety, and, in some circumstances, pain.
A central claim of Part IV is that societal responses to domestic
violence, and particularly tolerance of poor fact-finding conditions in
family courts, are shaped by the unacknowledged reactivity of the
people who make up the response systems (as well as of the people
who create and maintain those systems, such as politicians and the
citizens who elect them).26  This Part also suggests that addressing the
                                                          
23. Ironically, system participants may actually deny the reality or significance of
the events to which they are exposed or blame the victims, in an effort to cope with
the secondary traumatic stress they are experiencing.  See infra notes 24-26, 119-21
and accompanying text.
24. “Reactivity” is a lay and psychological term that may be unfamiliar to some
readers.  Psychologist Harriet Goldhor Lerner offers this explanation:
The initial impact of anxiety . . . is always one of increased reactivity.
Reactivity is an automatic, anxiety-driven response.  When we are in reactive
gear, we are driven by our feelings, without the ability to think about how we
want to express them.  In fact, we cannot think about the self or our
relationships with much objectivity at all. . . . 
HARRIET GOLDHOR LERNER, THE DANCE OF INTIMACY: A WOMAN’S GUIDE TO
COURAGEOUS ACTS OF CHANGE IN KEY RELATIONSHIPS 36 (1989).  Becoming aware of
one’s own reactivity and being able to identify that reactivity in others is a valuable
skill for anyone who works with people, particularly lawyers and judges. This skill is
essential for people who work with domestic violence and child maltreatment issues.
For further discussion, including the related concepts of transference and counter-
transference, see infra note 121 and accompanying text.  See also HERMAN, RECOVERY,
supra note 7, at 136-47.
25. Typical responses may include tuning out, denying or minimizing the
situation presented, feeling numb, and becoming irritable or hostile to the person or
persons in the present whose behavior has served as a stimulus.  Helpful coping
mechanisms may include converting a raw or primitive impulse into one that is more
socially acceptable or constructive (sublimation), altruism and humor.  See HERMAN,
RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 151-53.
26. The commonly reported examples of inappropriate, dysfunctional and
sometimes hostile behavior on the part of judges, attorneys, police officers, and court
personnel may become more understandable when this phenomenon is
acknowledged.  See infra notes 95 and 167-75 and accompanying text.
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fact-finding gap and other improvements in domestic violence
practice, both at the level of individual participants in the legal
system and in the system as a whole, entail finding ways to provide
advocates and institutional actors with the support they need to
handle being exposed to the traumatic experiences of others.
Interdisciplinary collaboration is suggested as a critical resource in
creating the supportive communities required.
Part IV first provides psychological background to understanding
the concept of compassionate witnessing,27 which is later described in
greater detail.  These sections explore how this practice, which is
rooted in kindness and care for ourselves, has the potential to help
people grapple more successfully with the vicarious traumatic stress
associated with various levels of domestic violence work.  Indeed, this
practice seems vital for the sustained effort and openness of mind
and heart required for finding new paths to change social response
systems and engage in the kind of peacemaking that can address the
deeper social patterns that fuel inhumanity and violence in intimate
relationships.  The transformative value of this practice in the legal
system, and its relevance to the needs of children exposed to
domestic violence or experiencing child maltreatment are described
in subsequent sections.  The last section of Part IV explores the
prospects for using compassionate witnessing to address the fact-
finding gap in civil domestic violence cases, as well as bringing about
other systemic changes in responses to cases involving domestic
violence and child maltreatment.
I. THE FACT-FINDING GAP AND THE COMPLEXITY OF FACT-FINDING
NEEDS
A. Inadequate Fact-Finding Resources and Practices in Family Courts
The inadequate resources in family courts create a substantial fact-
finding gap, which is intensified by the challenges of fact-finding in
civil domestic violence cases.  The gap is especially acute in domestic
violence protective order proceedings, but is also evident in child
custody and visitation disputes and contested divorce proceedings,
again especially when domestic violence issues, gender dynamics and
issues of power and control are of concern.  One reason for the
resource inadequacy is the huge volume of cases in many
jurisdictions, both in family law generally, and in civil protective
                                                          
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (introducing the concept of
compassionate witnessing).
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order proceedings in particular.28  One rough estimate of the number
of child custody cases filed nationally each year puts the number at
about half a million.29  The number of civil protective order cases is of
a similar order of magnitude.30  These case loads have expanded
significantly in recent decades, but resources within the family court
system have not increased sufficiently to meet the need.31  In
addition, many, if not most, litigants are unrepresented (especially in
both protective order and child custody cases)32 and the other
needed  decision-making resources—such as trial and appellate court
time and attention; attorney and judicial training in other relevant
disciplines and opportunities for interdisciplinary collaboration;
                                                          
28. At various points in this Article, the focus shifts among different subsets of
civil family law proceedings.  These shifts reflect overlaps and interactions in the
material under discussion.  Families and individuals experiencing domestic violence
often have to deal (either simultaneously or sequentially) with different types of
family court proceedings, and the dilemmas that prompted this Article likewise
appear in many different family law contexts.  While most of the discussion in Parts I
and III of this Article focuses on civil protective order proceedings and divorce and
child custody cases in which domestic violence is (or should be) an issue, the
problems of fact-finding in the child welfare system are also extreme.  This Article’s
recommendations of interdisciplinary collaboration and the concept of
compassionate witnessing should also be priorities in child welfare system reform
efforts.  See infra Part IV.B.3 (compassionate witnessing and the needs of children).
29. See Kristen Lombardi, Custodians of Abuse, BOSTON PHOENIX, Jan. 9, 2003, at 2,
(extrapolating from Massachusetts statistics for 2001), available at http://www.
bostonphoenix.com/boston/news_features/documents/02643516.htm.  The volume
of cases is understandable, since there are limited resources outside of the family law
system to address high intensity disputes in family or intimate relationships, and once
the aid of the system is invoked by one party, participation by the other is mandatory.
30. “A record high of 53,000 requests for civil restraining orders were filed in
Massachusetts in 1992.”  JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM 72
(1999).  In 2000, the New Jersey State Police reported 77,680 cases of domestic
violence involving a police response.  HON. ANGELO J. DICAMILLO ET AL., NEW JERSEY
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 7 (2002).  In Philadelphia in 2002,
about 8000 victims obtained permanent protection orders, and police 911
dispatchers fielded 73,000 calls reporting domestic violence–200 a day.  Craig R.
McCoy, Better Support for Domestic Abuse Victims, PHILA. INQ. Apr. 23, 2003, at B1.
31. Increased caseloads are the result of many factors, among them the increased
acceptance of divorce, the decline of the tender years presumption in custody
decision-making, and new concern with the problems of domestic violence and child
abuse and neglect. On the “astronomical increase” in domestic violence cases, both
in civil and criminal courts, see SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 15, at 49.
On the increase in family cases, see Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency
Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants
in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 117 (2001).
32. For example, a recent interdisciplinary study of 406 women who sought
intervention for domestic violence in Baltimore, Maryland, found extremely low
levels of attorney representation in civil protective order cases.  See Murphy, supra
note 13, at 510-11; Berenson, supra note 31, at 110 (reporting studies conducted
during the 1990s showing that one or both parties were unrepresented in from 40-
77% of domestic relations cases); McCoy, supra note 30 (reporting public interest
attorney Carol Tracy’s estimate that in 2002, at best only one out of ten women
seeking protection orders in family court in Philadelphia was accompanied by a
lawyer).
12
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resources for evidence gathering; the services of expert witnesses,33
rapid response capability for high risk cases—are far outmatched by
the demand for case resolution.34  As a result, in family law cases,
proceedings are often brief.  Indeed, civil protective order statutes in
most jurisdictions contemplate hearings that are conducted pro se.
The laws and many judges also discourage or preclude discovery in
civil protective order proceedings35 and with regard to the non-
financial aspects of divorce and custody cases.36
One experienced custody attorney recently commented,
[M]ost family courts are ‘overburdened’ with cases and don’t have
time for . . .  lengthy trials and investigations. . . . In many family
courts . . . you often have only one sitting judge to hear hundreds
of matters that have to do with many, many things, so the courts are
compelled to move things along as quickly as possible.37
In other words, as a result of heavy caseloads, family matters are often
subjected to routinized processing.  The combination of volume, time
pressure and oversimplified procedures virtually guarantees that
judges will not be making well-informed, factual determinations.  As
another experienced litigator commented,
Because there is often little or no pretrial discovery, or testimony
                                                          
33. At least in the context of child abuse and neglect proceedings, there is a
general recognition of the need for social work and psychological expertise, and the
court system supplies some funds for such services.  In the context of divorce, child
custody and domestic violence, the court often does not have such funds.  Needed
evaluations or services depend on the availability of free services or the parties’ ability
to pay.  In Philadelphia, for example, domestic relations court-connected counseling
services have only recently become available, and only on an extremely limited basis.
Lerner Interview, supra note 2.
34. See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 15, at 95-96 (discussing the
failure of domestic violence statutes to provide guaranteed access to counsel, despite
the evident need for such representation in many cases); see also infra note 99 and
accompanying text (discussing the cumulative impact of various factors on
unrepresented plaintiffs’ access to restraining orders).
35. Discovery in civil protective (or restraining) order cases are difficult in any
event because of the short time between the entrance of a temporary restraining
order and the final restraining order hearing.  Many state rules permit discovery only
upon a showing of “good cause” and requests are rarely made or granted.  For a
discussion of the New Jersey discovery rules, see DICAMILLO ET AL., supra note 30, at
32-33. Depositions are also not generally permitted.  See, e.g., Depos v. Depos, 704
A.2d 1049, 1051 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (holding that domestic violence
actions are summary in nature and do not authorize depositions or any other
discovery).
36. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 10, at 664-65, 668 n.30 (describing the proceedings
regarding child custody and visitation in a case where the judge refused to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the matter, instead only permitting “colloquy” with counsel);
Id.
37. Lombardi, supra note 29, at 2 (quoting Seth Goldstein, a Napa-California-
based attorney and founder of the Child Abuse Forensic Institute, who represents
men and women in custody disputes involving child sex-abuse charges).
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from qualified experts or others in the household or the
community who may have valuable information to offer, a family
court judge hearing a domestic violence case can rarely have
confidence that she has seen all the evidence relevant to her
determination.  The situation is exacerbated when there are no
attorneys to sharpen the facts and issues presented.  When the
judge has twenty minutes (or less) to hear and decide a case, try as
she might, she cannot possibly give such a momentous decision the
attention and reflection it deserves. 38
B. Challenging Cases That  are Difficult to Resolve
Family matters, particularly disputes involving children and
domestic violence cases, are often contested and the cases that
require court hearings are not necessarily clear-cut.39  Indeed, a high
proportion of both domestic violence proceedings and child custody
cases are murky, ambiguous, and difficult—cases that any
decisionmaker, no matter how wise or experienced, would find
challenging to resolve.
Of course, some of these cases would no longer seem as difficult if
there were more fact-finding resources or if the biases and reactivity
of fact finders and other participants in the legal system were
reduced,40 but other cases would remain daunting even after full
investigation and fact development.  The family court docket of cases
involving domestic violence issues typically includes a variety of
circumstances, including:
! textbook examples of male dominance and control and well-
documented serious violence;
! specific incidents of violent or threatening behavior by one or
both parties, whose significance varies depending on a host of
other circumstances about which little or no reliable evidence
may be available;
! cases in which, in addition to evidence of domestic violence,
the non-violent partner seems to be suffering from serious
personal dysfunctions that may also be salient to custody
decision-making;
                                                          
38. Lerner Interview, supra note 2.
39. See Tsai, supra note 21, at 1293 (noting that complex matters in domestic
violence involve issues relating to family dynamics and emotional relationships that
are not paralleled in other crimes).
40. See discussion infra note 46 and accompanying text and Part III.B; see, e.g.,
Meier, supra note 10, at 676-81 (discussing, among other issues, the powerful norm of
parental equality that courts rely on in adjudicating custody and visitation that, in
reality, favors emphasis on the father’s rights rather than the children’s needs in the
particular circumstances of each case).
14
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 17
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol11/iss2/17
FREEDMAN_PKFINAL5.DOC 6/9/03  1:36 PM
2003] SECONDARY TRAUMATIC STRESS 581
! cases in which there seems to be no good answer for the
children, because both parents’ behavior seems quite
problematic, the parents are at loggerheads, the children are
bonded to both parents and the option of removing children
from the household seems even more undesirable;
! cases in which the parties are engaged in intense conflict and
both parties’ behavior is arguably in violation of the civil
protective order statute, but it is not clear whether either party
is dangerous or to what extent one party is exercising power
and control over the other; and
! cases in which the behavior that is the basis of the court’s
jurisdiction is borderline; some of these cases involve serious
power and control issues and others do not.41
A batterer’s tactics in custody and visitation disputes may further
cloud the factual picture.  Social scientists report that batterers often
successfully employ a variety of maneuvers, including projecting a
non-abusive image, using new partners as character references, using
the mother’s anger or mistrust to discredit her, making false or
exaggerated defensive accusations against the other parent,
presenting themselves as the parties who are willing to communicate
or involving their own parents to obtain access to the children.42
Since “it is common for [batterers] to be skillfully dishonest,”43 fact
finding in cases involving allegations of abuse is particularly
challenging.
Fact finders are also in the difficult position of balancing
competing social priorities.  For example, promoting parent-child
interaction and encouraging cooperation between parents in their
children’s care often conflicts with the need to protect children and
adults from emotional injury, harassment, threats, manipulation and
violence.44  Judges are also making decisions about other people’s
futures without knowing what the future has in store.  The task of
                                                          
41. This listing of types of cases is intended to highlight the need for
sophisticated evidentiary inquiry and particularized fact finding in each case.  It does
not imply that this case typology or others should be used in such fact finding.  See
BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 2, at 130-49 and Meier, supra note 10, at  for
powerful critiques of several widely-used typologies of divorce and domestic violence
cases.  See also Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide: Protecting Battered Parents and Their
Children in the Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION COURTS REV. 273, 275-281
(1999) [hereinafter Dalton, Paradigms] (discussing competing paradigms that
prevent domestic violence from being recognized or properly weighed).
42. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 2, at 122-26.
43. Id. at 124.
44. But see Meier, supra note 10, at Parts III.C.1 - D.2, for reasons to believe that in
most cases, despite concerns to protect children’s relationships with both parents,
domestic violence should be given decisive weight in making custody decisions.
15
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deciding which cases deserve legal intervention, either in the form of
a protective order, or a departure from the child custody
arrangements that would otherwise be ordered, is extremely difficult
even with time for reflection, which is generally not available.  In
addition, to reach any conclusions about what is going on, judges
must evaluate adult behavior or parent-child interactions through the
distorting lens of adversary litigation.  Observations made in a
courtroom or when an evaluator is present may have little or no
relationship to the lived reality of family life, and the work of expert
witnesses is subject to other important limitations, even in the best of
circumstances.45
Worse still, the unexamined and often unconscious preconceptions
and beliefs of judges and other regular participants in family court
(such as custody evaluators, mediators, and attorneys) can be decisive
factors when these preconceptions are not subject to the checks that
the structures of the adversary system are intended to provide.
Gender bias, which is well documented, as well as homophobia, and
race, and class bias, is often joined by other distorting factors, both
traditional and sometimes quite idiosyncratic.46  Moreover, as
mentioned earlier, judges are often highly reactive to the subject
                                                          
45. See BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 2, at 115-17, 119, 120-25 (identifying
multiple reasons for differences between what judges and evaluators see and parental
behavior outside of the artificial context of evaluation and litigation.); David L.
Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 477, 482-85 (1984) (discussing the danger that, even in the unusual case that
adequate expert evaluative assistance is available, “the recommendation of the expert
or the observations of the judge would be unduly colored by the stresses of the
divorce process–by the parents’ depression, anxiety, anger, and confusion and the
child’s reactions to it”); see also Meier, supra note 10, at Parts III.B.2-B.3 (explaining
various sources of uncertainty and inaccuracy in courts’ credibility determinations in
custody cases involving domestic violence issues).  While psychological evaluations
can sometimes provide a useful source of data in child custody disputes, these can be
beyond the means of the parties, and if available, are of varying or uncertain quality
and relevance, and are often difficult for non-experts to weigh.  See Chambers, supra
note 45, at 482-85 nn.20–24; BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 2, at 118-19.  In
domestic violence cases, there are usually additional difficulties, including the fact
that most custody evaluators do not have specific training in domestic violence issues
and regularly dismiss allegations of abuse without investigation.  See BANCROFT &
SILVERMAN, supra note 2, at 117-22, 130-49.  See also Dalton, Paradigms, supra note 41,
passim for a sophisticated discussion of distortions in the identification and
evaluation of domestic violence and child maltreatment claims in custody and
visitation cases.
46. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 10, at III.B.2 (examining the blatant gender bias in
claims of “parental alienation,” where the mother is accused of using domestic
violence claims to alienate the child from his or her father); BARBARA A. BABCOCK ET
AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE, THEORY 1262-68 (1996)
(discussing bias against working or student mothers, the discriminatory effect of
relocation bans on custodial mothers, and sexism and heterosexism in using sexual
conduct as a factor in child custody decision-making); ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 47-
67, 92-98 (discussing the impact of racial bias, unconscious racism and poverty on
decision-making in child-related family matters).
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matter of the family court cases they hear.  Under the conditions
operative in most family courts, there is little chance for judges to
acknowledge to themselves or find appropriate ways to handle the
strong feelings that some family court cases inevitably generate.
In effect, the lack of adequate fact-finding resources further
increases the reactivity of participants in the legal system.
Paradoxically, the lack of supportive resources also gives system
participants (including other court personnel and attorneys, as well
as judges) additional incentives to truncate and routinize family court
proceedings in order to defend themselves against the emotional
stimulus overload they are experiencing.  A system that routinely
overloads participants is one that will inevitably suffer from declining
functional capacity as time goes on.47
What is astonishing is the ease with which these challenges of fact-
finding seem to become a reason for a retreat from fact-finding.  Civil
courts are established to determine the facts and resolve disputes
according to governing norms.  Dispute resolution in a case that is
important enough to litigate is not simply a matter of reaching a
result, but rather of coming as close as is feasible to an accurate
result.  The purpose of court hearings and evidentiary procedures is
to make it possible for courts to sift through the claims of the parties
and come to a fair conclusion based on the evidence.  However, when
family courts lack the resources needed to do a reasonable job of fact-
finding, no one seems to pay much attention.
C. Overview of the Situation in Civil Proceedings Involving Domestic
Violence
As a result of the conditions in family court, the difficulty of many
of the cases and the largely unaddressed problems of judicial bias and
reactivity, the promise of protection extended by both domestic
violence laws and child custody laws is profoundly compromised.
Serious cases of domestic violence are missed, relatively minor
incidents are subject to overreaction, appropriate remedies are not
ordered, custodial arrangements that are impractical and disruptive
to children are adopted by way of compromise, and judges, parties
                                                          
47. On the negative effects of unacknowledged reactivity on the performance of
divorce lawyers in domestic violence cases, see Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives,
Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 901, 921-27 (1997); Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce:
Constraints and Possibilities, 31 N. ENGL. L. REV. 319, 366-67, 369-70 (1997) [herinafter
Dalton, Domestic Torts].  For materials addressing other contexts of legal practice, see
infra app.  See also infra note 162 and accompanying text for recent work describing
new models of lawyering, teaching, and practice designed to encourage a greater
integration of psychological understanding into domestic violence lawyering work.
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and advocates are likely to become cynical or disheartened.
Proceedings in which domestic violence issues are at the forefront
are especially likely to be mishandled.  Many protective orders that
should be granted are denied or are inadequately enforced when
they are violated.48  Domestic violence victims often settle out of court
for less protection, aware that making the case before a judge may
expose them to unacceptable safety risks or require more evidentiary
and advocacy resources than they have available.49  Victims of violence
who are simultaneously engaged in divorce proceedings are routinely
denied protection on the suspicion that their requests for protection
are manipulative tactics.50  Additionally, children’s well-being is all too
often sacrificed.  Occasionally this is because a false claim succeeds.
More frequently, it is because the abuse of one parent or the child by
the other cannot be demonstrated to the satisfaction of
overburdened and often skeptical courts with the limited fact-finding
resources that are available, or because courts treat the abuse of the
parent or the child as less important than other factors in
determining custody.51
It bears emphasizing that civil remedies for domestic violence are a
critical resource for victims of domestic violence, because domestic
violence is widespread, harmful, varied, often escalating, and hard to
escape.  It is now generally agreed both that a significant proportion
of intimate relationships are characterized by ongoing patterns of
violent and illegally coercive behavior and that such patterns have
enormous social costs, both for individuals, their children and third
parties.52  While sociological and psychological understanding of
                                                          
48. Sometimes, but not always, these problems are the result of a lack of attorney
representation.  See, e.g., LeeAnn Iovanni & Susan L. Miller, Criminal Justice System
Responses to Domestic Violence: Law Enforcement and the Courts, in SOURCEBOOK ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 303, 314 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2001) (reporting
evidence that victims not represented by counsel are less likely to receive protective
orders, or if they do, the orders are likely to lack needed provisions excluding the
offender from the residence, or concerning child custody, visitation and child
support, and discussing enforcement problems).
49. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 10, at 664-65, 668 n.30 (describing a domestic
violence child custody case she litigated in which a mother gave up custody of her
child to the abuser rather than continue to litigate before a hostile judge).
50. See discussion infra note 97.
51. For a discussion of this problem, and the attitudes and beliefs that contribute
to these failures, see, e.g., Meier, supra note 10, at  PartII, III.A-E (explaining the
court systems’ mental “bifurcation” between custody and visitation issues, on one
hand, and domestic violence issues, on the other).
52. For a review of statistics, see DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 5-7,  See
also Jane Maslow Cohen, Private Violence and Public Obligation: The Fulcrum of Reason, in
THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 349, 368-69 (Martha Albertson Fineman &
Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).  For estimates of the annual costs of domestic violence
to United States’ companies, primarily as a result of health care expenditures, see id.
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battering and batterers is in early stages of development, there is
widespread agreement that the abusive behavior of a substantial
proportion of batterers will escalate in seriousness and frequency
over time, particularly in response to efforts by the victim to change
or end an intimate relationship with the abuser.53  It is also now
recognized that many people who are targets of abuse in intimate
relationships will need many attempts, often over a period of years, to
get the abuse stopped, either by alteration of the power dynamics of
the relationship or by leaving the batterer.54  Finally, the dynamics of
relationships characterized by battering and illegal coercion are quite
diverse, and advocates for battered women and researchers in the
field have increasingly emphasized the importance of confronting the
dynamics of power and control as well as particular acts of violent
abuse.55  Meaningful criminal sanctions are only likely to be applied
                                                          
at 369.
53. On theories of battering behavior, types of batterers and predictions of
escalation over time, see DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 74-94 (discussing inter
alia cyclical battering, shame and separation issues underlying the behavior, and the
generational chain of family abuse); GONDOLF, supra note 2, at 165-92 (discussing
research to identify the most dangerous batterers and develop appropriate responses
specifically for them); BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 2, at 1-28, 130-49, 178-87.
On domestic violence and exit from relationships, see Martha A. Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICHIGAN L. REV. 1, 68-74
(1991) (coining the term “separation assault” and explaining how to identify it); see
also BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 2 at 75-76, 110, 167-68 (illustrating battering
parents’ patterns of continued violence and coercion and control after separation).
For empirical evidence on the substantial overlap between divorce, child custody and
child support proceedings and domestic violence and the correlation of relationship
dissolution and separation assault, see DEMIE KURZ, FOR RICHER, FOR POORER,
MOTHERS CONFRONT DIVORCE 64-71, 134-43 (1995).  For recent data on assaultive
behavior designed to prevent relationship dissolution or in response to separation,
see PTACEK, supra note 30, at 79-91.
54. See JILL DAVIES ET AL., SAFETY PLANNING WITH BATTERED WOMEN: COMPLEX
LIVES/DIFFICULT CHOICES 74-80 (1998) (providing an overview of studies on point);
see also Murphy, supra note 13, at 506-09, 515 app. A (discussing the top ten strategies
women seeking intervention in domestic violence cases used to end the violence);
Mahoney, supra note 53, at 73-80 (discussing a 1983 study of women who used a wide
variety of strategies over a considerable period of time to end the violence in their
intimate relationships without leaving their partners).  For a vivid description of
Bernice Hampton’s creative efforts, over many years, to escape a relationship with a
violent and controlling partner who was the father of her children, and then to
recover from its effects, while simultaneously navigating off the welfare rolls, see
RAPHAEL, supra note 15.
55. See, e.g., PTACEK, supra note 30, at 74-91 (discussing the tactics and strategies
of men who batter, based on a random sample of 100 domestic violence complaints);
see also BANCROFT & SILVERMAN supra note 2, at 179-83 (identifying twelve steps
necessary for behavioral change, including acknowledgment and commitment to
change controlling behaviors and attitudes of entitlement); Evan Stark, Representing
Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973,
986 (1995) (arguing that the “profile of ‘the battered woman’ arises as much from
the deprivation of liberty . . . by coercion and control as . . . from violence-induced
trauma”); Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in
Domestic Violence Cases, 146 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2118-20, 2124-41 (1993) (discussing the
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to well-documented, long-standing patterns of violence or to
particularly violent acts,56 and only in cases that come to the attention
of the authorities.  Domestic violence laws intentionally include civil
as well as criminal remedies to promote victim safety on an
emergency and a long-term basis.  The civil remedies function both
as an alternative and an adjunct to the criminal justice system.  Civil
remedies are even more important when the parties have children in
common.  Thus, given the importance of civil remedies and the
complexity of these cases, the gap between resources for fact-finding
and the need for fact-finding in private family matters is a major
problem.
Despite the theoretical and practical importance of effective civil
remedies for domestic violence, which in turn depend on having
adequate fact-finding resources available, advocates for battered
women have not made addressing the gap in fact-finding resources in
civil cases a major focus of political work, and little direct attention
has been paid to these issues in the legal and popular literature on
institutional responses to domestic violence.  Instead, in recent
decades, funding, effort and attention have mainly been directed to
criminal law reforms,57 and on the civil side, to promoting improved
                                                          
systematic pattern of control and domination in battering and urging attention to
the internal culture of abusive relationships rather than specific abusive actions); R.
EMERSON DOBASH ET AL., CHANGING VIOLENT MEN 31-37 (2000) (analyzing why
batterers find the control from their violence functional and purposeful, even
though it can be costly in the long term for the abuser); DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra
note 3, at 66-67 (noting the power and control and equality wheels developed by the
Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, Duluth, Minn., and checklists used by a
batterers counseling program to identify violent and controlling behaviors);
Mahoney, supra note 53, at 81-87 (noting the impact on victim behavior of victims’
fears of imminent danger or serious bodily harm as a result of repeated battering
over time).
56. For example, one study demonstrates judges’ reluctance to impose criminal
sanctions when civil restraining orders are violated.  Approximately 43% of the
violations cases ended in dismissal or diversion, while only 18% resulted in jail time
and an additional 25% resulted in probation.  See Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a
Population of Court-Restrained Male Batterers: Why Restraining Orders Don’t Work, in DO
ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 192, 208 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa
eds., 1996).
57. In criminal law, reform efforts have addressed mandatory arrest and no-drop
policies, coordinated community responses centered on the criminal justice system,
and educating judges and law enforcement personnel.  See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED
WOMEN, supra note 15, at 184-88.  No-drop policies require or permit prosecutors to
proceed with domestic violence prosecutions over the objections of the victim, and if
necessary, to impose sanctions to get the victim to testify.  Another approach, known
as evidence-based prosecution, which has been adopted in some jurisdictions, is to
encourage law enforcement personnel to gather sufficient evidence to permit
prosecutions in many cases even without the victim’s participation.  For relevant
materials on changing criminal justice responses, see DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra
note 3, at 611-40.
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legal standards in several contexts,58 creating specialized domestic
violence courts, providing better training for judges and promoting
overdue collaborations between child welfare authorities and
domestic violence advocates.59  The problem is not with the reforms
that have been adopted, which have been welcome, but with the
relative neglect of the fact-finding gap in civil proceedings.  The next
section inquires into the causes and consequences of emphasizing
some and not other types of reform.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONCENTRATING ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
HIGH PROFILE CASES 
An emphasis on criminal law remedies dominates much of our
public discourse on domestic violence, as it does our preferred
response to many other social problems.60  Devoting the bulk of
material resources to criminal law approaches and carrying out
needed reform of federal and state statutory standards, without
addressing the fact-finding gap in civil cases, is both a reflection of
and a contributor to reductionist thinking about domestic violence.61
The most troubling aspect of this uneven pattern of reform is the way
it concentrates activist, government and media attention on a narrow
range of cases and a narrow range of remedies, when success in the
campaign against domestic violence and child maltreatment requires
far more complex and broadly effective remedies.  Family courts and
civil courts, not criminal courts, are the logical sites from which to
                                                          
58. Areas that have received much deserved attention include revising child
custody statutes to take account of domestic violence, and addressing domestic
violence issues in the context of immigration and welfare policy.  Reform activity has
also been devoted to improving the defense of victims of battering who kill their
alleged abusers and addressing issues arising at the intersection of the domestic
violence and child abuse and neglect systems.  All of these topics are discussed in
DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3 and several are also discussed in SCHNEIDER,
BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 15.
59. For a discussion of specialized domestic violence courts, see generally Tsai,
supra note 21.  James Ptacek’s study of judges’ responses to battered women in
protective order hearings in Massachusetts provides a useful historical overview of
the reform process in that state. See PTACEK, supra note 30, at 40-68.
60. See Symposium, Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets Readers, 10
J.L. & POL’Y 313, 330-31, 343-44 (2002) [hereinafter Symposium, Author Meets
Readers] (discussing David Garland’s book, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND
SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001), which analyzes a shift in criminal
justice theory toward a more punitive approach to offenders, in part justified in
terms of victims’ rights).
61. As to the former, the flurry of statutory reform efforts without accompanying
reform of civil court functioning can contribute to the unintended and misleading
impression that domestic violence is being adequately addressed, and that
victimization continues because women do not use the resources available, or
because the problem is beyond solution, thus rationalizing a withdrawal of political
attention and social resources.
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organize the kind of multi-faceted approach to domestic violence that
is needed.62  What might explain this lopsided distribution of public
attention and government resources among potential legal responses
to domestic violence?
Criminal remedies have some distinctive qualities that make them
particularly attractive to feminists and policymakers alike.  In many
instances, criminal law remedies are essential to protect the safety
and well-being of battered women and their children, and to ensure
that batterers are held accountable.  Such remedies, when
implemented effectively, simultaneously communicate a powerful
social message about the equality of women and women’s human
rights.  Resistance to gender equality and attachment to patriarchal
forms remains strong, and backlash within families, communities,
political life and the criminal justice system is a continuing problem.
Even though criminal law responses will not always be sufficient, the
availability of such responses in appropriate cases is one critical
measure of women’s equality before the law.
At the same time, the criminal justice system is best at dealing with
relatively straightforward examples and easily categorized domestic
violence, with recognizable story lines and sympathetic victims.  As a
result, actors in that system tend to emphasize such cases rather than
acknowledge the wide variety of circumstances which the legal system
must be able to address.  The simple and sensationalist story lines
encouraged by tragic cases of domestic violence and law and order
frameworks also serve media and political interests.  Dramatic cases
and “tough on crime” policies are easily communicated in the mass
media and have ready appeal to voters.63  Concentrating primarily on
criminal law issues is also easier than pursuing the more complex,
expensive and less politically palatable goal of expanding social
programs in other areas.  For instance, victims across social class lines
have a huge unmet need for legal services and for other supportive
services, whether or not their abusers are ever arrested, prosecuted or
                                                          
62. See Murphy, supra note 13, at 505-13, for a discussion of the complex
strategies battered women use to end or escape violence; victims interviewed listed
only one legal intervention (“CPOs”) in their top twelve strategies for ending
violence.  FUTURE INTERVENTIONS WITH BATTERED WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES 53-86,
170-85 (Jeffrey L. Edleson & Zvi C. Eisikovits eds., 1996) (advocating involving the
health care and child welfare systems in domestic violence prevention and response;
improving informal responses to domestic violence; and developing innovative
sanctions for batterers).
63. James Ptacek notes the paradox that the politicians and conservative lobbying
groups who tried to increase criminal sanctions for certain types of domestic abuse
“have historically been hostile to feminist views of social justice.”  PTACEK, supra note
30, at 14; see also Symposium, Author Meets Readers, supra note 60, at 332 (noting a
convergence of conservative and feminist interests).
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incarcerated.64  Of course, the provision of better legal and social
services might in some cases make it possible to avoid the need for
criminal law involvement altogether.65
In specific instances, both the good and bad consequences of
spotlighting tragic high profile cases are evident.  For example, James
Ptacek described the mixed results of a 1992 media campaign in
Massachusetts which focused on a series of cases in which battered
women who had sought help from the legal system were murdered by
their abusers:
This media spotlight contributed to public action against violence,
and by informing women of their rights it encouraged abused
women to seek restraining orders.  Nonetheless, several dilemmas
are posed by the collective definition of the problem as it
developed in the Globe and in public campaigns.  First, must issues
of poverty and racism be ignored in order to mobilize public
support against violence?  Is this really a sufficient strategy, given
the different needs of abused women in different circumstances?
Will a rising tide really lift all boats?  Second, is it possible to
address femicides in a public campaign without losing sight of the
ever-more common experiences of coercion and threats that drive
women to the courts?66
As Ptacek points out with regard to the Boston Globe campaign,
focusing narrowly on high profile cases (which are also those in
which criminal law remedies might well have been appropriate) can
mean ignoring the majority of cases in which criminal law sanctions
are for various reasons inappropriate or unlikely even to be
available.67  These include cases in which victims are dealing with
coercion and control that does not (yet) rise to the levels relevant to
the criminal justice system.  They may also involve victims who do not
want to cede control to the criminal justice system, some of whom
may have good reasons to distrust law enforcement personnel, or who
                                                          
64. See Symposium, Author Meets Readers, supra note 60, at 342-43, 347-50
(contrasting criminal law oriented domestic violence policies in the United States to
more social service oriented policies in the United Kingdom and other European
countries).  See also infra notes 77-81 and  accompanying text and Part IV.D.
65. See infra note 67 and  accompanying text.
66. PTACEK, supra note 30, at 68.
67. Barbara Hart has been a long time critic of undue reliance on criminal law
approaches to the exclusion of civil remedies.  See, e.g., Barbara Hart, Battered Women
and the Criminal Justice System, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 98, 100-
01 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzana eds., 1996) (noting the tension between a
battered woman’s future safety and the criminal justice system’s sole focus on
winning convictions); see also SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 15, at 187-88
(noting that the ideal model for state intervention is a “coordinated community
response,” but that “real world” criminal justice intervention rarely meets the ideal in
providing the victim with real safety or autonomy).
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have other goals, such as trying to continue the relationship but
without the violence, or securing safety in the context of ongoing
joint parenting relationships.68  Some of these cases, in addition to
being inappropriate to the criminal justice system, are also
ambiguous, murky or difficult cases for other reasons.
Thus, an undue criminal law emphasis distracts attention from the
many cases that do not fit the law and order mold, and implies that
such cases are not as important, or may not even be “real” cases of
domestic violence.  The hard work of sorting out how to respond in
the domestic violence cases in the civil courts and particularly in
family court can come to seem a low priority or even a poor
investment of legal and decisional resources.  Yet, unless the
resources necessary to improve the fact-finding capacity of civil courts
are provided, many domestic violence matters that could have been
handled civilly will instead escalate and be shunted into the criminal
courts, with greater costs to society and far less satisfactory results to
the individuals and families (and especially the children) who are
involved.69  Of course, many victims and their children will benefit
significantly from having access to civil remedies, even if criminal
remedies are later needed to address a continuation or escalation of
abusive behavior.70
The reductionist thinking characteristic of law and order
approaches may have a deeper appeal as well.  The criminal justice
system concentrates its resources on the most serious, urgent and
unambiguous cases, then labels one or both parties as deviant, and
                                                          
68. For a review of the evidence suggesting the value of civil restraining orders,
despite their limitations, see Iovanni & Miller, supra note 48, at 314-19; see also
Murphy, supra note 13, at 509-12 (discussing the role of temporary and final
restraining orders in the context of other strategies used by women to end domestic
violence).
69. This is not to say, however, that criminal law remedies are only appropriate in
life and death situations, or that family law cases and remedies are only appropriate
for (or only sought in) lower risk or otherwise less serious cases.  Indeed, in a
comparison between civil restraining order cases and criminal prosecutions in one
well-regarded specialized domestic violence court, offenders in the restraining order
cases “had the most violent and abusive criminal histories and were among the
greatest substance abusers, posing the highest risk to their victims for repeat
violence.”  Iovanni & Miller, supra note 48, at 317.  The interaction between civil
protective orders, private criminal complaints, arrest-initiated criminal prosecutions,
and family court responses to domestic violence is a complex matter.  Since different
types of remedies serve different functions, and individual cases involve a wide variety
of circumstances, it is important to resist the temptation to think of the different
settings and remedies in hierarchical terms, with family court as involving less serious
cases, and felony prosecutions at the top of the pyramid.
70. See Iovanni & Miller, supra note 48, at 313-16 (discussing evidence of the
benefits of civil protection orders to victims of domestic violence even in cases in
which contact and abuse continue).
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administers simple and easy to understand remedies, thereby
providing a safe social distance between “normal” families and those
afflicted with domestic violence.71  By singling out abusers for
punishment, the criminal justice system also encourages (and
sometimes treats as a prerequisite) termination of the relationship
between victim and abuser.72  The idea that victims can only be safe if
they separate from their abusers increases the social distance between
a small group of “deviant” families (those rent asunder by violence
and in need of criminal law intervention) and most families, who
because they continue to live together, are presumptively free of
domestic violence and other social problems.73 These
oversimplifications help protect advocates and government
functionaries alike from attending to messy and threatening realities,
including the existence of a continuum between the normal and the
violent, and the prevalence of violent and illegally coercive behavior
within families and in intimate relationships.74  These are realities that
we find difficult to tolerate for long without falling back into
judgment, blame and categorical thinking.
In short, criminal approaches may be more attractive because they
better enable people to manage the anxiety and distress brought on
by contact with patterns of intimate violence and coercion and
control in family settings.  From this perspective, the overemphasis
on criminal remedies and the inadequate fact-finding resources and
                                                          
71. One classic way to manage anxiety and maintain “safe” boundaries is by
targeting people from marginalized groups for regulation and punishment.  For an
illuminating exploration of woman battering and the politics of criminal justice,
including the damage inflicted on communities of color by the “war on drugs,” and
with particular attention to the implications of criminal justice approaches for
women of color, see PTACEK, supra note 30, at 37-39.  See also Symposium, Author Meets
Readers, supra note 60, at 331-32 (discussing racial bias in the criminalization of
battering behavior by men); SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 15, at 62-64,
184-88, 196 (describing ways the “intersection of racism and sexism” can create
added problems for battered women of color, especially in mandatory arrest
situations); Espinoza, supra note 47, at 930-36 (discussing how “colorblind lawyering”
is not always in the client’s best interest); and ROBERTS, supra note 8, passim (racism
in society’s responses to Black families).
72. Since batterers frequently escalate their violence and other acts of coercion
and control at the time of and subsequent to separation from their intimate partners,
pressuring victims of violence to leave their batterers is a highly questionable
practice.  See supra note 54 (reviewing data from various sources on separation
assault).
73. See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 15, at 78 (suggesting that is we
are honest about our own relationships, our own experiences might lead to a sense
of identification with rather than distance from the experiences of women who are
battered).
74. See id. at 77-79 (noting that asking why battered women stay in relationships
rather than what makes batterers abuse prevents us from having to examine the
compromises and contradictions involved in all intimate relationships).
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practices in family courts may both be aspects of the same underlying
problem, our collective and individual difficulties in tolerating the
painful feelings that exposure to intimate violence and child
maltreatment evoke.75
Acknowledging the limitations as well as the value of criminal law
remedies is thus not a reason to reject criminal law approaches in
favor of civil remedies.  Rather, what this discussion suggests is the
need for more attention to the emotional demands placed on legal
personnel as a result of involvement with domestic violence and child
maltreatment issues.  If politicians, government officials, judges,
attorneys and members of the public were better prepared to handle
those demands, there might be less need to oversimplify domestic
violence cases by slotting them into a reductionist law and order
framework, or subjecting them to routinized processing in family
court.  As a result, we may better be able to create the kind of
flexible, sophisticated and coherent legal and social responses that
are urgently needed.
III. ADDITIONAL STRUCTURAL AND ATTITUDINAL OBSTACLES TO
ADDRESSING THE FACT-FINDING GAP
What other factors, besides the greater attractiveness of criminal
law remedies and budget limitations, contribute to the neglect of civil
court fact-finding needs?76
Three important and interdependent factors seem to be operating.
The first is the prohibitive cost of legal services, which prevents most
claimants from obtaining adequate representation, and thus, real due
process.  When lawyers are not present to focus the issues, family
courts have an even more difficult time handling cases effectively.
Furthermore, family court decisions are rarely appealed, and those
which are typically centered on financial disputes between wealthy
litigants, so evolution of case law on other issues is slow.  Finally,
family lawyers are a much smaller and less powerful group than many
other segments of the bar, and thus cannot lobby as effectively for
systemic change.
A second factor is the pressures for settlement and against judicial
involvement in family decision-making (even in the context of
divorce), which creates additional obstacles to the litigation of
meritorious claims.  The third factor is closely related to the first two.
Most people doubt that judges and lawyers are likely to be much help
                                                          
75. See infra Parts IV.A-C.
76. See supra Part II; supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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in resolving family and intimate relationship disputes.  The fact-
finding gap persists in significant part because we have not been able
to imagine a way to overcome these obstacles.
A. The Prohibitive Cost of Legal Services 
The cost of legal services is a primary factor in the continuing
neglect of the fact-finding gap, because with inadequate or no
representation, the adversary system cannot operate properly.  Family
matters, including but not limited to domestic violence cases, present
a dilemma for the society and its legal system.  Most cases demand
significant attorney time if they are to be handled appropriately, but
legal fees are not generally covered by insurance,77 and except for
those at the top of the income pyramid, do not involve sufficiently
large sums of money to readily support private financing of the legal
services needed (nor are contingency fees in this context considered
ethical).78  Draconian cuts in legal services funding have further
reduced the availability of lawyers to handle family matters, especially
those which are contested.79  While many attorneys do excellent work
under trying circumstances, either as public interest or legal services
attorneys, on a pro bono basis or for moderate fees, their numbers
are tiny in relation to the size of the need for representation of
individual litigants of modest means in family law matters.  Domestic
relations cases differ in this regard, for example, from tort law, where
money damages are at stake and contingency fees are permitted, and
civil rights cases, where deep pockets and fee shifting provide some
opportunities for redress of claims.  In consequence, the vast majority
                                                          
77. With the exception of the small number of people who are covered by
prepaid legal services plans, which are usually employment related.  Not all of these
cover contested family matters, and those that do often have significant limits on the
extent of legal services available.
78. For studies showing that the high cost of litigation is a major cause of the
increase in self-representation in family matters, see Berenson, supra note 31, at 116-
18.  One article reported that the average cost of litigating a child custody case in
Orange County, Cal., was $10,000 in attorney’s fees, and $4,000 in forensic fees. Id. at
117.
79. See Martha Minow, Lawyering for Human Dignity, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 143, 144-49 (2002) (asserting that gaining access to legal services is
becoming increasingly difficult as the ratio of unmet need to service provision
continues to increase).  For example, in 2001, the New York “Legal Aid Society’s Civil
Division turned away at least six eligible potential clients for every client it [could]
assist.”  Michael Barbosa, Lawyering at the Margins, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y &
L. 135, 137 (2002); see also Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors
as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search of Access, Connection and Voice, 63 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1071-72, 1077-78 (1995) (criticizing “a skewed triage system that
neglects domestic violence issues,” and the marginalizing of domestic violence
because of the privileging of the public realm over the private, and because of the
“false dichotomy between instrumental and affective lawyering styles”).
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of people in family court are unrepresented or are represented
poorly, and the informality and brevity of hearings and failure to
allow evidence to be properly developed or introduced often goes
unchallenged both at the trial and appellate levels (especially since
appeals are quite rare).80  As a result of the way legal representation is
financed, there is also no large, well-organized and well-remunerated
group of attorneys available to advocate in the political process for
systemic changes to advance the interests of family law litigants and
potential litigants.81
B. The Pro-Settlement Bias of Family Courts
Another issue is the anti-litigation bias of family courts.  For
powerful practical and ideological reasons, the family court system
has long encouraged negotiated or mediated private settlements
rather than public judicial proceedings to resolve disputes between
present or former intimates, especially disputes between parents.82
The preference for settlement over litigation is of course not limited
to family matters, but given the societal importance of the issues at
stake—particularly in child custody and domestic violence cases—the
particular reasons for this preference in the family law context are of
                                                          
80. See Berenson, supra note 31, at 105 (commenting that the increase of self-
represented litigants in family law matters [due to the high cost of legal fees and lack
of attorneys providing free or low cost services] burdens the courts and often results
in unjust decisions for parties to family law disputes).  In addition to the problem of
cost and inadequate representation at the trial level, appeals are discouraged by the
time sensitivity of most family matters, especially those involving children or patterns
of coercion and control; by the discretion accorded trial judges under typically broad
statutory standards; and by the fact that parties are not repeat players (which reduces
the incentives for appeals).  See also supra text following note 76.
81. In related areas of family law where the government does provide some funds
for legal representation, like parent advocacy within the child welfare system, the
lawyers are typically paid well below market rates applicable to other areas of law, and
have had a difficult time in many places getting even minimally adequate resources.
Advocacy gaps for children have to some extent been addressed through the efforts
of public interest organizations and attorneys and advocates associated with law
school clinics; inadequate representation of parents has received even less attention.
See ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 125-26.
82. See Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law,
88 YALE L.J. 950, 953-58 (1979), for a discussion of the long tradition of negotiated
settlement in divorce cases and the policy reasons to defer to private agreement.  See
also CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW 147 (2d
ed. 2000), for a discussion of court-ordered and authorized mediation for family law
disputes; Ray Madoff, Lurking in the Shadow: The Unseen Hand of Doctrine in Dispute
Resolution 5 (2002) (noting that the trend toward mediated settlements in family
matters has had far less influence on family will contests, as a result of doctrinal rules
that “involve a backward looking inquiry that focuses on testator intent and provides
moral condemnation under a winner-take-all system”), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=309749.
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interest.83
Private settlements of family disputes best conform to the ideals of
family autonomy and privacy, which have had powerful appeal
throughout United States history.84  The traditional ban and
subsequent restrictions on access to divorce were consistent with
these notions.85  Family conflicts were forced into an innocent
party/guilty party mold, or treated as shameful signs of weak moral
character on the part of both parties.  Now that divorce is readily
available and fault considerations de-emphasized, a vast number of
people engaged in conflicts with former intimates turn to the legal
system to facilitate the resolution of their disputes.  However, given
the societal anxiety and distress that such conflicts evoke, and the
lack of a social consensus about what values should govern their
resolution, it is not surprising that divorce law is increasingly
privatized, particularly custody dispute resolution.  As a result, both
legal standards and legal procedures are increasingly designed to
reduce litigation to the bare minimum.86  Parties are expected to
resolve disputes as best they can by themselves with minimal or no
                                                          
83. See Madoff, supra note 82, at 1-3 (listing a wide range of areas for which
mediation is touted); see also Andrew Kull, The Simplification of Private Law, 51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 284, 291-93 (2001) (suggesting that, due to a new perception that certain
disputes are not important enough to justify the investment of legal resources in
their resolutions, there is a related trend in private law to move away from equitable
inquiries and instead to adopt no-fault legal rules for the resolution of disputes
between private citizens).
84. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973,
976-80 (1991) (reviewing the history and critical feminist commentary on the
descriptive and analytic strengths and weaknesses of commonly held dichotomous
notions of sharply differentiated public and private spheres).
85. Lifetime marriage without divorce was originally part of a larger structure of
moral regulation under what was characterized as the divinely ordained authority of
husbands and fathers.  The privacy and autonomy rationale, absent explicit
patriarchal justifications, came to the fore in later years, along with fault divorce.  See
Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117, 2118-20 (1996) for a discussion of the evolution of rationales for denying wives
protection from battering, and from hierarchical status norms to privacy and
autonomy within the private sphere of the family, now reconceived in terms of
companionate marriage.
86. See Madoff, supra note 82, at 12-17 (suggesting a connection between
extensive doctrinal changes in divorce law between 1965 and 1985, and the increased
reliance on negotiation and mediation to resolve divorce related disputes).  The
three most important changes in divorce laws are: “(1) the issues in divorce [and
custody] law are governed by vague standards and there is broad judicial discretion;
(2) the inquiry is primarily forward-looking in nature; and (3) the opportunity for
moral vindication has been largely eliminated.” Id. at 14.  For discussion of the
American Law Institute’s Draft Principles for the Law of Family Dissolution, which
continues the trend toward encouraging private rather than litigated dispute
resolution, and  which “regularly invite couples to substitute their agreements for the
law’s rules . . . and [attempt] to give couples a freer rein to negotiate . . . [while]
reducing their incentives to bargain strategically,” see SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note
82, at 108-09.
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judicial fact-finding or decision, either through negotiation or with
the aid of brief sessions with court-connected mediators.87  Anyone
who chooses to litigate, even sometimes when there is a lot of money
at stake, is likely to be stigmatized as foolish, unreasonable or
emotionally unbalanced.  As in many other situations, gender bias
often plays a role in determining which party bears the brunt of such
characterizations.88
The anti-litigation bias perhaps reaches its apogee in the context of
child custody litigation.  There are many factors involved in this
development.  Family lawyers, legal scholars and social scientists have
described the difficulties child custody cases pose for judges and
legislators as a result of the prospective nature of child custody
decision-making, the diversity of our cultural norms and beliefs about
human flourishing, and the poor fit between the personalities,
preferences, training and experience of most judges and the subject
matter at hand.89  Now that the preference for sole custody and the
gender-based standards, such as the tender years presumption, that
made the outcome of litigation more predictable have been replaced
with a preference for joint legal custody and if possible, shared
physical custody, and in the face of the negative consequences of
protracted custody litigation for the children involved, there is
enormous and understandable pressure on the legal system to
discourage custody litigation and privatize as many disputes as
possible.90
                                                          
87. For discussion of the strength of the mediation movement for family matters,
including those involving domestic violence, see Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547-48 (1991); DALTON &
SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 415; see also Meier, supra note 10, at 689 n.107 (describing
a domestic violence child custody case she litigated in which the judge blamed both
parties for bringing their dispute to court rather than working it out like “mature
adults”).  For a trenchant analysis of the inconsistency between feminist
understandings of battering and the premises of mediation, see Fischer et al., supra
note 55, at 2157-65.
88. On the double-binds battered women often experience in the context of
mandatory mediation, as a result of both batterers’ manipulative behavior and
mediators’ ignorance about domestic violence, see BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra
note 2, at 124-25.  On the pressure to mediate custody and divorce disputes and the
adverse consequences for women, particularly those experiencing patterns of
violence and coercion and control, see Dalton, Domestic Torts, supra note 47, at 365-
66.
89. For the classic article discussing this topic, see Robert H. Mnookin, Child
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 226, 249-62 (1975); see also Chambers, supra note 45, at 480-86
90. On the shift from the tender years presumption to joint custody, see Meier,
supra note 10, at Part III.A.  On the negative consequences of custody litigation for
children, see JANET JOHNSTON & LINDA E.G. CAMPBELL, IMPASSES OF DIVORCE: THE
DYNAMICS AND RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT (1998); JUDITH WALLERSTEIN &
SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER
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The anti-litigation bias of the family court system is problematic for
anyone with a meritorious legal claim whose adversary is able to
exploit superior bargaining power in negotiations, and for significant
numbers of parents whose personalities or circumstances make a
negotiated solution impractical.  However, the trend to privatize
disputes is an even more serious obstacle for potential domestic
violence claimants, whose circumstances are necessarily inconsistent
with cherished beliefs about the family that make cooperative
bargaining seem possible even when relationships break up.  As Joan
Meier documents in her path-breaking article in this symposium, in
cases involving children, the tendency towards privatization is linked
to false notions of neutrality and formalistic attachment to dividing
parenting time and authority equally between mothers and fathers.
These notions further impede domestic violence claimants’ access to
appropriate judicial relief.91
C. The Cumulative Impact of the Fact-Finding Gap and Other
Circumstances on People Struggling with Domestic Violence
The cumulative impact of the factors noted here is truly
remarkable, particularly in civil protective order hearings and in
divorce and custody matters where there are credible domestic
violence claims and genuine safety concerns.  Going to court as a
litigant is a stressful and unappealing prospect in the best of
circumstances, particularly for people experiencing family conflict or
dysfunction.  Most people who come to family court have inadequate
financial resources, and abusers often seek to maintain their power
by restricting victims’ access to financial resources.92  Yet people who
are being subjected by their partners to patterns of coercion and
control who then seek the aid of the family courts must either
represent themselves or somehow come up with the money to hire
attorneys, who often require substantial retainers and may be
reluctant to undertake cases involving domestic violence at all.  Most
family lawyers have little experience with domestic violence matters,
                                                          
DIVORCE (1989).
91. See Meier, supra note 10, at Parts III.A-B; see also DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra
note 3, at 357-64 (giving a brief overview of the evolution of legal standards
promoting various forms of shared legal and physical custody).
92. See PTACEK, supra note 30, at 76 tbl. 4.3, for data from a 1992 study of a
random sample of 100 restraining order files from Dorchester and Quincy,
Massachusetts, in which a number of women reported economic or resource abuse.
“Even in affidavits written hastily before their initial court appearances, many women
felt it important to name threats, intimidation, economic abuse, and sexual violence
as important to why they came to court.” Id. at 78.
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and many are dismissive or insensitive to such claims.93  If the clients
manage to get adequate representation, they must then assist in
marshaling evidence, usually under great time pressure and often
about humiliating events that they have previously tried to keep
private, in a court system that either prohibits or discourages
discovery and may severely limit the admissibility of evidence.  In
many circumstances, the domestic violence claimant will be subjected
to intimidating cross-examination94 and in the course of hearings,
many will also experience bureaucratic or hostile reactions from
judges.95  Along the way such claimants may be dealing with
threatened or intermittent violence, and must constantly weigh their
concerns for their own and their children’s safety and well-being
against the unfortunately all too real fear that destructive and
potentially dangerous custodial arrangements, including primary
                                                          
93. See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 15, at 95 (noting that many
battered women cannot afford legal representation, and even if they can, many
lawyers are not “sensitive to their particular problems”).  See also Dalton, Paradigms,
supra note 41, at 284, citing The Family Violence Project of the National Council of Juvenile
and Family Court Judges, Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State
Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L. Q. 197, 214 (1995) (discussing family lawyers’ poor
performance in building adequate evidentiary records of domestic violence).
94. If there are parallel civil and criminal proceedings, the defendant’s criminal
counsel is likely to provide representation in the civil case as well.  Given the linked
nature of the cases and the norms of adversary behavior in criminal courts, defense
attorneys tend to be quite aggressive in these circumstances.  Even if the complainant
is represented, s/he is unlikely to have been adequately prepared by counsel for
testimony, because of the short time between the grant of the temporary restraining
order and the final restraining order hearing.
95. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law,
Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1671-73 (1990) (discussing
court employees’ negative behavior towards victims of domestic violence); PTACEK,
supra note 30, at 46-48, 52-57 (discussing inappropriate and harmful police responses
to victims of domestic violence in the 1970s and 1980s); DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra
note 3, at 526 (court officials in the late 1980s); see also Susan Bryant & Maria Arias,
Case Study, A Battered Women’s Rights Clinic: Designing a Clinical Program which
Encourages a Problem-Solving Vision of Lawyering that Empowers Clients and Community, 42
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 207, 221 (1992).  As a result of feminist concerns
with judicial performance, the Violence Against Women Act includes funds for the
training of both federal and state judges. See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra
note 15, at 188, 240.  It is unclear how much progress has been made.  Iovanni and
Miller report research from the mid and late 1990s illustrating anti-victim bias and
open hostility toward battered women on the part of judges and court officials.
Iovanni & Miller, supra note 48, at 316-18.  Ptacek’s 1999 study of eighteen judges in
two specialized domestic violence courts in Massachusetts, showing improved judicial
behavior toward domestic violence claimants, also reports some recent examples of
negative judicial conduct.  PTACEK, supra note 30, at 104-05 (illustrating harsh
demeanor toward women complainants); id. at 109-10 (pointing out inappropriately
disengaged or friendly behavior toward male defendants); id. at 127-33 (showing race
and class-biased failures to provide economic remedies to domestic violence
complainants).  Since Ptacek’s study involved a small number of judges in a “model”
court, the behavior of judges hearing domestic violence cases overall probably
continues to be mixed.  See also infra notes 167-175 and accompanying text
(discussing the dynamics of problematic judicial behavior and prospects for change).
32
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 17
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol11/iss2/17
FREEDMAN_PKFINAL5.DOC 6/9/03  1:36 PM
2003] SECONDARY TRAUMATIC STRESS 599
residential custody to the abuser, will be ordered if they do not
cooperate in developing a parenting plan and agree to joint custody.
All such claimants must also face a substantial risk that the
domestic violence claim will be dismissed.  In civil protective order
proceedings, a surprisingly large proportion of claimants will be
encouraged by their own attorneys to settle for less protection, rather
than to risk outright dismissal of the claim by an overburdened, often
poorly trained and possibly unsympathetic or even hostile judge.96
Domestic violence claims are also particularly likely to be dismissed in
the context of ongoing divorce or custody proceedings, because such
claims will be seen either as the product of an overreaction to the
conflict “normally” associated with divorce, or as a manipulative tactic
designed to gain unfair advantage in the custody proceedings, or
both.97  Even if the domestic violence itself is acknowledged, judges
and custody evaluators all too frequently discount the significance of
violent and controlling behavior by fathers when determining
custody arrangements and parenting plans.98  If the domestic violence
claimant is unrepresented, the odds of failure rise steeply, in part
because without the evidence that an attorney could help gather and
present, most such cases will come down to one partner’s word
against the other, and the burden of proof is of course on the
claimant.99
                                                          
96. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 10, at Part I (describing two cases where women
settled for less protection due to judicial hostility and ignorance); see also supra note
46 (discussing the negative effects of unacknowledged reactivity to domestic violence
issues on the performance of divorce lawyers in domestic violence cases) and Dalton,
Paradigms, supra note 41, at 281-285 (discussing obstacles facing battered women and
their lawyers that prevent abuse from being accurately identified, and hence
preclude appropriate relief  in family court).
97. A woman who raises domestic violence issues in the divorce or custody
context “upsets the smooth functioning of the system, and is readily cast as a pariah.
Such women are often suspected of manipulating the system for their own
advantage, distorting the truth, or turning their children against their former
partners out of vindictiveness.”  Dalton, Domestic Torts, supra note 47, at 366.  Cf.
PTACEK, supra note 30, at 90 (summarizing a study of a random sample of 100
restraining order complaints which strongly counters the notion that women are
using restraining orders to gain advantage in divorce, home occupancy or child
support, since most plaintiffs were not married to defendants, nor still living with
defendants, nor were they asking for child support).
98. See Meier, supra note 10, at Part III.D-E; see also supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
99. In a recent interdisciplinary study of women who sought intervention for
domestic violence, only 32% of women who sought final restraining orders without
an attorney got such orders, whereas of the small sample of women who were
represented by attorneys when they returned to court for the final protective order
hearing, most (83%) were successful in getting the protective order.  See Murphy,
supra note 13, at 511-12, 521 app. G.  The study also showed the interaction of lack of
representation with other significant obstacles to success in civil protective order
proceedings.  For example, more than half of the women who filed petitions for
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The bottom line for victims can be devastating.  For example,
Kathleen Waits has published “Mary’s Story,” an account, written in
the first person, of one battered mother’s disastrous encounters (over
several years of divorce proceedings) with four different lawyers and a
number of expert witnesses and family court judges, that resulted in
the expenditure of tens of thousands of dollars; the batterer’s
successful use of the court system to harass the mother with false
accusations, thus putting the mother’s claimed deficiencies on trial;
ongoing abuse and intimidation of the mother by the father
throughout the proceedings; and the mother’s loss of the custody of
the youngest of her three children to the batterer.100  The ignorance,
insensitivity, incompetence, and misconduct on the part of the
professionals involved is shocking.  The mother was ultimately
successful in regaining custody of her youngest child when the
batterer’s new girlfriend reported that he was abusing the child.
Four years later, the father’s visitation rights were eliminated because
the children were thrown out of the back of his pick up truck when
he drove too fast on a bumpy road.101  The mother commented:
I cannot help but feel a little bitter that no one ever really cared
about my safety and its affect (sic) on our children.  In the court’s
eyes, Russ only became a bad father and a bad person when he
injured the children personally and individually. . . .  My word
about his abuse of the children never counted.102
In a similar vein, Battered Mothers Speak Out, a recent research report
based on interviews with domestic violence survivors in Massachusetts,
summarized battered mothers’ complaints:
about a host of offenses: how court personnel labeled them
hysterical and unreasonable; treated them with scorn,
condescension, and disrespect, failed to give them a chance to be
heard in court; and denied them access to sensitive investigations
and documents pertinent to their custody disputes.  Fifteen of the
                                                          
protective orders never got one, which is attributable to both the fact that a
substantial number of women (30%) never returned to court for the CPO hearing,
and that in 50% of the cases, the court or law enforcement failed to serve the ex
parte order.  Id.  See also DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 522; Peter Finn &
Sarah Colson, Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice, and Enforcement,
in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE:
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 43, 44 (1998) (reporting that “even with
a simplified petitioning procedure and energetic lay assistance, victims not
represented by counsel are less likely to get protection orders.  If an order is issued, it
is less likely to contain all appropriate provisions . . .”); Marano, supra note 3.
100. See Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Their Children: Lessons Learned From One
Woman’s Story, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 29, 34-67 (1998).
101. Id. at 59-62.
102. See id. at 61-62 (as excerpted in DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 348);
see also supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text; Meier, supra note 10, at Part III.D.
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40 women interviewed said that their ex-partners retained sole or
joint custody of the children–even though all 15 men reportedly
abused both their ex-wives and their children.  When it came to
allegations of spousal or child abuse, 38 women said judges, family
service officers, and [Guardians Ad Litem] had ignored or
minimized their claims. . . .  Carrie Cuthbert, one of the reports’
co-authors and co-director of the Wellesley Centers Women’s
Rights Network, explains . . . ‘Within the community of battered
women and their advocates, the family courts have gained a
reputation as a place where women don’t find justice.’103
D. Prospects for Fundamental Change
The situation in family courts, and particularly in domestic violence
and child abuse and neglect cases, cries out for remedy.  While
attorneys and clients are always frustrated when judges make legal or
fact-finding errors, the pervasive and systemic nature of family court
deficiencies is striking.  Family courts, particularly those with
domestic violence and child abuse and neglect dockets, are often
dismal places, overcrowded, underfunded, and inhumane in their
working conditions and their results.  Justice and human rights are
sacrificed in such circumstances, and society’s promises of protection,
security and care for its members are too often rendered
meaningless.
The current situation is neither hopeless nor very hopeful.  On the
one hand, many people in positions of authority and responsibility—
people in the state and federal government, the judiciary, the legal,
medical, mental health and social work professions, social activists,
and ordinary citizens—are already engaged in efforts to address the
crisis in family courts.  Many heartening efforts are underway, using
media attention, traditional political activism, social science research,
legal challenges and the mobilization of concerned citizens,
spearheaded by the existing movements for justice and care for
women, children and families.104
On the other hand, prospects for tackling the fact-finding gap in a
meaningful way do not seem very promising, at least to most
observers.  A careful look at the severity of the problems, particularly
in domestic violence and child abuse and neglect proceedings, as well
as the history in the child welfare system of repeated cycles of scandal,
promises of reform, and continued dysfunction, is sobering.105  Both a
                                                          
103. Lombardi, supra note 29.
104. See infra Part IV.B.2. , notes 183 and 185 and accompanying text, and app.
105. In early 2003, the New Jersey child welfare system was rocked by scandal as a
result of the death of a child whose case had erroneously been closed.  Among the
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lack of sustained attention to central difficulties and the profound
structural changes that seem warranted suggest that there may be
deeper patterns at work that deserve attention.
Making dramatic structural changes is a significant undertaking,
and decision-makers and the public have to be persuaded that the
results will be worth the effort.  Under present conditions, structural
reform of the family courts does not seem likely to pass the test.  It is
hard to imagine decision-makers or the public authorizing funding
that would dramatically increase basic fact-finding resources enough.
To do so would mean making lawyers available for everyone who
would benefit from legal representation; substantially increasing the
numbers of judges and mediators and the time and attention allotted
to each case; and revamping legal education by expanding clinics and
interdisciplinary collaborations so the new lawyers, judges and
mediators would be better prepared for this work.  One reason it is
hard to imagine these changes coming to pass is that, even with these
changes, it is not clear that people would be that much better off
unless there were a number of other equally fundamental changes at
the same time.
Many family matters involve domestic violence, patterns of
coercion or control or other serious parental problems, such as
alcoholism, drug abuse or mental illness.  Many families are also
suffering from moderate to severe economic and social disadvantage.
As a result, there are many additional resources that would have to be
available for families and individuals to derive real benefit from their
encounters with the legal system.  For instance, there would have to
be risk assessment, case screening, and evaluations and consultations
                                                          
problems that re-surfaced were chronic underfunding, crushing workloads and high
turnover among caseworkers, ancient and broken computer systems, and haphazard
supervision of workers.  See Leslie Kaufman & David Kocieniewski, Newark Boy’s Death
Reveals Failed Promise to Fix System, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at A1.  The New York Times
also noted that a similar crisis in 1998 had led to a flurry of reform initiatives, none
of which were implemented. “Taken together, experts and lawmakers say, the failure
to realize the needed reforms laid out nearly five years ago–a failure of political will
and sustained public interest–amounts to a familiar tale in the world of child welfare.
The formula of momentary crisis followed by calls for action followed by short-lived
commitment has played out repeatedly across the country over the decades.” Id.
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were several cycles of concern
about the impact on children of socially disapproved patterns of parental behavior.
Responses to woman abuse have also varied over time.  The results in both areas have
been mixed.  See, e.g., ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL
POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 5-7, 12-13
(1987); LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE 19-26, 289-99 (1988).  Gordon argues that “family violence cannot
be understood outside the context of the overall politics of the family.” Id. at 3; see
also PETERS, supra note 16, at 233 app. A and ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 174-200. How
might we proceed differently in hopes of avoiding the errors of the past, whether of
apathy and inertia, misdirected zeal or hostility to disfavored groups within society?
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with experts; advocates for children; supervised visitation;
coordination among the different branches of the legal system that
deal with family matters; and a variety of social services and treatment
programs for adults and children.  Income supports, employment
and educational opportunity, child day care, housing assistance, and
health care are some of the other resources that would also need to
be available.
Attention would also need to be paid to differential impacts of
judicial failures on particular groups and in particular circumstances.
The family court system (as well as the legal system as a whole) is not
simply dysfunctional and arbitrary, it is also oppressive along race,
class, disability, sexual orientation and gender lines, as has been
amply documented by others, including the book that occasioned
this symposium.106  It is folly to imagine that expanding judicial and
other resources for addressing family dysfunction either can be
accomplished or would be desirable if ways are not found to reduce
the frequently destructive effects (and side effects) of legal
intervention, including, but not limited to, these types of bias.
Thus, examined more deeply, current patterns of societal
investment have a certain logic.  Even in a more egalitarian society,
people would probably only invest scarce societal resources for the
resolution of family disputes when: (1) the criminal behavior of one
party is sufficiently serious to create a clear victim/perpetrator
dichotomy, and also implicate a generalized concern with law and
order; (2) there seems to be a reasonable chance that the legal
system will treat litigants fairly and reach accurate conclusions; and
(3) there are at least some of the resources necessary to deliver on
the system’s promises of protection and rehabilitation.  From this
vantage point, the historical cycles of incomplete or misguided
reform are hardly surprising.  People will not invest resources without
being able to imagine the possibility of getting better results; yet it is
hard to imagine getting good results from a system that is chronically
starved for resources and in which people lack confidence.
The difficulty of making change is not for lack of a clear blueprint
for change.  With change of this complexity and magnitude, that
kind of coherent plan is rarely if ever possible or necessary, especially
                                                          
106. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 15, at 62-65 (illustrating oppression
based on essentialism, racism, nationality, immigration); id. at 128-32 (demonstrating
oppression based on gender); BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 2, at 120-22
(illustrating racial and gender bias in custody disputes); id. at 125-26 (showing a
battering father’s successful use of a mother’s sexual orientation against her in a
custody dispute); see also ROBERTS, supra note 8, for an eloquent examination of the
powerful racial dimensions of the child welfare system’s destructive impact on
African-American families as well as the policy alternatives.  See also supra note 46.
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at the outset.  Rather, the problem is one of basic attitudes and core
beliefs.  To mobilize creative energy to tackle the problem of fact-
finding in domestic violence cases, and the larger problem of family
and individual suffering with which it is connected, requires some
sort of transformation in people’s attitudes toward themselves and
each other.  The possibility explored in the next section is that
compassionate witnessing can be a step toward that kind of
transformation of attitudes, beliefs and hence, choices.
IV. COMPASSIONATE WITNESSING AS A RESOURCE FOR CHANGE
One aspect of the problem of domestic violence and child
maltreatment that makes effective responses hard to create and
sustain—particularly responses that depend on fact-finding—is the
great difficulty most people experience in confronting the inhuman
treatment that people inflict on each other.  The paragraphs that
begin and end the introduction to psychiatrist Judith Lewis Herman’s
brilliant and iconoclastic book, Trauma and Recovery, provide
instructive commentary on this phenomenon:
The ordinary response to atrocities is to banish them from
consciousness.  Certain violations of the social compact are too
terrible to utter aloud: this is the meaning of the word
unspeakable.
Atrocities, however, refuse to be buried.  Equally as powerful as the
desire to deny atrocities is the conviction that denial does not work.
Folk wisdom is filled with ghosts who refuse to rest in their graves
until their stories are told.  Murder will out.  Remembering and
telling the truth about terrible events are prerequisites both for the
restoration of the social order and for the healing of the individual
victims.107
. . . .
This book appears at a time when public discussion of the common
atrocities of sexual and domestic life has been made possible by the
women’s movement, and when public discussion of the common
atrocities of political life [referring to traumas suffered in warfare
and under torture] has been made possible by the movement for
human rights. . . .  I have tried to communicate my ideas in a
language that preserves connections, a language that is faithful
both to the dispassionate, reasoned traditions of my profession and
to the passionate claims of people who have been violated and
outraged.  I have tried to find a language that can withstand the
imperatives of doublethink and allows all of us to come a little
                                                          
107. HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 1, 4.
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closer to facing the unspeakable.108
Herman expands on this central dilemma as follows:
To study psychological trauma is to come face to face both with
human vulnerability in the natural world and with the capacity for
evil in human nature.  To study psychological trauma means
bearing witness to horrible events. . . . [W]hen the traumatic events
are of human design, those who bear witness are caught in the
conflict between victim and perpetrator.  It is morally impossible to
remain neutral in this conflict.  The bystander is forced to take
sides.
It is very tempting to take the side of the perpetrator.  All the
perpetrator asks is that the bystander do nothing.  He appeals to
the universal desire to see, hear, and speak no evil.  The victim, on
the contrary, asks the bystander to share the burden of pain.  The
victim demands action, engagement and remembering.109
As Herman makes clear, the challenges she describes apply not
only to therapists, but also to everyone who comes into contact with
atrocities, including by simply following the news.  The dilemma of
how to respond intensifies with proximity.  The dilemma is even
more severe for people whose professional and social roles involve
assisting in ascertaining the truth of what occurred, preventing
further violation, holding perpetrators accountable and helping
victims (and perpetrators) recover.  The victim’s demand on
bystanders for “action, engagement and remembering” powerfully
affects not only care-giving professionals, but also activists, reformers
and scholars in the human rights movements concerned with
domestic violence and child maltreatment, and legislators, attorneys,
and judges.110
Herman’s work both points the way forward, and illustrates a
central conundrum of work with trauma, particularly within the legal
system.  The legal system necessarily operates in stark polarities.
When facts are found and a judgment is rendered, the fluid and
often messy realities of lived experience are temporarily fixed in the
clear, formal terms of the legal ruling.  In an adversary proceeding,
one party’s view is vindicated, and the other is rejected.  People
involved are likely to feel both shock and relief.  People feel relief
because the matter is resolved, and, if the judgment is fair, because
the truth has prevailed.  Even if the facts have been found with a
                                                          
108. Id. at 4.
109. Id. at 7-8.
110. See also id. at 7-32 (suggesting that historical cycles of attention and
inattention to interpersonal traumas reflect the underlying distress provoked by the
subject matter).
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reasonable degree of accuracy, however, there is also a sense of
shock, as the parties who have contended for the losing position
confront their losses.  Moreover, this sense of shock is not confined to
the losing side.  Until the judgment is reached, all the participants
participate to some extent in a number of alternate realities,
representing the many possible outcomes of the proceeding.
Whatever the outcome, when these alternate possibilities are at least
temporarily extinguished by the judgment, all the participants must
come to terms with the sudden shift in position and perspective that
the judgment has wrought.  Furthermore, at the moment of the
judgment, people are fixed in their positions, while in reality, none of
us is simply a victim or a perpetrator (or even simply a bystander).
We all participate to some degree in all of the positions.  After all, the
traumatic triad of perpetrator, victim, and bystander is familiar from
our earliest memories of childhood.  The slipperiness of these
categories continues to plague us as adults.  As victims, we take on
some of the characteristics of perpetrators, for example, when we
unfairly blame ourselves for what happened to us, and also when we
want vengeance and not just accountability for the perpetrators.111  As
perpetrators, we participate in victimhood as well, in that our
misdeeds and crimes cause negative consequences for us, and not
only for our victims.  Although many perpetrators never consciously
recognize these dynamics, these consequences include self-hatred
and despair, as well as increased alienation from other people.
Moreover, we are all bystanders to our own experiences and those of
others, especially since by the time we have an opportunity to tell
anyone else about what has happened to us or what we have done,
the event is already in the past, and we are now witnessing past
experience, rather than living it at the moment.  A holistic
perspective allows us to recognize the complex web of relationships
                                                          
111. Indeed, one of the notable consequences of interpersonal violence is the
intense rage, as well as terror and grief, that victimization necessarily generates in
both adults and children who are the targets of violence at the hands of others.
Healing from trauma involves developing a sufficient sense of self to be able to feel
and tolerate the intense feelings trauma causes, including an enhanced capacity to
understand violent impulses, impulses that all human beings share, (though not
everyone is conscious of such feelings).  Without such healing, victims of trauma
must somehow distance themselves from their feelings, which requires a great deal of
energy and causes considerable suffering.  Or victims may act these feelings out
toward themselves or others.  It is not surprising that self-destructive behavior is
common among victims of abuse, or that many adults who commit certain types of
crimes were themselves victimized as children, though most people who are
victimized do not go on to commit such crimes.  For a related and illuminating
discussion of the psychological dynamics of oppression, the roles of oppressors and
oppressed, and pathways to change, see generally PHILIP LICHTENBERG, COMMUNITY
AND CONFLUENCE: UNDOING THE CLINCH OF OPPRESSION (2d ed. 1994), which is
available from the Gesalt Institute of Cleveland Press.
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and the underlying fluidity of the categories of victim, perpetrator
and bystander, rather than slipping into polarized and distorted
thinking.
When, as children, we first experienced the roles that make up the
traumatic triad, we lacked a secure sense of ourselves as separate
beings simultaneously deeply connected to others around us.  In
these circumstances, all of the positions are terrifying.  It is worth
noting that even with the most caring and effective parents, all
children internalize these roles to some degree.  This is because no
matter how loving and capable their parents or caregivers, all
children have powerful experiences of disappointment and loss, and
protect themselves from otherwise overwhelming feelings by
assuming blame and unwarranted responsibility.  When children
undergo severe trauma, of course, these effects are usually far
stronger.
All of us carry the unresolved traces of those earlier experiences in
our adult lives.  Each time they come to the fore, we have an
opportunity to resolve them in some way.  Nonetheless, our
childhood terror is powerful.  When our current experiences make
the victim/perpetrator/bystander dynamic present to us in some way,
our first response is to recoil from the prospect of becoming
unwitting participants in the drama, either as victims, perpetrators or
bystanders.  Since all seem terribly painful, our first reaction is usually
to try as hard as we can to escape, using a variety of defensive
maneuvers.  Among the most common is to use whatever categories
and strategies we have available in an effort to impose logic, establish
control and somehow save ourselves from a reality that seems
overwhelming and intolerable.  At that point, we are no longer able
to use legal categories to serve truth, justice and compassion, because
our first priority is to keep our distance from the whole situation.
Learning to respond to trauma effectively involves developing the
capacity to be aware of our deep connections to the situations and
people with whom we work without becoming overwhelmed by our
own defensive thinking and losing track of our roles and
responsibilities.  This challenge operates on us individually, and in all
human systems.  The ability to identify who has taken a particular
action and respond appropriately with further action is a central
feature of legal practice (and of human social intercourse in
general).  Yet we are constantly at risk of defending ourselves from
our own emotional responses to the proceedings (and shock at the
power of legal judgments) by reducing the human beings who appear
in court to two-dimensional figures called “perpetrators” or
“batterers;” “victims,” “battered women” or “children of batterers;” or
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even “bystanders.” When we treat these categories as accurate,
comprehensive and mutually exclusive descriptions of actual people,
we may experience some temporary relief from the discomfort of our
own ambivalent feelings about the drama to which we are bystanders.
Unfortunately, when we are treating our categories as if they fully
captured reality and fail to recognize other dimensions that are
operating simultaneously, we lose the open heartedness that is
necessary to engage effectively with humans in distress.  Moreover, we
will lack the clarity and groundedness necessary to make and
implement the required judgments, which the other participants
(and we) understandably find so shocking.
The rest of this Article seeks to identify practices that can assist
people doing domestic violence work in the legal system to recognize
when their thinking is distorted by the emotional freight attached to
work with trauma, so that the legal system can serve truth and
embody both justice and compassion.  It follows two separate lines of
inquiry, which then come together in the final sections.  The starting
point for the first line of inquiry is the work of Herman and other
pioneers,112 who have taken the lead in investigating both the
dynamics of trauma and recovery (particularly forms of trauma
resulting from atrocities), and the practices which facilitate work with
victims and perpetrators.  Often guided by this pioneering work,
many people, including care-giving professionals,113 lawyers and legal
advocates, as well as other social activists, scholars and reformers,
continue to dedicate their lives to domestic violence and child
advocacy work.  Many who work with victims or perpetrators of
violence find their work profoundly rewarding.114  These are people
who have responded to victims’ needs to be heard and cared forand
to the equally profound need for humane responses to people who
have committed acts of domestic violence, as well as those who have
taken up the work of prevention.115  These first sections describe the
understandings and practices, drawn from both the care-giving
professions and activist and scholarly traditions, that have made
sustained work of this kind possible.116  The name used here for these
                                                          
112. See Appendix infra for a bibliography and resources.
113. See infra note 116.
114. For discussions of the rewards of different types of work to stop, prevent and
assist in recovery from interpersonal trauma, see, e.g., DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra
note 3, at 1121-22; PETERS, supra note 16, at 225-26; HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7,
at 153-54; LAURIE ANNE PEARLMAN & KAREN W. SAAKVITNE, TRAUMA AND THE THERAPIST
400-06 (1995).
115. For an overview of batterer intervention systems, see GONDOLF, supra note 2.
116. The women’s movement and the movement for children’s rights overlap at
many points with other grass-roots social movements as well as with groups within the
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understandings and practices is “compassionate witnessing.”
The second line of inquiry focuses on the aspects of action,
engagement and remembrance that make up the project of
restorative justice and peacemaking work.  Caregivers and advocates,
lawyers and judges have parts to play in pursuing justice and making
peace.  This inquiry examines how the practice of compassionate
witnessing, which therapists and others have developed, relates to the
tasks of ascertaining truth, securing victim safety, practicing
restorative justice and peacemaking.  Both lines of inquiry then come
together in asking what compassionate witnessing can contribute to
efforts to address the fact-finding gap in civil domestic violence
proceedings, as well as other deficiencies in existing systems of social
response and prevention.
A. Compassionate Witnessing and the Problem of Bystander Reactivity
1.  Psychological Perspectives on How People Cope with Distress
Compassionate witnessing is the capacity to remain open hearted
and productively engaged with people in painful and difficult
circumstances, particularly when outcomes are uncertain.  People in
movements to end intimate violence and those who are engaged in
cutting edge human services work are at their best when they are able
to relate in this way.117  It is this capacity that enables people who work
with trauma to respond compassionately to their own moments of
grief, anger and despair; recognize and handle compassion fatigue;
avoid burnout; create community; and establish new pathways to
change when existing paths are blocked.118
The practice of compassionate witnessing is informed by
psychological thinking about basic human needs for connection and
relationship, and, conversely, how people respond to experiences of
                                                          
academy, and groups of care-giving professionals, including nurses, physicians,
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers and clergy.  The thoughts advanced in Part
IV of this Article are informed by the experiences and theoretical and practical work
of people in many of these different contexts.
117. For working definitions of compassionate witnessing, see supra note 20, and
infra notes 125 and 126 and accompanying text and the text following note 135.  The
ideas embodied in the practice of compassionate witnessing have an ancient history,
and yet have needed to be re-discovered and re-invented in every generation.
Traditions that have nourished this practice include Zen Buddhism, Kabbalah,
mystical Christianity, Sufi poetry, and various schools of psychotherapeutic thought,
including Humanistic Psychology.  See infra app. for a terminological note and a brief
list of general, psychological and legal resources.
118. For a pathbreaking collection of articles on the problems faced by
professionals who work with traumatized people, as well as possible solutions, see
COMPASSION FATIGUE, supra note 16.
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disconnection and pain.  As Jean Baker Miller and Irene Pierce Stiver
explain,
Violation of another represents the opposite of empathy.  If one
person is empathic to another, s/he will not engage in the kind of
disconnection or mistreatment that hurts or violates that person–
and violates the relationship. . . .
With regard to non-mutual relationships, we believe there is a
continuum that starts with a lack of awareness of the experience of
others and the sense of a person’s “right” to coerce them, and at its
extreme leads to racial, class or other oppressions on the societal
level, and on the more personal level to emotional, physical and
sexual abuse. 119
Domestic violence, child maltreatment and other inhumane
treatment of one person by another are forms of violation, and each
evokes pain both in its victims and in others who come in contact
with them.  Experiencing pain leads people to feel vulnerable, small,
and helpless, whether or not they are conscious of these reactions.
Similarly, people experiencing trauma directly or vicariously are
likely to feel fear, anger, grief and despair.  Since these feelings are
often unwelcome, more acceptable responses may quickly be
substituted, for example, boredom, impatience, frustration, irritation,
a vague sense of discomfort, blame, judgment, or loss of energy.
Reactivity—in the form of strong feelings or their common
substitutes—is a signal that a person is in distress of some kind.120  If
the reactivity and distress are minor, the person may be able to wait
until the feelings pass, or simply shift attention to something more
appealing.  If the feelings are stronger or recurring, people are likely
to respond to their distress either by acting inappropriately or,
recognizing that something is amiss, by engaging in a process of self-
reflection.  Personal growth occurs when someone is able to
recognize that her or his feelings are not simply the product of
present circumstances, but involve unresolved issues and distorted
thinking in another area of the person’s life, either contemporary or
in the past.  At that point, there is a possibility that the underlying
issues (which may not previously have been recognized) can be
identified and perhaps resolved.
This experience of becoming reactive is universal (though
heightened in traumatic contexts), and everyone navigates her or his
                                                          
119. JEAN BAKER MILLER & IRENE PIERCE STIVER, THE HEALING CONNECTION: HOW
WOMEN FORM RELATIONSHIPS IN THERAPY AND IN LIFE 58 (1997).
120. See supra note 24; see also MILLER & STIVER, supra note 119, at 77-78, 106-07.
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own reactivity with more or less success.121  The most satisfying
ongoing relationships are those in which the people involved are able
to recognize moments of reactivity, and use them as resources for
growth.  In such a relationship, people are more in touch with reality,
and more able to explore differences and similarities between
themselves and another.122  The alternative is for reactivity to be acted
out, and people to remain locked in the constricting patterns of
behavior and belief that developed originally as a method of
handling otherwise intolerable and overwhelming feelings of distress.
Psychotherapists’ work is to assist clients whose relationships are
impaired by old patterns of defensiveness and disconnection to learn
to make new choices for the present.123  In order to help clients make
                                                          
121. Psychotherapists often address patterns of reactivity in the context of
therapist-patient or other professional-client relationships in terms of transference
(on the part of the client) and counter-transference (on the part of the therapist or
other professional).  See Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference
in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259, 262-89 (1999) (discussing
transference, counter-transference and the attorney/client relationship, and
summarizing relevant psychoanalytic and legal literature); see also app.  Miller and
Stiver offer a useful reframing of traditional notions to emphasize the role of the
therapist’s personal reactions (or counter-transference) as a critical resource to
establishing the connectedness that is necessary for psychological healing.  MILLER &
STIVER, supra note 119, at 143; see also CONSTANCE J. DALENBERG,
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE AND THE TREATMENT OF TRAUMA 3-11 (2000) (giving an
overview of definitional issues and distinguishing different schools of thought).
Peters uses a narrower definition of counter-transference, as the lawyer’s package of
reactions specific to an individual client, as distinguished from secondary traumatic
stress, which she defines as the cumulative effect of working with trauma. See PETERS,
supra note 16, at § 9-2(f).  For a discussion comparing and contrasting the concepts
of counter-transference, secondary traumatic stress and burnout, see Figley, Overview,
supra note 16, in COMPASSION FATIGUE, supra note 16, at 1, 9-16.
122. Psychologist Harriet Goldhor Lerner offers this definition of intimacy:
[I]ntimacy means that we can be who we are in a relationship, and allow the other
person to do the same. . . . [In other words], we can stay emotionally connected to
that other party who thinks, feels, and believes differently, without needing to
change, convince, or fix the other. . . . An intimate relationship is one in which
neither party silences, sacrifices, or betrays the self and each party expresses
strength and vulnerability, weakness and competence in a balanced way.
HARRIET GOLDHOR LERNER, THE DANCE OF INTIMACY: A WOMAN’S GUIDE TO
COURAGEOUS ACTS OF CHANGE IN KEY RELATIONSHIPS 3 (1990). Miller and
Stiver use the concepts of mutual empathy and mutual empowerment in
relationships, which result in connection, in contrast to relationships characterized
by distance, power-over, and non-mutuality, which result in experiences of
disconnection, to capture similar ideas. MILLER & STIVER, supra note 119, at 42-
59.
123. Psychologist and therapist Deborah Anna Luepnitz explains
psychotherapeutic work this way:
What talking therapy helps us do is separate the particular catastrophes of our
family and social circumstances from the general catastrophe of having been born
human, and thus, subject to aging, death, and the dilemmas of intimacy caricatured
in Schopenhauer’s fable. . . . Psychotherapy cannot make us whole, but it does
allow us to transform suffering into speech and, ultimately, to learn to live with
desire. . . .  [I]t can help turn egregious neurotic misery into the porcupine
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change, psychotherapists must know something about their own
experiences of disconnection and connection, and the process of
healing.  Thus, methods of recognizing reactivity (in oneself as well as
in others) and utilizing the resulting information productively are
important parts of psychotherapeutic training.124  However, a concern
with reactivity and attention to methods of responding productively
to one’s own distress is by no means limited to psychotherapeutic
contexts, as the following section explains.
2.  An Introduction to the Concept of Compassionate Witnessing
Compassionate witnessing takes the constructs of psychotherapy
and simplifies and extends them.  Not simply a professional tool,
compassionate witnessing is one name for a more conscious and
practiced version of a capacity all human beings share, and all use in
our relationships.  In essence, compassionate witnessing allows
bystanders to recognize our reactivity as a sign of the truth of our
shared humanity: while we are individually quite different, we
simultaneously all have the same basic needs and the same repertoire
of emotional responses.  Rather than acting out that reactivity,
compassionate witnesses make the conscious choice to stay present to
this truth of connectedness and similarity, while using various
techniques that allow them to simultaneously acknowledge and own
their own reactive feelings.  Staying present has some important
correlates.  For example, from a perspective of our common
humanity, we cannot cast someone else out without in some sense
casting ourselves out too.125  Similarly, the practice of staying present
to our common humanity with others we encounter entails finding
effective ways to respond to suffering.  Our openheartedness allows
us to recognize and understand the suffering of others, because it is
similar to our own.  Our own suffering, combined with our ability to
                                                          
dilemmas of everyday life.
DEBORAH ANNA LUEPNITZ, SCHOPENHAUER’S PORCUPINES, INTIMACY AND ITS DILEMMAS
18-19 (2002).
124. See Silver, supra note 121, at 271 (citing psychotherapeutic literature on
counter-transference and several descriptions of psychoanalytic training); see also
infra app. for selected works from traumatic stress studies and psychology.
125. Thus, the practice involves being able to recognize the constant pull we all
experience to divide the world into good and bad, and consciously to choose to
recognize that both always co-exist.  As sages from many traditions teach, each of us is
a complex mixture of feelings and desires.  The mixture of good and bad and
everything in between is an important part of what it means to be human.  Dr.
Theodore Isaac Rubin suggests an appreciation for “compassionate shades of gray,”
as an alternative to “a dream world of non-existent, simplistic black-and-white notions
which simply do not apply to human life.”  THEODORE ISAAC RUBIN, COMPASSION AND
SELF-HATE 143 (1975).
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find comfort in the face of our suffering, leads us to see the
importance of responding to the suffering of others.  As a result,
compassionate witnesses both experience and create a sense of
commonality and shared purpose in addressing sources of trauma.
It is helpful to realize that compassionate witnessing involves a
more conscious use of the skills people use to create intimacy and
connection with each other in daily life.  Intimacy between people
depends on each person’s willingness to be in touch with her or his
own feelings and wants, which are expressions of that person’s life
force.  Compassionate witnesses are able to acknowledge their own
feelings and wants—a personal sense of self—while in relationship
with another, who also has distinct feelings, wants and selfhood.
None of us grow to adulthood with these capacities for intimacy fully
intact.  The work of adulthood (and not only of psychotherapy) is to
restore that capacity, which is necessary to a full life and satisfying
relationships.  All of us spend some of our time mired in the
defensive strategies developed in childhood (and perhaps intensified
as a result of painful adult experiences), and, in consequence, disown
parts of ourselves.126  The more we attempt to separate ourselves from
our distress, the more disoriented, vulnerable to upset, and
disconnected we become, and the more maintaining our defenses
seems a matter of life and death.  A downward spiral of defense
meeting defense keeps people feeling isolated, lonely and
increasingly desperate for connection.  Yet with connection comes
the certainty that blocked material and aspects of ourselves we
learned long ago to view as dangerous to our well-being will be
brought to the fore.
All of us suffer from this dilemma, as it is part of the human
condition,127 and all of us move in and out of connection as we
navigate through our lives.  Some people are more sensitive to this
dilemma, or have been exposed to more traumatic experiences, and
                                                          
126. Jean Baker Miller and Irene Pierce Stiver offer the following comments:
[A] relational context that includes serious or repeated disconnections will lead
people to create restricted and distorted images of the possibilities of relationships
between themselves and others, and to construct meanings that disparage and
condemn themselves.  These images and meanings then further limit their ability to
act within connections to know their own experience and to build a sense of
worthiness.
MILLER & STIVER, supra note 119, at 82-83.  Miller and Stiver suggest that our
fear of engaging with others because of our past disconnections and violations is so
powerful that we develop strategies of disconnection.  Through these strategies, we
try to maintain some degree of connection while keeping our full responses,
perceptions and feelings out of relationship.  Id. at 104-17 (discussing inter alia the
strategies of emotional disengagement, role-playing and replication).
127. Miller and Stiver use the term “central relational paradox.”  See id. at 81-82.
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for them, this dilemma can become excruciating.  People engaging in
violence and efforts at coercion and control are acting out this
dilemma in particularly dangerous and destructive ways.128  Bystanders
to domestic violence (and other scenes of trauma) who are successful
in navigating the core challenges of relationship in their own
personal lives are nonetheless likely to be deeply challenged by
engagement with the suffering of victims and perpetrators of violence
and coercion and control, because of the “human consequence of
knowing, caring and facing the reality of trauma.”129  As discussed
earlier and in section B of Part IV, the challenges of engagement are
particularly great for witnesses who take part in responding to the
demands of restorative justice and peacemaking.
3.  Components of Compassionate Witnessing Practice
Compassionate witnessing can enable bystanders, including
lawyers, judges, court personnel, advocates, and others, to remain
present to the painful truths of the experiences of victims and
perpetrators of violence in intimate relationships and family settings.
What is more important, this practice is profoundly beneficial to
everyone who undertakes it, whatever their chosen work, because, to
use Byron Katie’s phrase, it is a practice of “loving what is.”130  Nine
components of compassionate witnessing practice, which can also be
understood as requirements for adopting this stance, are discussed
here.  These include: (1) conscious choice; (2) adopting a moral
stance as a witness; (3) acknowledgment of the particular challenges
of work with trauma (that is, the problem of secondary or vicarious
traumatic stress); (4) integrated use of reason and emotion; (5)
maintenance of appropriate boundaries; and (6) a willingness to
explore one’s personal connections to the experiences and situations
one encounters as a witness.  The three final, and perhaps most
                                                          
128. For a remarkable account, in the context of restorative justice, of dialogues
between rape victims and the men who raped them, which eventually resulted in the
men’s acknowledgment that their rapes represented distorted attempts to get
empathy for their own past experiences of abuse and violation by imposing similar
agony on others, see D. Killian, Beyond Good & Evil: Marshall Rosenberg on Creating a
Non-Violent World, SUN, Feb. 2003, at 6-7, available at http://www.thesunmagazine.
org/326_Rosenberg.pdf.
129. PEARLMAN & SAAKVITNE, supra note 114, at 150-51, quoted in PETERS, supra note
16, at §9-2(g).
130. BYRON KATIE & STEVEN MITCHELL, LOVING WHAT IS (2002).  There are many
different methods that people have used to develop the capacity to be compassionate
witnesses.  The components chosen for discussion here are drawn from the practices
already being used by many people who work with domestic violence and other
forms of interpersonal trauma.  Some resources for exploring other pathways are
included in the Appendix and in notes 152 and 157 infra.
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important, components are: (7) active self-care; (8) participation in
creating an interdisciplinary community of support for one’s work
and for victims and perpetrators of violence; and (9) a
commitment to being present and participating in remedial
engagement moment to moment under conditions of uncertainty.131
The core of the practice of compassionate witnessing, a thread that
runs through and links all nine elements, is a sense of integrity, based
on an understanding of what it means to be human, that leads to
actions guided by kindness and care for ourselves and others.  The
first seven elements are discussed here. The last two are discussed
later in this section.
The first requirement for handling traumatic material productively
is to have a sense of personal autonomy in relation to one’s work as a
witness.132  Indeed, in order to serve as a compassionate witness, one
must actively choose to engage with others in this way.  Some people
have made a conscious choice to create meaning in their own lives by
working for justice and reconciliation among people, and this sense
of larger meaning energizes them.  This is not necessary, however.  It
is the choice to engage that is key.133  From the exercise of conscious
choice comes a host of other resources, including passion, curiosity,
excitement, creativity, patience, persistence and a willingness to take
                                                          
131. These requirements are interconnected.  For example, as explained below,
the last requirement, acting in the present under conditions of uncertainty, is closely
linked to the second requirement, adopting a stance of moral witness.  It is hoped
that listing them separately will make the practice as a whole easier to understand.
For a clear, sophisticated and detailed look at ways for lawyers and other helping
professionals to recognize, recover from and act to prevent stress, burnout and
secondary traumatization, see PETERS, supra note 16, at §§ 9.1-9.6.  See also Yael
Danieli, Countertransference, Trauma and Training, in COUNTERTRANSFERENCE IN THE
TREATMENT OF PTSD 368, 384-85 (John P. Wilson & Jacob D. Lundy eds., 1994)
(principles of self-healing for therapists working with traumatized clients).
132. For sociological documentation, see CARY CHERNISS, BEYOND BURNOUT (1995)
(discussing two studies of stress and successful coping strategies among twenty-six
human service professionals employed by public institutions (including six lawyers),
conducted during the first year of their work and twelve years later, finding that
autonomy, support, and moral commitment were among the most critical factors to
their satisfaction and success).
133. The psychologists, teachers, spiritual leaders and other pioneers whose work
informs this Article are in agreement that the need and capacity for connection is a
basic defining characteristic of human beings, rather than a rare or learned
inclination.  Patterns of disconnection and distorted communication result not from
a lack of need or capacity, but because of cultural, societal and familial patterns that
lead people to behave counterproductively.  One leading contemporary exponent of
this view of universal human needs is Marshall Rosenberg, who formulated an
approach known as “Nonviolent Communication,” a basic form of interaction that is
being used around the world to facilitate renewed connective capacity among people
in a wide variety of settings, from daily life in workplaces, schools and families, to
situations of previously violent enmity, including those requiring restorative justice.
For more information see supra note 128 and MARSHALL B. ROSENBERG, NONVIOLENT
COMMUNICATION: A LANGUAGE OF COMPASSION (1999).
49
Freedman: Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumati
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2003
FREEDMAN_PKFINAL5.DOC 6/9/03  1:36 PM
616 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 11:2
risks and make change.  These are some of the resources needed for
remedial engagement with trauma.
A second requirement is adopting a moral stance as a witness.  As
Dalton and Schneider recognize in their textbook, Battered Women
and the Law, there are important overlaps here between Herman’s
observations about the client-therapist relationship and the lawyer-
client, or advocate-client, relationship.134  In the excerpt which Dalton
and Schneider present, Herman distinguishes as follows between the
necessary professional neutrality of the therapist and the therapist’s
moral stance as a witness:
In entering the treatment relationship, the therapist promises to
respect the patient’s autonomy by remaining disinterested and
neutral.  “Disinterested” means that the therapist abstains from
using her power over the patient to gratify her personal needs.
“Neutral” means that the therapist does not take sides in the
patient’s inner conflicts or try to direct the patient’s life decisions.
Constantly reminding herself that the patient is in charge of her
own life, the therapist refrains from advancing a personal agenda.
The disinterested and neutral stance is an ideal to be striven for,
never perfectly attained.
The technical neutrality of the therapist is not the same as moral
neutrality.  Working with victimized people requires a committed
moral stance.  The therapist is called upon to bear witness to a
crime.  She must affirm a position of solidarity with the victim.
This does not mean a simplistic notion that the victim can do no
wrong, rather, it involves an understanding of the fundamental
injustice of the traumatic experience and the need for a resolution
that restores some sense of justice.  This affirmation expresses itself
in the therapist’s daily practice, in her language, and above all in
her moral commitment to truth-telling without evasion or disguise.
Yael Danieli, a psychologist who works with survivors of the Nazi
Holocaust, assumes this moral stance even in the routine process of
taking a family history.  When survivors speak of their relatives who
“died,” she affirms that they were, rather, “murdered.” . . .  “The
use of the word ‘death’ . . . appears to be a defense against
acknowledging murder as possibly the most crucial reality of the
Holocaust.”135
All human beings share the capacity to serve as witnesses in this
                                                          
134. DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 1071.
135. DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 1072-73, quoting HERMAN, RECOVERY,
supra note 7, at 135.  Upon reading this passage, some readers may wonder how the
kind of moral witnessing Herman suggests as part of the therapist’s role can be
reconciled with judges’ roles as neutral arbiters, partial to neither party.  This
question is discussed in Part IV.B of this Article.
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sense, as well as the desire to turn away that Herman so eloquently
described.  Our concern here, however, is with people who are
choosing to take this stance in the context of a professional role.  
Despite the many significant differences among the roles of
therapists, lawyers and judges, these roles share core commitments to
truth, justice, and human rights, as well as to professional neutrality,
discernment and engagement.  Each has a part to play in responding
to clients or litigants, and each is required to take appropriate action
informed by these core commitments.  A compassionate witness in
any professional role is one who, consistent with her or his
professional relationship to the person or people involved, is present
to the human realities of the circumstances presented, including any
traumatic material, stays in relationship to the situation and all of the
people involved (including herself or himself), attends responsibly to
both intellectual and emotional aspects of issues that are raised, and
takes appropriate action in light of governing norms.
The difference between compassionate witnessing and traditional
professional norms has to do with the ideas of presence and
relationship embedded in this statement.  Tradition suggests that
therapists, judges and lawyers can operate in disconnected, distant
and resolutely intellectual ways, and simultaneously be present to
people and their often complex, ambiguous and painful experiences.
Recent work in psychology and trauma studies challenges these
notions, suggesting that human connections are essential to
professional work of this kind.  Thus, the idea of compassionate
witnessing invites professionals to find a new middle ground of
engagement, consciously maintaining a healthy sense of both self and
other in relationship.136  Compassionate witnesses are conscious of the
twin temptations to withdraw and to become over-involved, and
commit themselves simply to do the best they can under the
circumstances, simultaneously acknowledging both the power that
society and the people who seek their assistance have invested in
                                                          
136. I leave to another occasion a more detailed analysis of the ways this account
of lawyering and judging roles conflicts with or indeed may clarify or enhance
traditional understandings of these roles.  See PETERS, supra note 16, §§ 2.3-2.4, 9.5 for
thoughtful exploration of competing professional norms and ethical rules in relation
to representation of children in child protective proceedings; Susan Bandes,
Repression and Denial in Lawyering (Oct. 18, 2001) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author) and resources discussed therein for a related discussion of ethical
questions, role constraints and the personal reactions of attorneys to difficult aspects
of criminal defense work generally and death penalty cases in particular; see also
Susan Swihart, Ethical Issues, in ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE
IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, 12-1-12-5 (Deborah
Goelman et al. eds., 1996).  For a discussion of the traditional split between reason
and emotion in law and legal training, see infra note 138.
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them and the limits of what they are able to do.
It is helpful to underscore once again key areas of similarity
between compassionate witnessing and traditional notions of judicial
and attorney roles.  Both require a professional, while subject to role
constraints (for example, impartiality for judges and mediators, or
advocacy and loyalty for attorneys), to be guided throughout by a
commitment to truth and justice, following the facts where they lead
without compromise.  Likewise, judges under either view are required
to do justice, tempered, to the extent the law permits, by mercy.
Compassionate witnessing does however add additional elements to
traditional thinking about professional roles.  As discussed above,
taking this stance is a matter of choice, a choice which carries with it
greater clarity about the moral dimensions of carrying out
professional responsibilities in the context of atrocities.  A
compassionate witness is someone who understands and embraces
the demands that shared humanity places on everyone to respond
with fortitude and conviction to the painful circumstances of both
victims and perpetrators of violence and coercive control.
The next several elements that compassionate witnessing practice
adds to traditional thinking about judging and lawyering flow very
directly from a commitment to be kind to ourselves and others, and
thus maintain our integrity as witnesses.  One is an explicit
acknowledgment of the particular difficulties of carrying out
professional responsibilities in settings involving allegations of
violence, abuse, and illegal coercion, including, for example, the civil
proceedings that are the subject of this Article.  Like therapists who
work with survivors of severe trauma, judges, attorneys, advocates,
neutral evaluators and other system personnel must acknowledge the
possible effects of secondary traumatic stress.  A compassionate
witness is conscious of this phenomenon and attentive to the possible
impact of vicarious distress on her or his own functioning and that of
others involved in responding to traumatic situations.  Ignoring this
issue or denying possible effects has painful consequences for people
working with traumatic material, because it supports problematic
coping mechanisms and creates isolation rather than community.137
                                                          
137. Some recent research suggests that there are significant numbers of people
who experience very limited effects after bereavement or other losses, and that some
of these people are resilient because they deny or repress painful aspects of the
experience.  For a recent journalistic survey of this research, see Lauren Slater,
Repress Yourself, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, (Magazine) at 48.  Popular accounts
sometimes exaggerate the relevance of these studies to complex interpersonal
traumas like domestic violence and child abuse, and also inaccurately equate healthy
coping mechanisms (similar to those suggested here for compassionate witnesses)
with denial or repression.  In any event, even these researchers agree that many
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The fourth requirement, which is closely related to the third, is a
different perspective on how professionals (in common with other
human beings) can best respond in situations where they are
bystanders and witnesses to trauma.  Professional training often
teaches lawyers, judges, psychologists and other professionals to
handle their emotions by using the tools of a well-developed intellect,
putting their emotions in second place, or even ignoring them
altogether.138  However, in dealing with trauma, no one can
successfully and consistently function effectively without using both
reason and emotion, and without some tools to handle the personal
identifications that trauma often evokes in bystanders.139  By
developing the capacity to use reason and emotion in an integrated
way, professionals who choose to function as compassionate witnesses
are able to use their own emotional responses as resources in carrying
out their other professional responsibilities, including remaining
present in the face of the disturbing and painful material to which
they are exposed, and maintaining appropriate boundaries, neither
over-involved nor disengaged from the human complexities of the
situation.
The step of acknowledging our own personal connection to the
circumstances we encounter in our work, including feelings
transferred from other contexts in our lives, is not only of central
importance, it is profoundly difficult, and requires strong motivation.
This step also requires continued practice140 because it involves
                                                          
people do have disruptive reactions to direct and secondary trauma.  Thus,  it is
important for people who work with traumatic material and with trauma survivors to
be knowledgeable about the possibility of such reactions and have tools available to
respond appropriately to people in distress, including themselves.  See infra app. for
selected resources on point.
138. On the emphasis in legal training and law practice on splitting reason and
emotion, see, e.g., Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research
on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337 (1997); Silver,
supra note 121, at 279-80.  Cf. Leti Volpp, Lawyering at the Margins: On Reason and
Emotion, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 129, 130 (2002) (discussing works
which question on various grounds the possibility of separating reason and emotion
as traditional legal thinking claims to require, including Susan Bandes, What’s Love
Got to Do with It?, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 97, 97-100; Rachel Moran, Law and
Emotion, Love and Hate, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 747, 747-48 (2001); Martha
Nussbaum, Emotion in the Language of Judging, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 23, 23-25 (1996);
and Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (1995)).
See also infra app.
139. There are similar conflicts in medicine and psychology.  See, e.g., JONATHAN
SHAY, No Escape from Philosophy in Trauma Treatment, in SECONDARY TRAUMATIC STRESS:
SELF-CARE ISSUES FOR CLINICIANS, RESEARCHERS AND EDUCATORS tbl. 1 (B. Hudnall
Stamm ed., 1995), available at http://www.sidran.org/shay.html; see also MILLER &
STIVER, supra note 119, at 125.
140. Many people also find difficulty in consistently carrying out most of the other
requirements of compassionate witnessing practice.  See, e.g., infra notes 143, 194-96
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acknowledging our own self-protective strategies for coping with
distress, which, by the time we are adults, are familiar and deep-
rooted.  Indeed, most of us think these defenses are necessary if we
are to be able to do our work (and at some level, even to survive).
Learning that we can risk letting some of our strategies go at least
some of the time is a gradual and demanding process.
One reason for our resistance to “getting personal” about this work
is our own experiences of violation, our own relationship to violence
and abuse, our own feelings of loss, grief, rage, and fear, our own
destructive as well as constructive impulses.141  Yet while, in the
context of our professional work, it may or may not be appropriate to
discuss aspects of our personal experience with others, we cannot be
fully present as witnesses to traumatic experience without recognizing
and acknowledging specific resonance in our own lives and beings.
Indeed, our willingness to be real with ourselves about our own
experiences challenges false dichotomies between us as professionals
and the clients and litigants with whom we work .  After all, in order
to ask for intervention, people dealing with domestic violence have to
begin by acknowledging to themselves at least some of the painful
realities of the experiences that brought them to our offices or
courtrooms.142  Professionals who are able to acknowledge their own
resistance to facing painful experiences will find it much easier to be
understanding of the similar feelings and behavior of clients and
litigants.143
In choosing whether to make these changes, it is helpful to
remember that we have only two choices.  The first is to become
conscious of the impact of secondary traumatic stress on us, our
reactions to our own experiences of victimhood and aggression, and
the shared humanity that these commonalities reflect.  The second is
to deny that we are being affected, and be governed by our own
unacknowledged reactivity.  Each time we are willing to look at the
distortions our own reactivity introduces, we become better able to
accept the truth of this challenging proposition.  Moreover, this is not
an either/or choice.  Rather, everyone oscillates between
consciousness and unconsciousness.  The practice of compassionate
witnessing simply facilitates the process of recognizing when we have
                                                          
and accompanying text.
141. See Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering for Intimate
Abuse, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1225, 1258-60 (1996).
142. See, e.g., Dalton, Domestic Torts, supra note 47, at 338.
143. See Mills, supra note 141, at 1228-31; PETERS, supra note 16, §§ 9.3(b)–9.4(d).
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become unconscious, and moving back toward consciousness.144  It is
also helpful to recognize that we are the ones who reap the greatest
benefits of developing our own capacities for conscious living.
Compassionate witnessing is a practice people adopt out of self-love,
not out of altruism.
Maintaining appropriate boundaries is essential to successful
functioning in one’s professional role, and also to serving as a
compassionate witness.  Boundaries promote the well-being of the
client, who needs to be able to seek specific kinds of support from
outside observers, free of the mutual responsibilities that friends or
family members undertake with each other.  Boundaries also protect
the bystander who has become a witness from taking on personal
responsibility for rescuing, changing or befriending a client or
litigant.
Negotiating boundaries is also integrally connected to the practice
of monitoring the personal emotional resonance of traumatic
material.  Experienced witnesses, like experienced professionals, use
their awareness of their own feelings—whether of distance,
connection, pleasure, discomfort, grief, irritation, rage, boredom,
fear, curiosity—to assist them in their work with clients, in their own
personal journeys of exploration and growth, and in maintaining
flexible boundaries which support connection and balance in the
relationship.  While professional norms are of great importance, a
compassionate witness will need the support of colleagues and people
with experience and expertise in working with emotionally charged
situations to develop the skills and perspectives necessary to make
sound choices.
Ultimately, boundaries are a matter of respect for oneself and for
the other person or people in the work setting.  Work with
boundaries is likely to be of particular interest to people in the legal
world, since one way to view law is as a system for creating and
negotiating workable boundaries.145
                                                          
144. See HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 135 (“The disinterested and neutral
stance is an ideal to be striven for, never perfectly attained.”); see also infra app. for
material on processes lawyers use to track the ebb and flow of counter-transferential
material in their work with clients.
145. There is a vigorous debate among feminist theorists and clinicians about
working with counter-transference issues, what boundaries are appropriate and how
they should be negotiated.  See infra app. for references.  For brief introductions to
psychological thinking about counter-transference reactions (“CTRs”) and
boundaries in therapeutic work with trauma survivors, see HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra
note 7, at 140-51; MILLER & STIVER, supra note 119, at 144-46; Judith V. Jordan &
Linda M. Hartling, New Developments in Relational-Cultural Theory, in RETHINKING
MENTAL HEALTH AND DISORDER 48, 52-53 (Mary Ballou & Laura S. Brown eds., 2002).
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The six components of compassionate witnessing which have
discussed thus far—conscious engagement, adopting a moral stance
as a witness, reckoning with secondary traumatic stress, integrating
reason and emotion, maintaining appropriate boundaries, and
exploring one’s personal connections to what one encounters as a
witness—are all aspects of the integrity made possible by inquiry into
our own thinking.  As the philosopher Epictetus observed, “we are
disturbed not by what happens to us, but by our thoughts about what
happens.”146  When we are able to inquire into our own thoughts, we
are able to recognize the distortions in our thinking that lead us to
confuse the past with the present, our own experiences with those of
others, our own present security with imagined vulnerabilities and
dangers.  When we recognize the ways in which we are scaring
ourselves, we are no longer distracted from the situation that actually
confronts us.
As may by now be apparent, compassionate witnessing involves self-
care and community.  Both self-care and community increase our
ability to inquire into the sources of our own reactivity, and do the
personal work necessary to achieve the calm and clarity that facilitate
productive engagement with the world, but that may otherwise elude
us.  Active self-care is a clear expression of kindness toward ourselves,
and increases exponentially the degree of compassion and efficiency
we bring to our work.
Herman’s work includes an insightful discussion of the kinds of
support and conscious self-care therapists require in order to work
with victims of trauma.  Dalton and Schneider include a generous
chunk of this discussion in their textbook for law students,147 and
highlight the importance of both support and self-care in a
subsequent note:
Judith Herman is adamant about the need for professionals
working with those who have experienced trauma to engage in
“self-care.” . . . [S]he talks about setting appropriate limits with
clients, about guarding against over-commitment, about finding
room in one’s life for relaxation and pleasure, and about working
in an environment in which there is sufficient support, ideally
among peers, but at a minimum from a clinical supervisor.  These
conditions may be harder for lawyers and legal advocates to secure
                                                          
146. Epictetus, Encheiridion, V, quoted in KATIE & MITCHELL, supra note 130, at
257. “Two other relevant statements: ‘Nothing can disturb us.  We suffer only when
we want things to be different from what they are.’ (Encheiridion, V). ‘No one has
the power to hurt you. It is only your own thinking about someone’s actions that can
hurt you.’ (Encheridion, XX)”  Id. at 257.
147. DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, 1080-82 (excerpting HERMAN, RECOVERY,
supra note 7, at 133-54).
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than for those working in the mental health field, where concepts
of self-care are better established, and clinical supervision
traditionally includes attention to the clinician’s own emotional
state. . . .
[A]nyone who has worked in this field has either experienced, or
witnessed burnout, and Herman offers a compelling explanation
both of why this happens, and of what to do to guard against it.
She is also clear that self-care by professionals enhances rather than
detracts from the service they provide to their clients.  It is worth
careful attention, therefore, on the part of students, advocates and
lawyers . . . to the ways in which they can create and maintain a
working environment sufficiently attentive to their own needs.148
These insights need to be extended and deepened.  People work
with trauma effectively when and to the extent that their own human
and spiritual needs are being met.  Of course, all human beings
experience some trauma, and everyone needs access to these
resources.  There is every reason to start with ourselves.
It is critical to the success of this strategy to pay heed to the kinds
of self-care Herman recommends.  Her prescription has to do with
core human needs for a balanced life, for connection with self and
others, and for a relational life characterized by intimacy, authenticity
and safety.149  Social systems, including the legal system, function well
only when participants’ needs for basic self-care can be met.  Radical
change for the better is possible in any social system when these
needs begin to be acknowledged and addressed.  Conversely, if the
needs of participants in the system for care are denied, everyone will
continue to suffer in all too familiar ways.  This suffering will
necessarily lead people to distance themselves in various ways, in
order to avoid succumbing to their distress.  The more we are trying
to operate in denial of our own needs, the less capacity we have to
care for ourselves or meet the needs of others.
In other words, what makes integrity possible, both for individuals
and for the legal system as a whole, is, as Herman insists, the
following:
It cannot be reiterated too often: no one can face trauma alone.  If
a therapist finds herself isolated in her professional practice, she
should discontinue working with traumatized patients until she has
secured an adequate support system. . . .
. . . The role of a professional support system is not simply to focus
                                                          
148. DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, 1091-92 n. 1.
149. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text; see also infra app.C. (listing
resources for lawyers regarding compassionate witnessing skills).
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on the tasks of treatment but also to remind the therapist of her
own realistic limits and to insist that she take as good care of herself
as she does of others.150
People who work in the field of domestic violence can both protect
themselves from burnout and help bring about systemic change by
committing themselves to active self-care, which includes recognizing
and owning our own responses as we do this work, and taking
responsibility for reaching out for the support each of us needs.151  As
each of us cares for ourselves, we become better able to make
recognition of our common humanity an operating principle in our
professional work.  We will also enthusiastically join efforts to create
the interdisciplinary communities of support necessary for systemic
reform.  To use a well-worn phrase, it is by changing our own
behavior that we become part of the solution, not part of the
problem.
The role of a compassionate witness also entails efforts to create
community and a commitment to operating in the present, without
ever knowing what will happen next.  The next section takes up the
second line of inquiry mentioned earlier, an exploration of how
compassionate witnessing practice speaks to the core work of the
legal system, pursuing truth and restorative justice.  Section IV.C then
brings the two lines of inquiry together in a discussion of the central
importance of community and the practice of acting with kindness
and integrity in the face of uncertainty.152
B. Compassionate Witnessing and the Legal System: The Role of Restorative Justice
and Peacemaking in Responding to Atrocities
1.  Teachings from Trauma Stress Studies
The second part of Judith Lewis Herman’s book, Trauma and
                                                          
150. HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 153 (emphasis in original).
151. Most lawyers, judges and domestic violence advocates who act as
compassionate witnesses will want to seek some support on an individual basis (for
example, through psychotherapy, personal growth workshops, meditation training,
or religious, spiritual or artistic pursuits).  At the same time, programs to encourage
people in the legal system to practice compassionate witnessing depend on creating
support systems that are not dependent on that level of individual initiative
(although as a result of participation, people may be motivated to go further on their
own).  Training in many of the skills required for compassionate witnessing is already
a part of some law school clinical programs and some programs for training judges.
See infra app. for more information; see also PETERS, supra note 16, at § 9-4 (providing
helpful strategies for lawyers to use in their practice); infra note 211 (discussing
strategies to prevent secondary traumatic stress at the institutional level).
152. Psychotherapist David Crump teaches that it is often the case that, “[I]n
order to see, I must act.”  Information on David Crump’s work is available at
http://www.ee.org.
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Recovery, describes the stages of recovery from trauma, particularly
severe forms of interpersonal trauma and complex interpersonal
trauma, in terms that encompass both individual incidents and
patterns of domestic violence and child abuse.  Chapter Seven
discusses the role of healing relationships in promoting recovery,
followed by chapters about safety, remembrance and mourning,
reconnection and commonality.153  Healing relationships are those
that place priority on the empowerment and recovery of the client or
litigant.  In addition, the relationship is premised on a conscious
agreement between the witness and the client or litigant about the
witness’ use of the unequal power resulting from witness’ professional
role and the client or litigant’s dependence on the witness for
assistance.  The witness takes on the responsibility to use the power
that has been conferred upon her only to foster the purposes for
which the power has been conferred, resisting all temptations to
abuse that authority.
All of these aspects of recovery are salient to the work of the legal
system.  The first part of Part IV of this Article suggests some of the
ways compassionate witnessing practice helps professionals and other
bystanders better relate to victims and perpetrators of domestic
violence and child abuse who are suffering from being directly
involved in traumatic events.  An important teaching of trauma
theory is that when bystanders become compassionate witnesses in
their relationships with victims and perpetrators, even if the witnesses
involvement is narrowly time-limited or task-specific, the resulting
relationships are nourishing both to the witnesses and to the people
whose humanity and traumatic experiences are being acknowledged
and brought into relationship.154  Section B(2), which follows,
provides some illustrations of this proposition drawn from the work
of lawyer/teachers and judges who have adopted some elements of
compassionate witnessing practice.
Advocates for victims of domestic violence and their children and
judges who have chosen to serve as compassionate witnesses are also
actively engaged in assisting both adult and child victims of domestic
violence and perpetrators of such violence in facilitating all the other
tasks of recovery.  The battered women’s movement and its allies have
                                                          
153. See HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 133-236.
154. See, e.g., MILLER & STIVER, supra note 119, at 121-22, 129-30, 178, 183-88
(suggesting that in therapeutic relationships, when patients see that they have
impacted the therapist, they open up more and the resulting relationship is more
beneficial to both parties, which helps the patients grow in other relationships as
well).  This teaching is not unique to trauma theory, but is also part of a number of
other traditions and communities, which are discussed in app..
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succeeded in designing and establishing important legal frameworks
and networks of other resources that are designed to support victims
in their efforts to achieve safety, do the work of remembrance and
mourning, reconnect with others, and experience commonality.
These frameworks are also essential in supporting perpetrators to
accomplish the same tasks, although there has not been as much
conscious awareness that these tasks are as essential for perpetrators
as for victims.155
The argument to this point is that compassionate witnessing can
help individuals and the legal system do better at remaining present
to people experiencing and recovering from interpersonal trauma.
The suggestion here is that the severely inadequate fact-finding
resources and practices discussed in the earlier part of this Article are
in large part a manifestation of our individual and collective
difficulties trusting that safety, truth telling, justice and, hence,
reconnection and commonality can exist in reality rather than
remaining a utopian illusion.  The rest of the Article discusses the
ways compassionate witnessing practice, as embodied and expressed
in the social and legal response systems for domestic violence and
child maltreatment, generates concrete experiences of safety, truth
telling, justice, reconnection and commonality for the witnesses
themselves and for victims, perpetrators, and bystanders—that is, for
everyone. In other words, compassionate witnessing, through the
ongoing work of committed lawyers, judges, legal personnel,
teachers, scholars, care-giving professionals, social activists, legislators
and citizens, is itself the work of restorative justice, as well as evidence
that justice and reconciliation are possible.  More precisely,
witnessing to and healing from trauma are in essence the same
thing.156
The next sections explain some specific ways compassionate
witnessing practice is already informing the practice of lawyers and
                                                          
155. From the perspective of both traumatic stress theory and compassionate
witnessing practice, adult perpetrators are morally responsible for their crimes.  They
are also, and equally, fellow sufferers.  Perpetrators are people who, because of past
experiences, distorted perceptions of reality and learned patterns of destructive
behavior, do not currently have the ability to establish satisfying relationships with
themselves or others.  By committing atrocities, perpetrators demonstrate, in
distorted ways, their own needs for safety, remembrance, mourning, reconnection
and commonality.  Unless they somehow learn on their own, or outsiders are able to
intervene to stop their efforts to violate and control others and help them begin to
establish healing relationships of some sort, perpetrators remain trapped in tragic
patterns of behavior that are traumatic to them as well as to victims and bystanders.
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
156. This is a central premise of holistic (or nondualistic) healing traditions,
including, for example, Jason Shulman’s work, which is known as Integrated
Kabbalistic Healing.  See http://www.kabbalah.org for additional information.
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judges, and suggests that these positive effects can be intensified by
conscious commitment to and engagement in compassionate
witnessing practice.  It is helpful in thinking about the transformative
potential of compassionate witnessing in the legal system to pay
particular attention to the links between current fact-finding
difficulties, the aspects of recovery from trauma described above—
relationship, safety, truth telling, justice, reconnection and
commonality157—and the nine elements of compassionate witnessing
practice, particularly numbers one and two, choice and adopting a
stance of moral witness.158
2.  The Transformative Potential of Compassionate Witnessing in the Legal
System
When individuals who make up the legal system practice
compassionate witnessing, critical needs of litigants and their
children begin to be met.  Most people who live in abusive or severely
troubled families, especially children, are “difficult” cases in the sense
discussed earlier in this Article.159  In troubled families, the available
choices are limited and often seem bleak, outcomes of particular
courses of action are uncertain, and there seem to be no easy answers
or simple solutions.  Children and adults who are in the process of
sorting out for themselves how to handle the abusive or coercive
aspects of their intimate relationships have a critical need to have
concerned adults available to serve as compassionate witnesses.160
People of any age who are at risk of harming another or being
harmed or are already suffering significant physical and emotional
injuries need to have as much authority and autonomy as possible
consistent with keeping them safe from doing harm or being harmed.
Unfortunately, for most adults who are abusive, and for adults and
children suffering from abusive behavior by an intimate, the typical
                                                          
157. These concepts from Herman’s work are introduced at the beginning of Part
IV.B.
158. See supra Part IV.C (defining and discussing the components of
compassionate witnessing).
159. See supra Part I.B.
160. See supra note 155 and infra note 222 (explaining that the need for witnessing
extends not only to those being injured but, to the extent possible (given the need to
stop the abuse immediately and to hold those who cause harm accountable), also to
those who are causing injury).  There are of course practical reasons for this;
prevention of future abuse depends on finding effective ways to help violent people
change their behavior.  See, e.g., GONDOLF, supra note 2, at 4; Sandra L. Bloom, Our
Hearts and Our Hopes are Turned to Peace: Origins of the International Society for Traumatic
Stress Studies (last visited Mar. 4, 2003), available at http://www.istss.org/what/
history4.htm.  Prevention aside, however, the practice of compassionate witnessing
entails work with everyone involved, and not just the “innocent.”  See also infra app..
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responses of the legal system are themselves a major source of
trauma, because the legal system subjects the parties to processes that
are often harsh and indiscriminate, and are both unpredictable and
controlled by others.  At present, the absence of appropriate social
response and legal intervention leaves many adults and children to
suffer alone. Judith Lewis Herman observes:
The core experiences of psychological trauma are
disempowerment and disconnection from others.  Recovery,
therefore, is based upon the empowerment of the survivor and the
creation of new connections. Recovery can take place within the
context of relationships; it cannot occur in isolation.  In her
renewed connections with other people, the survivor re-creates the
psychological faculties that were damaged or deformed by the
traumatic experience.  These faculties include the basic capacities
for trust, autonomy, initiative, competence, identity and intimacy.
Just as these capabilities are originally formed in relationships with
other people, they must be reformed in such relationships.161
Adults experiencing domestic violence, either as perpetrators or as
victims, can benefit significantly from receiving compassionate
witnessing from professionals with whom they come in contact.
Feminist legal theorists, clinical law teachers and activists have begun
to use compassionate witnessing in their work with clients, and have
written about the value of this approach (though using different
terminology).162  Ann Shalleck’s work provides a useful synthesis of
much of this work.  As she explains, in recent years feminist theorists
and activists have mounted systematic challenges to dominant
paradigms of legal thinking about domestic violence, and particularly
concepts of the “battered woman” and “battering” which “lead many
women not to recognize themselves or their experiences in the
standard narrative of domestic violence” and which, through
expression of these concepts in choices made by advocates or counsel
for women, or by prosecutors and judges, may “create additional
dangers for women who have been abused rather than ensuring or
even increasing their safety or the safety of their children.”163  To
                                                          
161. HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 133.
162. Elements of compassionate witnessing are being introduced into the practice
of lawyers and judges in other contexts as well, as a result of innovative scholarship
and teaching. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 121, at 296-313 (advocating lawyering with
self-awareness and the cultivation of emotional intelligence among law students and
lawyers).  Silver also summarizes writing on lawyering and emotional intelligence
from 1930 to the end of the twentieth century, but notes that it has not had a
widespread impact on legal education and law practice.  Id. at 283-89.  For further
discussion, see infra app.
163. Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between
Lawyer and Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019,
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counter these dangers,
these theorists and activists are engaged in a search for new legal
strategies that provide abused women with legal accounts of abuse
by an intimate partner that resonate with their own experiences,
that create additional space for safely challenging that abuse, and
that do not separate social policies regarding domestic violence
from the complex and multiple realities of women who must find
ways to cope with violence in their intimate relationships.164
As has been the case since the modern battered women’s
movement was initiated in the 1970s, feminist activism against
domestic violence is premised on a commitment to empowering
women, woman by woman.  The models lawyers and lay advocates
have developed in order to support their clients’ empowerment
(including their safety and recovery from trauma) incorporate many
elements of compassionate witnessing.
For example, Shalleck reviewed the work of six theorists of
domestic violence legal practice (all but one of whom are clinical law
teachers), and grouped the characteristics of the lawyering they
described under several headings.165  These theorists all emphasize
the need for conscious and emotionally sophisticated relationships
between lawyers and clients as a foundation for the empowerment of
victims that is at the core of feminist lawyering on behalf of victims of
violence.166  Shalleck’s discussion of the first category, “Reflection on
Experience,” concretely illustrates both the overlap of these models
of lawyering with compassionate witnessing, and also the benefits to
both clients and lawyers of this innovative way of operating:
[T]hese models of lawyering encourage lawyers representing
women who have been abused to identify and reflect upon, both
before and during their representation, their own experiences of
and feelings about violence or powerlessness in intimate
relationships.  This reflection is needed for three interrelated
reasons.  First, understanding his or her own vulnerability and
powerlessness within intimate relationships is part of a lawyer’s
ability to experience empathy with the client’s situation.  Although
the lawyer may not have gone through the same type of experience
as the client, the lawyer needs to find within his or her own
experience a basis for beginning to understand the situation of a
                                                          
1025-26 (1997).
164. Id. at 1027.
165. The other headings are: “Recognition of the Fluidity of the Lawyer-Client
Relationship,” “Working Collaboratively with Clients,” “Developing Responses that
Enable Clients to Take Steps that Are Viable Within Their Particular Situations,” and
“Making Time.”  Id. at 1019.
166. See id. passim.
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client on an emotional level.  For these theorists, the discovery of
common experiential ground is necessary, not primarily for
instrumental reasons of gaining the trust of or increased rapport
with a client, but for the construction of a relationship built
explicitly on the shared recognition of the similarities and
differences in their situations.  From a relationship characterized
by this sort of understanding comes the lawyer’s abilities to act
effectively with and for the client.
For these theorists, self-reflection is important for more than
empathic understanding, however.  Reflection by the lawyer on his
or her experiences is part of the process of understanding the
pervasive nature and complex dynamics of intimate violence.  The
lawyer needs to see intimate abuse . . . as a complex mixture of
experiences involving not just physical violence, but also coercive
behavior and the exercise of power and control. . . .167
Just as lawyers who incorporate compassionate witnessing into their
work find that the change benefits both lawyers and clients, many
judges now recognize the value of compassionate witnessing in their
work with victims of violence, including domestic violence.
In fact, Herman’s work is one of the resources James Ptacek used
in his thoughtful study of domestic violence judges in
Massachusetts.168  These were judges who had chosen to work in
specialized domestic violence courts, which had been established
after many years of struggle to reform the legal system’s response to
domestic violence.  Ptacek observed the ways eighteen judges in two
of these courts interacted with women seeking restraining orders and
men alleged to be batterers, arguing that judges’ demeanor in the
courtroom, an aspect of the “emotional labor” of judging, can
empower or re-victimize women seeking to stop abuse in their
intimate relationships.169  Ptacek found that ten of the eighteen
judges he observed usually used what he characterized as a “good-
natured” demeanor in their interactions with battered women.170
“The judges who exhibited this kind of demeanor used their
authority to make women feel welcome in court, to express concern
for their suffering, and to mobilize resources on their behalf.”171
                                                          
167. Id. at 1029-38; see also Waits, supra note 100, at 67-78 (discussing the
importance to clients of how they are treated by helping professionals); note 178
infra and PETERS, supra note 16, §§3-1-3-3 (describing a similar model of lawyering for
children); infra app.
168. See PTACEK, supra note 30, at 137-38, 149, 153.
169. Id. at 97-111.
170. Id. at 98-101.
171. Id. at 99.  Ptacek notes that two of the ten usually “good-natured” judges
sometimes used a variant of this demeanor, which contained elements of
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If demeanor is an image of authority, the image [good-natured]
judges wanted to communicate is one of empathy and support.
They want to use their power to make women feel welcome in the
court and to facilitate their requests for judicial remedies.  There is
an awareness by these judges that this demeanor is communicated
by the design of court processes, by their patience, by open
expressions of concern, through their listening to both parties, and
by serious attention to the criminal nature of violence and abuse.172
This demeanor contrasted with several alternative forms of self-
presentation, including bureaucratic (formal and distancing), firm,
condescending or harsh.  Advocates for battered women have long
contended that the attitudes and behavior of law enforcement
personnel, including police officers, prosecutors, court personnel
and judges are a critical factor in the effectiveness of legal remedies
for domestic violence.173  Ptacek’s work provides concrete evidence of
both variations in judicial demeanor, and the significance to victims
and perpetrators of particular choices by judges.
Ptacek’s work also confirms the relevance of other elements of
compassionate witnessing practice to judges’ ability to engage
supportively with litigants experiencing domestic violence.
Emotional labor is a double-sided concept: it names both the
means and the ends of a type of work.  The ends of judging as a
type of emotional labor involve making an emotional impact on
plaintiffs and defendants. . . . [T]o have this impact, judges will be
most effective if they act on their own feeling and emotional
expression.  If the goal is making a woman feel welcome in the
court, the means may involve controlling or suppressing
inappropriate feeling, such as frustration, or it may require evoking
a desired feeling, such as empathy, that may not readily be there at
the end of a very long and draining day.  Truly engaging with a
woman seeking an order requires more than merely pretending
empathy.  To really reach someone who has been assaulted and
who may be intimidated and upset, a judge is more effective if he
or she genuinely feels empathetic.174
Ptacek describes the cognitive and expressive work involved.  Judges
report their active engagement in learning about domestic violence,
                                                          
condescension toward the women appearing before them. Id. at 106 tbl. 5.1.
172. Id. at 122.
173. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
174. PTACEK, supra note 30, at 117-18.  For extended discussion of the political,
sociological and personal factors that shape judicial behavior, and inquiry into the
emotional demands that presiding over domestic violence cases places on judges, see
id. at 95-97, 112-35.
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and their conscious work on their self-presentation in court.175  Ptacek
notes that:
. . . [T]here is also a personal cost to judges who present a “good-
natured” demeanor.  Empathetic engagement with women who are
suffering from terrorizing violence can be exhausting.  “Trauma is
contagious,” according to Judith Lewis Herman. . . . Herman states
that in the role of witness to a violent crime, the therapist
“experiences, to a lesser degree, the same terror, rage, and despair”
as the survivor.  This is called “vicarious traumatization.”  Judges
who are willing to recognize women’s experience of victimization
will also feel this, as will advocates, shelter workers, and other
feminist activists.  With the volume of battering cases on court
dockets, a district court judge in Massachusetts will meet several
hundred women who have been abused and hear several hundred
accounts of violence every year.  One judge spoke of how she dealt
with the personal strain of working with women who had been
abused.  She described the restraining order hearings as a “terrible
emotional burden”:
“I think that two things help me with the stress.  One, I talk about
it. . . . I try not to make it identifiable, and I’m careful about
confidences.  But the things that are most traumatic, I do talk
about.  Both with friends and in terms of public speaking, as
examples.  And I do a lot of committee work. . . .  I find that that
gives me a sense of contributing in a way that dealing with the case
by miniscule case–as much as I enjoy that, and I take each case very
seriously, I think that if you feel like you are having some long
effect, or short-term effect, anyway, on the system as a whole, it’s
easier to deal with the grind.”
By talking about traumatic events, and engaging in work on
battering that is less isolating and individualized than sitting on
criminal cases, this judge seeks to create a social environment that
will strengthen her ability to stand as witness to such violence.
Herman argues that “the perpetrator’s arguments prove irresistible
when the bystander faces them in isolation.”  Given the patriarchal
structure of the state and the threat to the gender order that a
campaign against sexual violence represents, it becomes tempting
for judges to abandon the burden of vicarious trauma and turn
against women who have been victimized.  The current social
environment for hearing and affirming women’s testimony about
violence was created by the feminist movement.  Herman insists
that the ability for our culture to sustain this recognition and
support depends on the continued strength of this movement.176
                                                          
175. Id. at 118-20.
176. Id. at 126-27.
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The lived experiences of judges and lawyers with compassionate
witnessing practice in domestic violence cases illustrate both the need
for this sort of practice, and its value.177  After the next section, which
identifies some particular issues of concern as to the needs of
children, Section IV.C takes up elements eight and nine, the
formation of interdisciplinary communities to facilitate systemic
change and presence and engagement in the face of uncertainty.
This section also highlights the link between fact-finding deficiencies
in civil domestic violence practice and the value of compassionate
witnessing in legal and societal responses to domestic violence and
child maltreatment.
3.  Compassionate Witnessing, Children’s Needs and the Legal System
Examining children’s needs through the lens of compassionate
witnessing is illuminating.  The primary source of compassionate
witnessing for children is usually their parents (or other guardians).
Indeed, good parenting is a model for many of the tasks of a
compassionate witness.178  Children who experience trauma at the
hands of a parent or guardian are at risk of growing up without this
critical resource for healthy development, because even if the
traumatic experience comes to an end, it is likely to be minimized,
covered up or ignored by the parental perpetrator.179  However, if one
                                                          
177. The strain that Ptacek’s “good natured” judges describe means that the full
panoply of resources and attitudes which make compassionate witnessing possible
are not in place.  Experienced witnesses can help beginners learn to do this work in
ways that are nourishing rather than depleting.  See infra app. for additional
information.
178. See MILLER & STIVER, supra note 119, at 42-47, 51, 66-68 (asserting that mutual
empathy in parent-child relationships promotes growth and happiness and that this
interaction can be found in other relationships as well); GROVES, supra note 8, at 84-
85 (“Parents are the most important frontline supporters of their children. By their
ability to listen, to help children understand, to interpret the world for children, and
to provide an emotional buffer, they help children withstand the most traumatic
events.”); see also Lynda Marin, Mother and Child: The Erotic Bond, in MOTHER JOURNEYS:
FEMINISTS WRITE ABOUT MOTHERING 19-22 (Maureen T. Reddy et al. eds., 1994),
reprinted in JUDITH G. GREENBERG ET AL, MARY JO FRUG’S WOMEN AND THE LAW 513, 516-
18 (2d ed. 1998) (describing the pleasure she and her young son take in each other,
and the ways her son incorporates his experience of her mothering as a
reinforcement of his own self-love); PETERS, supra note 16, at 1 (explaining children’s
needs for compassionate witnessing).  She states:
Children’s unique viewpoints seem fated to get lost in the needs of an adult world.
Because adults working with children are often people who prize children very
much, children are cherished, but sometimes for what they represent to the adult,
rather than for who they are on their own terms.  It is extraordinarily easy to lose
track of the child’s point of view in the middle of an adult’s day.
Id. Peters argues that traditional legal representation, which can be described as a
“lawyer-as-context” model, should be replaced with a “child-as-context” approach.
Id. at § 3-1.
179. For a clear and compelling explanation of the impact of child abuse on
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of the parents or an outsider is able to help re-establish safety for the
child, and respond to the child’s situation as a compassionate witness,
the child can begin the tasks of recovery.180  Thus, the well-being of
child survivors of intimate violence (either domestic violence
perpetrated against a partner or physical and emotional abuse more
directly inflicted on the child) can be enhanced by the development
and implementation of two types of response. The first is legal and
other interventions to support protective parents and other
caregivers in re-establishing safety and serving as compassionate
witnesses for their children, and the second is mechanisms to provide
compassionate witnessing to children whose parents or other
caregivers are unable to meet this need.181  As to the latter, two prongs
are needed: intervention based on engaging with the child and the
child’s perspective, and efforts to facilitate ongoing relationships
                                                          
children’s development and their relationships with their parents and significant
others, see HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 96-110.  For a discussion focusing
specifically on the destructive impact of secrecy and parental inaccessibility, see
MILLER & STIVER, supra note 119, at 89-98, 111.  For a discussion of the impacts on
children of exposure to a battering parent, including but not limited to abuse
directly targeted at the child, see BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 2, at 29-97.  For
batterers’ tendencies to minimize or deny abuse of their partners and children, or to
blame their victims, see id. at 18-19.  For the effects on children’s beliefs and values
of exposure to a battering parent, see id. at 48-51.
180. See GROVES, supra note 8, at 80-85, 100-03; BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note
2, at 103-05, 190.
A strong bond to a caretaking parent has shown to be critical to recovery
[from the] profound and chronic emotional distress of trauma. . . .
Traumatized children need to be with a parent who is able to ‘acknowledge,
recognize, and bear witness to the child’s pain.’ Research indicates . . . that a
strong mother-child relationship is an important contributor to resilience in
children of battered women.
Id. at 104.
181. For the former’s importance, see supra note 178. For the value of the latter,
see GROVES, supra note 8, at 85-103 (noting therapists, teachers, police officers, and
other adults as resources for children who have witnessed violence); see also
BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 2, at 191-97 (indicating child therapists, family
therapists and programs for children exposed to domestic violence as resources
available), and PETERS, supra note 16, at §§3-1-3-3 (children’s lawyers as resources for
children).  One study of eighteen children living in violent homes found that,
“[A]ccording to the children, the best support for them was a strong caring adult
within easy distance of home or school to whom the child could talk openly and
safely about the violence at home.  For some, it was a neighbor, for others a relative,
a teacher, or an adult domestic violence worker.” Peter G. Jaffe et al., Domestic Violence
and High-Conflict Divorce: Developing a New Generation of Research for Children, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF CHILDREN 189, 224 (Sandra A. Graham-Bermann
& Jeffrey L. Edleson eds., 2001) (discussing a study conducted in Western Australia
in 1992).  Jaffe concludes: “Children exposed to family violence need not only the
emotional support, advice, companionship, and instrumental aid that social support
can offer them in response to specific incidents of violence but also the long-term
support to recover developmentally from the effects of exposure.” Id. at 230; see also
Jordan & Hartling, supra note 145, at 64 (discussing a series of studies showing that a
relationship with one supportive adult is associated with good outcomes when
children are faced with various adverse conditions).  See also note 183 infra.
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between supportive adults and the child.  Both supporting protective
parents and successfully interacting directly with the child where
parents are unable to meet the child’s needs are hugely difficult for
the legal system and other response systems, particularly as these
systems are currently configured.
These observations contribute additional depth and urgency to the
earlier discussion of the devastating effects of the civil fact-finding
gap on victims of illegal patterns of violence and coercion and their
children.  Using felony prosecutions in relatively dramatic and clear
cut cases to interrupt, sanction and perhaps halt partner and child
abuse is necessary.  Unfortunately, justice system responses to child
endangerment suffer from enormous problems.  The most glaring is
the prosecution of mothers for “failure to protect” their children
from harm at the hands of other adults, whether or not the mothers
were themselves abused or could realistically have stopped the abuse
of their children from occurring.182  In contrast, when people in the
criminal justice and child welfare systems—prosecutors, judges, social
workers, other care-giving professionals and advocates for children
and parents—are able to work in collaborative partnerships informed
by compassionate witnessing perspectives, children’s needs to have
their relationships with their parents respected and preserved, and to
experience connection rather than disconnection in their
interactions with other adults, are given priority whenever possible.183
As discussed in Parts I and III above, divorce, restraining order and
child custody proceedings also often fall short in meeting children’s
needs for both accurate fact-finding and compassionate and effective
                                                          
182. For materials on this issue, see DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 285-334;
SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 15, at 157-68.
183. For example, since 1998, the Peace: A Learned Solution (“PALS”) Project, a
collaboration between Providence House, a battered women’s shelter in Willingboro,
New Jersey, and the New Jersey Department of Youth and Family Services, has served
over 100 New Jersey children exposed to domestic violence.  The child witnesses,
three to ten years of age, receive individual and group therapy, day care and after-
school programming and case management services for a period of six months.  A
therapist offers counseling to the children’s mothers about parenting issues related
to domestic violence.  The innovative features of the program – tailoring treatment
to the needs of each child, the sophistication of the services provided, and the
coordination of services to children with services to their mothers – have been shown
to be far more effective than previous interventions for child witnesses to violence.
In comparison to a control group of child witnesses and their mothers who received
psychoeducational classes but did not receive intensive individualized therapeutic
attention, the children in the PALS program and their mothers showed dramatic
improvements in their functioning, which for many of the children had previously
been impaired at clinical levels.  NJ Spotlight: The Peace: A Learned Solution
(PALS)Project, NJ ADVISOR, 7 AM. PROF. SOC. ON THE ABUSE OF CHILDREN – N.J.
NEWSLETTER 16-19 (Fall 2002).  Psychologist Linda Jeffrey and sociologist Demond
Miller, both of Rowan University, will soon be publishing additional research on the
PALS model.  See also infra note 185.
69
Freedman: Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumati
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2003
FREEDMAN_PKFINAL5.DOC 6/9/03  1:36 PM
636 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 11:2
responses to children’s own experiences in the face of the failures of
parents and other adults.184  To an equal or possibly even greater
extent than in the dependency context, the lack of systematic
attention to such cases leaves individual actors in the legal system to
struggle alone with their reactivity and distress in the face of the
terrible suffering experienced by thousands of adults and children.
Compassionate witnessing practice is already significant in both
local and national efforts to address the needs of children affected by
violence, abuse and neglect.  Collaborative communities are
facilitating cycles of witness, recovery and eventually prevention of
domestic violence and child maltreatment and are growing in
influence, although often only able, because of severe resource
constraints, to address a small part of the need.  Where such
communities do not already exist, activists, non-profit organizations,
foundations, government officials, scholars, and clinicians from a
number of disciplines are actively engaged in research, organizing,
writing and speaking out about the need and possibility for change.185
With this support, even small groups of individuals working in systems
of response already have less need to distance themselves and
disengage.  Even without anywhere near enough social support and
                                                          
184. See also Meier, supra note 10, at Part II.B.
185. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (“NCJFCJ,”
http://www.ncjfcj.org)  is involved in a number of promising collaborations, one of
which was initiated by the publication in 1999 of Effective Intervention in Domestic
Violence and Child Maltreatment Cases: Guidelines for Policy and Practice,
Recommendations from the National Council on Juvenile and Family Court Judges
Family Violence Department, popularly known as the “Green Book.”  See Meier, supra
note 10, at 659 for discussion of the many such collaborative communities scattered
across the country that are using the Green Book as a starting point  Coordinated
community responses to domestic violence, see infra note 199, are another example.
There are many law school clinics that facilitate the establishment of interdisciplinary
collaborative communities of witness in family law, domestic violence and child
advocacy.  See infra app. for articles describing some of this work.  Universities and
non-profit organizations in many locations also take on this role, adding more
substantial research (and often national outreach) capabilities.  In Philadelphia, the
Support Center for Child Advocates and the Center for Children’s Policy, Practice
and Reform at the University of Pennsylvania (http://www.ssw.upenn.edu/ccppr)
are engaged in and supporting cutting edge interdisciplinary collaborative service
work, research and policy change.  Collaborations initiated by these organizations
locally, (and in the case of the CCPPR, regionally and nationally) involve lawyers and
social workers for children and adults (both from social and legal service
organizations and volunteers), judges, child welfare and family court system
personnel, and scholars and clinicians from the disciplines of social work, law,
medicine, nursing, and psychology.  Lawyers from the Support Center work in social
work-lawyer teams.  Students in Penn’s Child Advocacy Clinic, which is co-taught by a
legal clinician and a pediatrician, come from law, medicine, and the graduate
program in social work.  Teams from both programs have access to many other
resources for collaboration and support.  Lerner Interview, supra note 2.  Other
promising collaborations are discussed in GROVES, supra note 8, at 104-26, and supra
note 183.
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funding, these groups of individuals are beginning to respond more
creatively and effectively to the human needs of adults and children
they encounter.
Similarly, as Ptacek’s work illustrates, individual actors dealing with
adults in family court settings change their behavior when they are
operating within a local framework which supports a compassionate
witnessing perspective.  Because the well-being of children and
parents is intimately connected, these changes make a difference to
children as well as to adult victims.186  What would it take for more
widespread change?
C. Compassionate Witnessing and Systemic Change
1.  The Logic and Resilience of Legal System Patterns
The hypothesis presented earlier is that the legal system’s penchant
to respond to domestic violence cases either under a “get tough on
crime” rubric, or by truncated mini-hearings in family court, reflects
the dynamic of secondary traumatic stress at a systemic level.  While
existing procedures have many deficiencies, they have the advantage
of buffering legal professionals’ and other bystanders’ exposure to
the charged material involved in cases of domestic violence and child
maltreatment.  The structured operations of the criminal law are
ritualized and somewhat abstract, and create a protective sense of
distance between the public and legal professionals on one hand, and
victims and abusers on the other.  The relatively unstructured brief
proceedings in civil court protect legal professionals and court
personnel in another way, by reducing many cases to “he said/she
said” family dramas in which underlying dynamics of power and
control can be minimized or ignored.  Instead, both parties can be
blamed for airing their dirty laundry in public, or for what are
characterized as joint failures to protect their children.  In domestic
violence cases in which the dynamics of power and control are more
difficult to evade, judges are prone to adopt a bureaucratic
demeanor, distancing themselves from the human dimensions of the
matter at hand, and shifting responsibility for a humane response to
other actors in the court system.  As Ptacek observes,
[I]nterviews with judges revealed aspects of the gendered division
of labor and the gendered patterning of emotionality in the courts
that cast light on [institutional resistance to supportive demeanor,
and preferences for bureaucratic procedures in domestic violence
cases.]
                                                          
186. See supra notes 178, 180.
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There is a relationship between the “objectivity” of the judiciary
and its support staff.  Arlie Russell Hochschild uses the term coined
by Ivan Illich, “shadow labor,” to identify the kind of
unacknowledged emotional labor that women perform to ensure
that institutions run smoothly.  In the courts, the clerical staff and
advocates do this kind of emotional labor, offering a human face to
plaintiffs and defendants.  One judge admitted how his
“objectivity” depended on the work of advocates:
. . . I am very grateful when [plaintiffs] come in with domestic
relations advocates, and I can sit back and play a more objective
role. . .
Note the metaphor of physical distance in the judge’s statement–
”sit back”–denoting greater emotional distance. . . . [Courts
depend on domestic relations advocates, battered women’s shelters
and law students to provide this emotional labor] and
simultaneously [there is] a denial of this dependence and a lack of
acknowledgment of, or responsibility for providing this emotional
service.  It is left to the largely female clerical staff of the courts to
facilitate this process. . . .187
The flip side of these institutional dynamics is that if the legal
system did not have to be structured to distance professionals from
suffering which they are not equipped to handle, fact-finding
practices might improve, thereby providing a foundation for more
sophisticated, flexible and effective responses to cases involving
domestic violence, family dysfunction and child maltreatment.
Applying the standards of moral witnessing by therapists188 to the
legal system shows just how demanding it can be to follow the truth
wherever it leads.  The adversary system establishes processes to
determine the truth of what occurred, and lead to corrective action
based on that truth.  Significantly, the structure of the system is also
designed to protect system participants from the potentially crushing
demands of carrying out these responsibilities alone.  The core
functions are divided among several different actors.  Indeed, in
criminal trials, a jury of citizens acting as a group is only responsible
for the decision in a single case, and aside from death penalty cases,
does not impose the sentence on the person they have voted to
convict.189  Even with the responsibilities divided up, professionals in
                                                          
187. PTACEK, supra note 30, at 125-26 (internal citations and emphasis omitted)
188. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (quoting HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra
note 7, at 135)..
189. For a review of the literature on juror trauma, an interesting study of this
problem in traumatic and non-traumatic criminal trials, and a discussion of possible
administrative responses, see Daniel W. Shuman et al., The Health Effects of Jury Service,
in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY 949 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winnick eds., 1996).
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both criminal and civil contexts often find their responsibilities
difficult to bear.  Judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and civil
lawyers are each subject to distinctive role deformations, which if
unchecked prevent the system from functioning properly.190
In the environment of family court, structures are looser than in
other parts of the legal system,191 which can paradoxically place more
stress and incentives to disengage on participants.  Despite the
charged nature of much of the subject matter, there are fewer checks
and balances when components of the system malfunction.  As in
some other civil settings, the judge bears responsibility for applying
the law and finding the facts, but otherwise there are many distinctive
challenges, especially in divorce and child custody cases.192  As noted
earlier, the parties are only sometimes represented by counsel, and
children are rarely represented, further reducing the protective and
process-supporting mechanisms available.  The responsibilities
imposed on the judge can become very burdensome.193  In this light,
                                                          
190. For example, in the pursuit of political rewards, prosecutors may sacrifice
their commitments to truth and justice, or act out their own or community anxieties
about particular groups of people or types of crime.  Defense attorneys may fail to
provide clients with a competent defense when the facts of the case are too ugly, or
may use the cloak of their roles as defenders of the weak against the power of the
state to justify abusive tactics toward witnesses or other morally questionable actions;
see Bandes, supra note 136, at 3-4, 14, 20-22; see also supra note 95(discussing displays
of impatience, hostility and bureaucratic demeanor by judges and other legal
personnel); supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing dynamics and consequences of such
behavior, as well as promising alternatives).
191. The loosest structures of all seem to characterize restraining order hearings,
in part because victims of domestic violence are supposed to be able to get such
orders without attorney representation.  See, e.g., DIST. CT. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
PRACTICE § 1:02 (referring to MASS. GEN. LAWS  ch. 209A); see also PTACEK, supra note
30, at 98-99 (noting that unlike criminal proceedings in domestic violence cases,
“restraining order hearings have no set formal structure in Massachusetts”).  Varying
degrees of informality are also characteristic of many proceedings in dependency
court.  See Amy Sinden, Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?: A Critique of Informality in Child
Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 350-58 (1999).
192. The divorce process creates particular challenges for judges, since the goals
of this process are not very clear, either for the parties or from a societal viewpoint,
and the applicable standards for resolving disputes between the parties are often
ambiguous, containing diverse and conflicting components. The parties also often
have a wide array of conscious and unconscious goals, some but not all of which
parallel those in the governing statutes.  Over twenty years ago, Mnookin and
Kornhauser noted, “[E]xisting legal standards governing custody, alimony, child
support, and marital property are all striking for their lack of precision. . . .”
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 82, at 969.  Contemporary family law texts
emphasize the incommensurability of factors listed in typical equitable distribution,
spousal maintenance and child custody laws.  See, e.g., JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW,
CASES AND MATERIALS 762-65 (4th ed. 1999) (listing equitable distribution, alimony
and maintenance standards); SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 82, at 745-46, 766-778
(indeterminacy, rules and discretion in child custody decisionmaking).
193. The inability of professionals to live up to their responsibilities contributes
significantly to the fact-finding gap described earlier in this Article.  From both a
professional responsibility and a compassionate witnessing perspective, judges and
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both the anti-litigation bias of family court, discussed earlier, and the
larger problem of fact-finding gaps become even easier to
understand.
2.  Honoring and Challenging Strategies of Disconnection
As earlier sections of this Article have documented, in many
divorce and child custody cases, and certainly when civil protective
orders are sought, there is a pressing need for structured proceedings
to ascertain the truth of what occurred and to impose the corrective
actions required to keep victims and children safe, hold batterers
accountable and facilitate changes in entrenched patterns of
coercion and control.  Simultaneously acknowledging the compelling
internal logic of present arrangements and the urgent need for
change is essential.
From a compassionate witnessing perspective, this stance is also
potentially energizing.  Miller and Stiver devote an entire chapter of
The Healing Connection, their paradigm-shifting book arguing for a
relational approach to psychotherapy, to the radical notion of
“Honoring the Strategies of Disconnection.”194  They note:
We want to emphasize our belief in the great importance of
respecting [people’s] strategies of disconnection . . .
. . . [O]ne’s strategies for staying out of authentic connection . . .
are in some sense adaptive. . . . [T]hey arise when the only
relationships that are available are in some fundamental way
disconnecting or even destructive: at some point in a person’s
history there was good reason to develop these strategies . . .
Instead of labeling such behaviors in therapy as resistance [or as
defenses], we think of them as lifesaving–or mind-saving–strategies
that people have developed for a reason. . . .
                                                          
lawyers whose functioning is compromised are accountable for their poor
performance, whether or not their failures derive from their exposure to traumatic
material.  Judges and lawyers who are not able to carry out their functions effectively
should not continue to do this work.  As discussed below, however, accountability
does not entail scapegoating.  Addressing professional responsibility issues includes
considering whether judges, attorneys and other legal system personnel have been
provided with the material, intellectual and spiritual resources required to do their
jobs.  The more we ask system participants to perform in inhumane circumstances
with inadequate tools and support and under the pressure of misleading ideas about
their roles and responsibilities, the more accountability for their failures should be
shared by the government and society.  See also infra note 199 and accompanying
text; infra app.
194. See MILLER & STIVER, supra note 119, at 148. The term now used for this body
of work is “relational-cultural theory.”  The change in terminology reflects in part an
increasing emphasis over time on nuanced attention to the specific cultural contexts
relevant to individual healing and social change.  See, e.g., Jordan & Hartling, supra
note 145, at 53-55.
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Thinking about strategies of staying out of connection
[empathetically] can make a big difference in our whole attitude
and approach.  We can feel a new kind of respect and honoring–
even admiration–for some of the strategies patients have developed
even as we believe these strategies are making problems for the
patients themselves, and for the therapist. . . .
. . . [I]t is not just a question of an intellectual understanding. . . .
That is important, but the therapist must really be able to “get
with” the feeling of them.  This combination of thought and
feeling makes the difference: it allows the patient to “feel the
therapist feeling with her” so that the therapy moves.195
As discussed earlier, this perspective is remarkably similar to the
attitude toward clients that many domestic violence advocates,
feminist lawyers in domestic violence cases, and progressive child
advocates have adopted.  The authors of an excellent book on safety
planning with battered women describe their approach as follows:
[T]he response to domestic violence must be built on the premise
that women will have the opportunity to make decisions about that
response–to guide the direction and define the advocacy.  This
means advocacy that starts from the woman’s perspective,
integrates the advocate’s knowledge and resources into the
woman’s framework, and ultimately values her thoughts, feelings
opinions, and dreams–that she is the decision maker, the one who
knows best, the one with the power.  This is woman-defined
advocacy.196
Several of the recent important articles on new models of lawyering
for domestic violence cases give compelling examples of the
challenges of attending fully to the situated logic of clients’
perspectives, the positive results of respectful partnerships, and the
negative consequences of failures to engage sufficiently with the
complex emotional, political, and cultural resonances of each client’s
decision-making process.197  As Miller and Stiver argue in the therapy
context, the need to attend to the nuances of client decision-making
is often most compelling when the client’s decision-making appears
to be (and may in fact be) negatively affected by defensive strategies
                                                          
195. See MILLER & STIVER, supra note 119, at 149-50, 152 (emphasis in original).
196. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 54, at 3-4.  The remainder of the book describes
specific steps advocates can take to integrate a consciousness of their own strengths
and weaknesses, a thorough and sensitive exploration of the client’s perspective,
both as to batterer-generated risks and life-generated risks, and the need “to
integrate the advocate’s knowledge, resources and advocacy into the woman’s risk
analysis and plans.” Id. at 6.
197. For a fascinating exploration of these complexities, see, e.g., Espinoza, supra
note 47.
75
Freedman: Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumati
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2003
FREEDMAN_PKFINAL5.DOC 6/9/03  1:36 PM
642 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 11:2
the client has developed over time for dealing with various types of
adversity.198
Advocates who have developed coordinated community responses
to domestic violence have also pointed out the greater practical
efficacy of looking at the handling of domestic violence matters in
each community from a systems perspective rather than in terms of
the functioning of particular individuals.  Legal systems must be
designed to promote and reward the desired behavior of system
participants, so that appropriate responses to domestic violence do
not depend on heroic actions by individual workers.199  This is one of
several ways compassionate witnessing and coordinated community
response initiatives overlap conceptually and practically.  An
important feature of compassionate witnessing practice is that it
operates at all levels simultaneously.  This is one of the implications
of the grounding of this practice in a sense of our shared humanity.
As discussed earlier, being a compassionate witness entails bringing
these principles to every encounter, including attitudes toward
oneself, and toward people whose behavior is disconnected,
frustrating and even actively destructive.200 Thus, relational-cultural
theory, feminist and progressive thinking about lawyer-client relations
and systemic reform, and compassionate witness principles combine
to suggest the importance of curiosity, respect, patience, and
kindness in efforts to change the legal system.  Indeed, what is
needed is the capacity to combine a passion for delivering on the
promise of safety for victims, accountability of batterers and
opportunities for restorative justice, with an equal commitment to
attend carefully to the history, culture and internal logic of current
practices and structures, open to learning what sustains them, what
can and must be preserved, and what patterns, though honorably
established, are no longer constructive, and need to be changed.
3.  The Eighth and Ninth Components of Compassionate Witnessing:
Creating Community and Confronting the Unknown
In light of the resilience and logic of traditional patterns, how
                                                          
198. For example, Espinoza discusses difficulties and ethical blind spots she and a
clinic student, operating as a lawyering team, experienced in dealing with a client
whose choices were informed by circumstances, world views and concerns that were
unfamiliar and uncomfortable for the lawyers, and some of which therefore weren’t
even discussed until after the representation was concluded. Id. at 912, 919-22, 928-
30.
199. See COORDINATING COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LESSONS
FROM DULUTH AND BEYOND 37-40 (Melanie F. Shepard & Ellen L. Pence eds., 1999).
200. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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realistic is the suggestion of implementing compassionate witnessing
within the legal system?  This Article introduced the concept of
compassionate witnessing only after an extensive survey of the
negative consequences of legal system failures, and the many
obstacles to making change through more conventional means.  The
implicit premise is that readers—and citizens—would need a clear
grasp of how badly current systems are working to consider adopting
a new and challenging practice.201  People who are committed to
creating better legal responses to violence, coercion and abuse might
nonetheless prefer to make change using familiar tools, or at least to
have a specific and concrete plan of action toward change.  The
practice of compassionate witnessing is a novel approach in part
because the first step is not to try to change anything, but simply to
be present with reality, including aspects of reality that seem very
painful.  Being a witness starts with witnessing (by not surrendering
to) our own deep desires to turn away from that reality or to
transform it into something that is easier to bear.  The notion is that
actions, when they come, will be different because they are not driven
by our anxiety and distress.  For most people, this is likely to be a big
change in perspective.  Taking action as quickly as possible, without
time for reflection—whether by turning away or by intervening in the
situation—is one of the most common strategies people employ to
avoid recognizing their own anxiety and their experiences of
secondary traumatic stress.  At least initially, therefore, many people
may have negative reactions to this model.
Even for people who feel some attraction to this new concept, the
idea of using compassionate witnessing to shape policy and legal and
judicial practice may sound radical and either foolishly idealistic or
painfully out of reach.202  Again, an extrapolation from Herman’s
suggestions for therapists may be illuminating.  Here is her
description of the perspective that allows therapists (and by
extension, others) to engage successfully in facilitating recovery from
trauma:
Integrity is the capacity to affirm the value of life in the face of
death, to be reconciled with the finite limits of one’s own life and
the tragic limitations of the human condition, and to accept these
realities without despair.  Integrity is the foundation upon which
trust in relationships is originally formed, and upon which
                                                          
201. Such a new practice would require roots in psychology, a discipline that is
unfamiliar and not always well understood by (or attractive to) people who have
chosen to be lawyers and judges.  See supra note 138 and accompanying text, and
note 162.
202. Which may actually come down to the same thing.
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shattered trust may be restored.  The interlocking of integrity and
trust in caretaking relationships completes the cycle of generations
and regenerates the sense of human community which trauma
destroys.203
The first sentence is powerful and challenging, because it links
integrity to the acceptance of very painful realities both in each of
our lives individually and that we share with all human beings.  The
premise of Herman’s work and of this Article is that responding to
trauma depends at its core on being committed to staying in reality,
no matter how distressing or painful.204  This is a challenge for both
individuals and for the systems they create.  When participants in the
legal system (or any other bystanders to trauma) are caught up in the
drama of trying to work with trauma without acknowledging their
own pain, these individuals cannot operate, at least at that moment,
with the integrity of which they are capable at other times.  When
many of the system’s participants are caught up in this drama, the
integrity of the system as a whole will be seriously compromised.  At
moments, or in circumstances, when integrity is compromised, both
other legal personnel and clients or litigants who are turning to those
individuals or systems for assistance will experience distress.  When
the legal personnel, clients or litigants have themselves been severely
traumatized by past experiences of violation, these moments of
distress are likely to trigger a wide variety of painful reactions, and
ratchet up the anxiety and distress they are experiencing to perhaps
intolerable levels.  It is this sense in which trauma is said to be
contagious.205
Great courage is required to move toward integrity.  It is not a
simple matter for anyone to begin to recognize how, under the stress
of the painful material we encounter, and because we do not have
adequate support systems, we become caught up in our own
reactivity.  When we are overwhelmed, we blame and judge victims,
abusers, other participants in the legal system, legislators and society
for their (and our) human limitations in the face of violence, strong
emotions, pain, suffering and great need.  We cannot tolerate either
                                                          
203. HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 154.
204. Or more accurately, to create the intention to be in reality, and stick with the
effort as one experiences distress, contracts into denial and illusion, and eventually
finds one’s way into a more expansive understanding that can accommodate one’s
feelings of distress without panic.
205. See HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 140.  For a compelling analysis of
secondary traumatic stress at the institutional level, see Don R. Catherall, Preventing
Institutional Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder, in COMPASSION FATIGUE: COPING WITH
SECONDARY TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN THOSE WHO TREAT THE TRAUMATIZED 232-
40 (Charles R. Figley ed., 1995).
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our own suffering and limitations or the suffering and limitations of
others around us.
One of the dangers of work with trauma is that, if we become
overwhelmed, we will forget to inquire into the distortions in our
thinking that both direct and secondary traumatic stress creates.  Our
pain is real, but some of its causes may be in our thinking about
reality, rather than in reality.  For example, in Herman’s definition of
integrity,206 the limitations of human existence are referred to as
“tragic.”  The limitations to which she refers are real.  Bodies become
sick and die; our physical strength and mental capacities are limited
even when we are in good health; there is much about life that is
beyond our understanding.  Moreover, human beings have great
creative and destructive powers, and are capable of terrible atrocities.
Recognizing the pain that destructive behavior can and does cause
ourselves and others is a critical step in human development.  When
we lack this awareness, we are dangerous to ourselves and others.
Compassionate witnessing reminds us that we are all dangerous in
this way at least some of the time.  Indeed, being caught up in our
own reactivity, and therefore out of touch with reality, creates a
danger of harm to ourselves and others.  The word “tragic” aptly
describes these destructive effects of human unconsciousness.
At the same time, labeling human limitations as “tragic” can also
have pitfalls, if we confuse the map with the territory,207 and do not
continue our inquiry.  Any limitation, or for that matter, any action,
no matter how tragic, is never only tragic.  Destruction and creation
are always present.  Inquiry leads us to recognize that what seems
tragic from one perspective is always also simply part of what is—like
the fact that, unaided, humans cannot fly or live underwater.  Human
beings have an innate capacity to treat limitations, whatever their
origins, as a source of inspiration.  The work of healing allows people
to move from mourning a tragedy to reconnection, which is a process
of finding the creative possibilities in what had previously seemed
only tragic and a reason for despair.  The polarized thinking to which
we are all subject, and which interpersonal trauma brings to the fore
for all of us, needs to be the subject of active inquiry, lest it obscure
promising avenues for change.  With inquiry, we are able to move
from a dualistic and categorical perspective, in which destruction and
creation are sharply delineated and separate from each other, to a
                                                          
206. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
207. This phrase from the work of Milton Erickson reminds us that the words,
names and categories we use are not themselves reality, but rather only tools to
communicate and interact with each other.
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nondualistic perspective, which is more fluid and open-textured.
Judith Herman’s definition of integrity uses the word “tragic” in this
nondualistic way, when she links the mature capacity to accept
human limitations with the work of healing from trauma, and speaks
of the possibility of affirming life in the face of death.
Thus, promoting a capacity for inquiry is a critical requirement for
improving legal system responses to domestic violence.  Supportive
communities of compassionate witnesses, committed to self-care, can,
through inquiry, restore a capacity for integrity both to individual
lawyers, advocates and judges and to the legal system as a whole.208
One of the first subjects of inquiry may be our belief that creating
such communities will necessarily be difficult or even impossible.
As discussed earlier, building interdisciplinary communities of
support has already begun in many localities, often aided by national
organizations, private foundations, universities and the state and
federal governments.209  One critical need is for efforts to restore the
social safety net, including in particular a funding base and
organizational structure for supportive social service and mental
health services and programs.210  Domestic violence and child
maltreatment cases place tremendous demands on professionals who
work with families and children.  Since the funding, training, and
programs are not there, the professionals who remain are also
stressed because they are underpaid and overworked, leading to high
turnover and flight from these occupations.  Screening and outreach
for domestic violence and child maltreatment, provision of treatment
services, and professionals’ capacity to serve as compassionate
witnesses for clients are among the resources that are needed and
currently in extremely short supply.  The strain on these supportive
services also has obvious implications for the possibility of
undertaking interdisciplinary collaborations to support
compassionate witnessing in the legal system.
Strengthening our conscious awareness that the work in which
                                                          
208. At the level of individual institutions, Catherall suggests steps needed to
implement a secondary traumatic stress prevention program, including careful
planning; opportunities for workers to normalize and better understand their
reactions, and have a safe environment in which to share and work their reactions
through; and steps to facilitate healthy mechanisms for coping with stress in general.
Catherall, supra note 205, at 240-46.
209. See supra  note 185 and accompanying text.
210. Making these resources available appears inconsistent with present trends
toward concentrating increasingly limited mental health resources on
pharmacological and biochemical interventions and very short-term therapies.
GROVES, supra note 8, at 129-32.  Similarly, the financing of health care may turn out
to be a critical issue, as well as the associated shortage of nurses.
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both care-giving professionals and the legal system are engaged is the
work of responding to atrocities with inquiry, truth-telling, restorative
justice and peacemaking may lead to the kinds of energized and
widespread activism that will in turn make possible the fundamental
changes in collective understanding and resource allocation that are
called for.  The paradox is that our attitudes and our practices can
only be changed in concert with each other.
The Appendix lists resources that can serve as starting points in
efforts to find support and create community both on an individual,
local, or professional level and more broadly.  In addition, there are
increasing links between work in the United States and
internationally on women’s and children’s rights to equality and
justice, including freedom from violence, abuse and intimidation.  As
discussed in Liz Schneider’s book, this work is carried out both in
explicitly feminist terms and in the context of human rights,
restorative justice and other peacemaking work, and has enormous
transformative potential.211  For example, the work of commissions on
truth and reconciliation in South Africa and other countries is
instructive and inspiring to anyone interested in using compassionate
witnessing perspectives to inform systemic change efforts.212
There are at present deep political divisions both within the United
States and internationally, which include major disagreements about
the nature, source and solution of domestic and global problems.  At
the same time, all sides in contemporary political discourse—and
most people in the world, whether or not they are politically active—
tend to think our individual and collective happiness and well-being
depend to a large extent on making significant changes in the world
around us.  When such changes seem unlikely, most of us respond
with anger and despair, and many of us are inclined to put those
feelings into action.  The alternative is to change our thinking to be
able to respond with kindness and integrity to people around us,
whatever they are doing or thinking at the moment.213  When we
think the world around us must change in order for us to practice
kindness, we adopt what might be called a politics of disconnection.214
                                                          
211. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 15, at 53-56.
212. A Black psychologist appointed to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission has written a compelling account of her work as a compassionate
witness with Eugene de Kock, a former colonel in the South African police force,
who led a counterterrorism unit that tortured and killed Black activists during the
apartheid years.  PUMLA GOBODO-MADIKIZELA, A HUMAN BEING DIED THAT NIGHT: A
SOUTH AFRICAN STORY OF FORGIVENESS (2003).  See also Rachel L. Swarns, Looking for
Hope in an Apartheid Monster’s Eyes, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2003, at A1.
213. See infra app. for works expressing this perspective.
214. Note, however, that the practice of compassionate witnessing includes being
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Our wish to know the future before we commit ourselves to living in
the present explains some of the difficulty we have in creating and
maintaining systems capable of meeting basic human needs for
significant parts of the population, or coming together to address
pressing social problems either domestically or globally.  Perhaps the
most pressing of these problems are self-reinforcing patterns of
violence and domination that seem to many people to be a necessary
feature of human life on the planet.  The challenge is for people who
see the possibility of a different politics to subject our own thinking to
inquiry, and to discover immediately that deep connection is always
available, when before we believed that we were living in a society that
was somehow irreversibly committed to disconnection and denial.
What do lawyers and judges bring to this challenge of self-inquiry?
Many people choose the legal profession in order to develop the
capacity for intellectual analysis, or to seek personal power, both of
which may have as a subtext the hope of thereby thinking our way out
of feelings of vulnerability we perceive as intolerable and tragic.215
Lawyers, like many professionals, are trained simultaneously in the
arts of connection and disconnection.  While the dominant emphasis
appears to be the pursuit of material gain, at a deeper level, people
also become lawyers to help create a legal system governed by justice
and mercy and to make possible the social connections human beings
need to flourish.  Both levels are resources in creating a system with
integrity.  Maturity for lawyers and judges, as for all adults, consists in
being able to let go some of the sense of difference and specialness
we rely on to shield ourselves against the need to inquire into how
our own thinking is contributing to our suffering.  Making change
depends on being able to add to our intellectual and professional
accomplishments the capacity to recognize the possibility of fully
embracing ourselves and our circumstances, including our capacities
to make change.  It is when we can do this that we can create the kind
of legal system in which we would like to be participants.
Recognizing the necessary—indeed, foundational—connections
between care and concern for ourselves and care and concern for
others is what makes it possible for us to reconcile the apparent
                                                          
aware of and willing to experience our own anger and that of others, and indeed,
maintaining relationships with ourselves and others that are sturdy enough to
encompass everything that arises in those relationships.  Anger is a valuable and
potent resource for change.  For useful discussions on point, see, e.g., LICHTENBERG,
supra note 111, at 157-59, and ROSENBERG, supra note 133, at 135-53.
215. Of course, domestic violence work, and family law more generally, evokes the
sense of personal vulnerability in particularly powerful ways, because family settings
are those in which everyone first learns about love and hate, power, authority and
vulnerability, and much else that is basic to our lives as human beings.
82
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 17
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol11/iss2/17
FREEDMAN_PKFINAL5.DOC 6/9/03  1:36 PM
2003] SECONDARY TRAUMATIC STRESS 649
dichotomies between self-interest and the well-being of others, and
find our calling, whatever it is.
Lawyers and judges who have chosen domestic violence and child
protective work (both in the private litigation and child welfare
contexts) have a particular opportunity to be compassionate toward
themselves and hence to develop the capacity for compassion toward
others, simply because lawyers and judges are themselves exposed to
the deleterious effects of secondary traumatic stress.  The need is for
each person who is able to do so to explore the possible usefulness of
this practice, and to encourage others.  When numbers build,
compassionate witnessing may take hold in one location at a time, as
there is a critical mass necessary to create a supportive community,
disseminate new norms of personal and professional conduct, and
help community members create personal support systems to
facilitate individual and collective work for change.216
One of the most difficult tasks for people who have chosen to serve
as witnesses is staying present at the hinge of possible change when
our own thinking is leading us to despair and a sense of being
overwhelmed.  The practice of compassionate witnessing opens the
heart simultaneously to the power of each moment of our lives, and
our inability to know the future.  Whenever a person feels a sense of
urgency about change needing to occur on a particular timetable
(immediately, if not sooner) or in a particular way (the way I see it),
that person is in the grip of reactivity, and in need of compassion and
support themselves.
Compassionate change agents are those who are willing to subject
their own thinking to inquiry, and to treat themselves kindly,
including at moments when reactivity takes over, as it inevitably will.
As a result of this acceptance, and a conscious commitment to doing
the best one can in each moment, compassionate witnesses can stay
engaged with everyone else, who is, of course, also working things out
for themselves as best they can (although in times of reactivity, even
the most compassionate observer may find this difficult to believe!).
Thus, the question posed at the beginning of this subsection of
whether implementing compassionate witnessing in the legal system
                                                          
216. Efforts to promote constructive change can be hampered both if direct
service is neglected in favor of novel programs promising dramatic breakthroughs,
and if direct service is funded to the exclusion of interdisciplinary collaborations and
needed support networks.  As to the latter, Professor Joan Meier reports, for
example, that funding for a conference designed to create a peer support network
for interdisciplinary domestic violence collaborations in clinical and non-clinical
settings was cut from a 1999 VAWA grant because of VAWA’s emphasis on direct
service funding.  Telephone Interview with Joan S. Meier, Professor of Law, The
George Washington University Law School (Feb. 2, 2003).
83
Freedman: Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumati
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2003
FREEDMAN_PKFINAL5.DOC 6/9/03  1:36 PM
650 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 11:2
is realistic is itself a question loaded with understandable impatience,
born of yearning to end or escape the uncertainty and perhaps
distress associated with present circumstances.217  The practice of
compassionate witnessing calls us to be kind to ourselves when we
find uncertainty difficult or impossible to tolerate, in the knowledge
that if we are kind, we will better be able to stay fully present to reality
and see where to direct our attention at the moment.218  Choosing
our steps in this way permits us to respond with integrity.  From this
perspective, compassionate witnessing is not an alternative to action,
but rather a necessary component of action.
CONCLUSION
A chapter titled “Remembrance and Mourning,” in the second half
of Judith Lewis Herman’s book, Trauma and Recovery, begins as
follows, “In the second stage of recovery, the survivor tells the story of
the trauma.  She tells it completely, in depth and in detail.  This work
of reconstruction actually transforms the traumatic memory, so that it
can be integrated into the survivor’s life story.”219  This Article argues
that the fact-finding gap in civil domestic violence proceedings
deprives victims and also everyone else—their children, perpetrators,
and bystanders—of an essential resource: a forum in which people
can tell the stories of trauma and have those stories witnessed by
others, so that the traumatic memories can be transformed and
integrated into people’s life stories, into the web of their intimate
relationships, and into the life of the society.  As one researcher put
it, “Within the community of battered women and their advocates,
the family courts have gained a reputation as a place where women
don’t find justice.”220
It is important to make the link between ascertaining the facts that
will permit the redress of individual wrongs, and the needs of the
society as a whole.  As Herman observes in discussing trauma
survivors who choose to seek formal legal redress for crimes against
them,
                                                          
217. Philip Lichtenberg suggests that change agents need to “anxiously act
assertively,” LICHTENBERG, supra note 111, at 181-90, and discusses the tendency to
see change efforts as impractical in part because we are all anxious and ambivalent
about making change, id. at 199-205.
218. If kindness to ourselves seems beyond our reach, perhaps we will be able to
remember to reach out for support, which can restore our connection to ourselves
and give us new resources for addressing whatever provoked our distress.  Under
conditions of overwhelm, reaching out for personal support is almost always the most
constructive choice available.
219. HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 174.
220. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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[The survivor] . . . recognizes . . . that holding the perpetrator
accountable for his crimes is important not only for her personal
well-being but also for the health of the larger society.  She
rediscovers an abstract principle of social justice that connects the
fate of others to her own.  When a crime has been committed, in
the words of Hannah Arendt, “The wrongdoer is brought to justice
because his act has disturbed and gravely endangered the
community as a whole. . . . It is the body politic itself that stands in
need of being repaired, and it is the general public order that has
been thrown out of gear and must be restored. . . . It is, in other
words, the law, not the plaintiff, that must prevail.”221
The concept of restorative justice brings critical depth and nuance
to efforts to understand the challenges facing the legal system and
the society in dealing with crimes, particularly those involving
intimate violence.  The reality of the human condition is that we all
share experiences of being the perpetrator, the victim and the
bystander, although in each of our lives, different strands are likely to
be more visible.  Therefore, our well-being individually and
collectively depends on our ability to treat perpetrators, victims and
bystanders with dignity and compassion.  Each of us is helped when
we can establish institutions and practices that attend humanely and
effectively to the circumstances of each person.  For both
perpetrators and victims, this means holding people accountable for
their wrongdoing, halting destructive behaviors222 and providing the
kinds of support that create genuine opportunities for change and
reconciliation.  Our legal system presently is unable to carry out the
basic tasks of fact-finding that would permit the requisite truth telling
in the presence of witnesses, moral reckoning and firm,
compassionate, supportive and effective responses to intimate
violence.
The reality we face is that unless our attitudes shift, we will
continue to be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the changes
needed for lawyers and courts to provide reliable help to perpetrators
and adult and child victims of domestic violence.  We will also
continue to believe that the wider social changes needed to make
restorative justice possible are entirely out of reach.  This Article
suggests that these challenges are simply systemic manifestations of
                                                          
221. HERMAN, RECOVERY, supra note 7, at 209-10.
222. This may include the protective use of force, including if necessary
incarceration, which should not however be confused with the punitive use of force.
Marshall Rosenberg explains the distinction as follows: “The intention behind the
protective use of force is to prevent injury or injustice.  The intention behind the
punitive use of force is to cause individuals to suffer for their perceived misdeeds.”
ROSENBERG, supra note 133, at 155-56.  See id. at 155-63 for further discussion.
85
Freedman: Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumati
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2003
FREEDMAN_PKFINAL5.DOC 6/9/03  1:36 PM
652 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 11:2
vicarious traumatization.  Jean Koh Peters observes, with regard to
lawyers who represent children in child protective proceedings that,
“[t]he lawyer who is most dedicated to trying . . . to do justice to the
client’s own experience of his or her world is also the one most likely
to find the client’s life challenges seeping into the lawyer’s own daily
functioning.”223  She continues,
A pro-active strategy of preventing the negative effects of stress and
vicarious traumatization from accumulating to a disabling level . . .
are crucial assets to the lawyer who wants . . . to continue to
perform this hard and important work. . . .
[Understanding] vicarious traumatization also frees the embattled
lawyer from time- and energy-consuming battles with shame and
low self-esteem which are misplaced in this context. 224
At a systemic level, the dismaying conditions in civil domestic
violence proceedings and dependency courts both reflect and cause
secondary traumatic stress and burnout.  Our ability to change the
conditions in our courts (and in society) likewise depends on our
ability to free ourselves from battles with shame, blame and internal
warfare, while each positive systemic change will help us step away
from attack and defense and toward more loving and constructive
relationships with ourselves and others.
The age-old practice of compassionate witnessing is gaining new
impetus in the work of many people who have dedicated themselves
to the work of peacemaking and restorative justice in the domestic
lives of men, women, and children.  People may now be ready to
make the connections between individual practice and systemic
integrity.  Recognizing that change begins with ourselves and benefits
everyone—victims, perpetrators and bystanders to domestic
violence—can energize each of us to begin creating healing
relationships, and the experiences of safety, remembrance,
mourning, reconnection and commonality which such relationships
facilitate.225  The legal system has a distinctive role in the process of
                                                          
223. PETERS, supra note 16, at § 9-6.
224. Id.
225. Philip Lichtenberg makes a similar point when he notes that
liberation psychology . . . does not call for sacrifice on the part of any activist
engaged in the liberation struggle, and it does not privilege [people in any
particular social position]. . . .  To meet as equals in the contact of dialogue
is the essence of liberation psychology.  It is the movement away from
sacrifice on the part of anyone . . . that animates the . . . commitment and
actions that are aimed at transforming systems of exploitation into systems of
cooperation among equals.
Because each of us is oriented both to change and resistance to change, we
are all available at one time or another for efforts to alter exploitative
systems. . . .  The focus of attention is upon actions that facilitate the
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preventing and healing from trauma: creating a sustained capacity for
finding facts accurately when there are allegations of violent and
coercively controlling behavior, applying governing norms fairly,
creating the conditions for due process and the respect for human
rights in the legal process, and cooperating with other social
institutions to respond effectively and humanely to the needs of
people caught up in the drama of violence and coercion and control.
Adopting the practice of compassionate witnessing ourselves has the
advantage of bringing immediate comfort.  Extending the practice to
a wider audience in the legal system is one pathway between the
difficulties of our present situation and a more hopeful future.
As the body of the Article illustrates, the intellectual underpinnings
and societal implications of the practice of compassionate witnessing
are complex, while the practice itself is both simple and profound.
In each area of small or large deficiency that we encounter, the
challenge is to mobilize human creativity to make change possible.
The holistic nature of the practice of compassionate witnessing plays
an essential role.  The desire to turn away from suffering is powerful.
Yet, as Herman points out, the force of secrecy and denial is matched
by the yearning for openness and recovery. When people practice
compassionate witnessing, there is a synergistic effect both on people
around them, and on the resources available to support change.  No
one can or needs to become a compassionate witness in isolation,
because small shifts in a new direction call forth similar impulses that
everyone shares to some degree.  Likewise, no one can or needs to
take responsibility for discerning all the steps necessary to bring
about the changes required.  We engage most deeply with reality
when we form the intention to be guided by kindness, integrity and
compassion in our work, inquire into distortions in our thinking that
cause unnecessary suffering to ourselves and others, find other like-
minded people, and proceed with caution and curiosity into the
unknown.
                                                          
dialogue of equals, whatever the source. . . .  Change depends upon  [the]
support of all who support it in whatever degree that is embraced.
LICHTENBERG, supra note 111, at xi-xii.
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APPENDIX
I. A Note on Terminology
The concept of compassionate witnessing which is explored in this
Article has roots in many traditions.  Although different terms may be
used, the array of skills, beliefs, attitudes, understandings and
patterns of behavior required for compassionate witnessing are being
taught and practiced in a number of settings.  Some of these settings,
as well as some helpful written materials, are listed below.  Readers
interested in exploring this practice further are encouraged to attend
to common threads and significant variations in work that is being
done, and not to place undue emphasis on terminology as a method
of identifying similarities and differences.
Note also that the concepts of compassion and witness are
sometimes imbued with specific theological or sectarian associations.
For a history of the Greek, Hebrew and Christian concepts of witness
as these are reflected in the Old and New Testaments, including the
relationship of these concepts to legal proceedings and to theological
debates within the Christian tradition, see Allison A. Trites, The New
Testament Concept of Witness (1977).
II. Selected Bibliography and Websites
A. Of General Interest
o DAVID BRANDON, ZEN IN THE ART OF HELPING (1976).
o BETSY MCALISTER GROVES, CHILDREN WHO SEE TOO MUCH:
LESSONS FROM THE CHILD WITNESS TO VIOLENCE PROJECT
(2002).
o JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY (1992).
o BYRON KATIE & STEPHEN MITCHELL, LOVING WHAT IS
(2002).
o PHILIP LICHTENBERG, COMMUNITY AND CONFLUENCE:
UNDOING THE CLINCH OF OPPRESSION (2d ed. 1994).
o PHILIP LICHTENBERG ET AL., ENCOUNTERING BIGOTRY:
BEFRIENDING PROJECTING PERSONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(1997).
o MARSHALL B. ROSENBERG, NONVIOLENT COMMUNICATION:
A LANGUAGE OF COMPASSION (1999), and the CENTER FOR
NONVIOLENT COMMUNICATION at http://www.cnvc.org.
o THEODORE ISAAC RUBIN, COMPASSION AND SELF-HATE
(1975).
B. Traumatic Stress Studies and Psychology
o COMPASSION FATIGUE, COPING WITH SECONDARY
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TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN THOSE WHO TREAT THE
TRAUMATIZED (Charles R. Figley ed. 1995).
o CONSTANCE DAHLENBERG, COUNTERTRANSFERENCE AND
THE TREATMENT OF TRAUMA (2000).
o JEAN BAKER MILLER & IRENE PIERCE STIVER, THE HEALING
CONNECTION: HOW WOMEN FORM RELATIONSHIPS IN
THERAPY AND IN LIFE (1997).
o JEAN BAKER MILLER TRAINING INSTITUTE at the WELLESLEY
CENTERS FOR WOMEN, at http://www.JBTMI.org or
http://www.wcwonline.org.
o LAURIE A. PEARLMAN & KAREN W. SAAKVITNE, TRAUMA AND
THE THERAPIST: COUNTERTRANSFERENCE AND VICARIOUS
TRAUMATIZATION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY WITH INCEST
SURVIVORS (1995).
o THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR TRAUMATIC STRESS
STUDIES at http://www.istss.org.
C. Legal Resources
1. A useful overview
Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the
Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259 (1999).  Silver
observes:
[M]any writers have attempted to educate the bar and the academy
about the importance of understanding the operation of the
unconscious on the practice of law.  Yet most of this literature
appears to be largely unknown outside of a small community with a
particular interest in or inclination towards psychology.
Id. at 289.  Nonetheless, Silver concludes there is reason for
optimism, both because of the “movement towards mainstreaming
public discourse about mental and emotional illness . . . [and] a
convergence of several threads of scholarship that focus on bringing
humanism to bear on the lawyer/client relationship.”  Id.  Among the
threads Silver discusses are Therapeutic Jurisdprudence, affective
lawyering, lawyering with an “ethic of care” and Creative Problem
Solving.  Id. at 293-95.  More recently, the term “Comprehensive Law
Movement” has been used as an umbrella term for the approaches
Silver describes and several others, including the Collaborative
Lawyering Movement.  See, e.g., the eponymous panel at the American
Association of American Law Schools’ Annual Meeting Workshop on
Dispute Resolution: Raising the Bar and Enlarging the Canon,
January 3, 2003.
2. Books
o ELIZABETH DVORKIN ET AL., BECOMING A LAWYER: A
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HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONALISM (1981).
o JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD
PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL
DIMENSIONS (1997) and the 1999 CUMULATIVE
SUPPLEMENT.
3. Additional Law Review Articles
o Susan Bryant & Maria Arias, Case Study: A Battered Women’s
Rights Clinic: Designing a Clinical Program Which Encourages a
Problem-Solving Vision of Lawyering that Empowers Clients and
Community, 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 207 (1992).
o Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives:
The Invisibility and Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 901, 921-27 (1997).
o Rhoda Feinberg & James Tom Greene, Transference and
Countertransferences Issues in Professional Relationships, 29 FAM.
L.Q. 111, 114 (1995).
o Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors
as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search of Access,
Connection and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071 (1995).
o Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating
Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in
Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295 (1993).
o Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: A New Job Description for
the Battered Women’s Prosecutor and Other More Modest
Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 183 (1997).
o Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering
for Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1225 (1996).
o Kimberly E. O’Leary, Creating Partnerships: Using Feminist
Techniques to Enhance the Attorney-Client Relationship, 16
LEGAL STUD. F. 207 (1992).
o Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the
Relationship Between Lawyer and Client: Representing Women
Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1025-26
(1997).
90
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 17
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol11/iss2/17
